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Abstract
This thesis argues for a novel conception of political realism as a theory of political le-
gitimacy: the Dual Convergent Conception. The thesis is framed by the thought that
one way of theorising about political legitimacy involves working out how reasonable
people can achieve a stable political order so that, despite their profound moral differ-
ences, they may live together governed by principles they have sufficient moral reason
to affirm from within their own point of view. I argue that this ultimately involves
making a special sort of argument that takes reasonable disagreement about justice se-
riously: a Disagreement to Legitimacy argument. This is an argument with two parts.
The first part involves finding the best explanation of reasonable disagreement about
justice. After arguing against all extant explanations of reasonable disagreement, I de-
velop a novel explanation: Diverse Packages Theory. This explanation makes use of
the idea of metalinguistic negotiation and empirical work in developmental psychol-
ogy on concepts, to argue that the best explanation of reasonable disagreement about
justice is that reasonable people possess and use diverse concepts and conceptions
of justice. The second part of the Disagreement to Legitimacy argument involves
proposing, on the basis of Diverse Packages Theory’s explanation, how all reasonable
people can have sufficient moral reason to coordinate and continue coordinating over
time on coercive principles or rules that order society’s basic institutions. I then argue
that extant conceptions of political liberalism and political realism cannot show how
reasonable people can achieve this. I then argue that by combining certain elements
of the political liberal view of convergent agreements, and the political realist focus
on a contextually situated acceptance of coercively enforced political principles, the
Dual Convergent Conception of political realism can show how reasonable people
can achieve a stable political order.
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Chapter 1
From Disagreement to Political
Legitimacy
1 Introduction
Let me start this thesis where I hope to end it. At the end of A Theory of Justice,
in describing the kind of perspective that he has tried to adopt in his arguments and
which give them their normative force, Rawls (1999: 514) says:
The perspective of eternity is not a perspective from a certain place be-
yond the world, nor the point of view of a transcendent being; rather it
is a certain form of thought and feeling that rational persons can adopt
within the world. And having done so, they can, whatever their gen-
eration, bring together into one scheme all individual perspectives and
arrive together at regulative principles that can be affirmed by everyone
as he lives by them, each from his own standpoint. Purity of heart, if
one could attain it, would be to see clearly and to act with grace and
self-command from this point of view.
What Rawls sums up there and continues in Political Liberalism is doing political phi-
losophy in a way that tells us how we ought to act from the “perspective of eternity”.
In A Theory of Justice this perspective involves bringing together people pursuing
diverse conceptions of the good life (or as he calls them “rational plans of life”) and
crafting a conception of justice that allows them to live together in a stable political
order. In Political Liberalism, or at least in one part of the book’s project, this per-
spective is expanded to diverse conceptions of justice itself (or as he calls them “com-
prehensive doctrines”) and crafting the grounds of a legitimate conception of justice.
That is where this thesis begins, with the perspective of eternity involving reasonable
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disagreement about justice itself. This is because of the simple fact that everywhere
we look in society reasonable people disagree not merely about what is good for them,
but also about what is ultimately good for other people, for society, and how this can
be rightfully achieved. Or in other words, they disagree about justice itself. This in-
volves doing political philosophy in a way that takes seriously, as Charles Larmore
(2013: 295) says, “the modern realization that reasonable people tend naturally to dis-
agree about fundamental aspects of the right and the good”.
As it was for Rawls, when we move to taking reasonable disagreement about jus-
tice seriously, we move from theorising about justice alone to theorising about polit-
ical legitimacy. The goal being to show how we can achieve a stable political order so
that people with profound moral differences may live together governed by principles
they can all affirm from within their own point of view and not, as Rawls (2005: lx)
says, “be governed by power and coercion alone”. That is what this thesis is about. It
is devoted to arguing for a theory of political legitimacy that takes reasonable disagree-
ment about justice seriously. This is a theory that tells us which political principles or
rules that are coercively enforced reasonable people have sufficient moral reason to
coordinate on.1 This will tell us how reasonable people can achieve a stable political
order.
For Rawls and his followers, the theory of political legitimacy that achieves all
this is a conception of political liberalism. In short, that a political principle or rule
is legitimate if all reasonable people conclusively justify endorsing it. This sort of free
endorsement is what, according to political liberals, can achieve a stable political order
where people with profound moral differences can live together by political principles
or rules they call affirm from within their own point of view.
In this thesis I argue political liberalism is wrong about what constitutes a stable
political order. I argue that we ought to embrace a conception of political realism. In
short, that a political principle is legitimate if all reasonable people conclusively justify
accepting it in a given context. This sort of contextually situated acceptance is what,
according to political realists, can achieve a stable political order.
But, I will argue that extant conceptions of political realism, just like political
liberalism, also cannot achieve a stable political order. Given that, I propose a novel
conception of political realism: the Dual Convergent Conception. The key idea being
that political realism involves a state of affairs of ‘ordered moral warfare’. This is a state
of affairs where all reasonable people can accept a political principle or rule and yet be
1Throughout this thesis I will take the object of political legitimacy to be a “political principle or
rule” because it is a neutral way of describing what various theorists seek to legitimate. Whether those
principles and rules are part of a ‘theory’ or merely laws will be left to competing theorists to specify.
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able to advocate for their ideal political principles or rules and tolerate others doing so
as well. And, crucially that this is not a modus vivendi where two disagreeing parties
refrain from coercing the other for prudential reasons.
The main argument for the Dual Convergent Conception will be that it, as op-
posed to its competitors, actually takes reasonable disagreement about justice seri-
ously. I will argue that it responds better than its competitors to what the best ex-
planation of reasonable disagreement about justice tells us actually causes such dis-
agreement. This will show, I submit, that the Dual Convergent Conception does bet-
ter than its competitors, at showing how reasonable people, despite their reasonable
disagreements, can achieve a stable political order. This is because it is better than
its competitors at showing which political principles or rules that are coercively en-
forced all reasonable people have sufficient moral reason to coordinate on. As such,
much of this thesis will involve showing how, in light of what I will argue is the best
explanation of reasonable disagreement about justice, theories of political legitimacy
either succeed or fail at dealing with what causes reasonable disagreement about jus-
tice whilst not violating some moral fixed points about the use of coercive power and
the kind of stable political order we require.
Given all that, the goal of this chapter is to clear the ground for making the argu-
ment for the Dual Convergent Conception. To that end I settle the details of what it
means to argue for a theory of political legitimacy that takes reasonable disagreement
about justice seriously and how this sets the trajectory of the rest of the thesis. The ar-
gument of this chapter then proceeds as follows. In §2 I settle the details of what I will
take political legitimacy to be and propose that theorising about political legitimacy
involves making a special sort of argument: a Disagreement to Legitimacy argument.
I then consider and respond to two objections to Disagreement to Legitimacy argu-
ments. In §3 I tease out the methodological implications of theorising about political
legitimacy in this way and how it will determine the trajectory of my argument for
the Dual Convergent Conception. Finally in §4 I detail the road ahead and how this
thesis will proceed.
2 Theorising about Political Legitimacy
In this section I lay out the methodology of this thesis. I clarify the idea of political
legitimacy, describe what it means to theorise about it in terms of Disagreement to
Legitimacy arguments, and why making such an argument is the core of this thesis.
In §2.1 I clarify how I understand political legitimacy to involve reasonable people
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having sufficient moral reason to coordinate on a political principle or rule that is co-
ercively enforced. I argue that it involves both the justification of political authority
and the use of coercive power. This is because only a theory that includes both notions
can show us how to achieve a stable political order. In §2.2 I argue that we ought to
conceive of theorising about political legitimacy as making Disagreement to Legiti-
macy arguments. This is because it clarifies the formal features of a project that takes
reasonable disagreement about justice seriously and so provides a clear methodologi-
cal framework in which different theories of political legitimacy can be evaluated. In
§§2.3–2.4 I consider two objections that might be raised against Disagreement to Le-
gitimacy arguments. First, I consider the objection that my characterisation of a Dis-
agreement to Legitimacy arguments does not square with those who I claim make
such arguments. Second, I consider the objection that whatever Disagreements to
Legitimacy arguments do, they cannot involve arguing for a theory of political legit-
imacy. This is because fundamental normative principles are fact-insensitive and the
whole point of a Disagreement to Legitimacy argument involves normative theories
being sensitive to the fact of reasonable disagreement. I respond to both objections in
turn and defend Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments as a way of theorising about
political legitimacy.
2.1 What is Political Legitimacy?
As I have said, this thesis is about arguing for a theory of political legitimacy. But,
before I can explain what it means to do such a thing, we need to get clear on what
political legitimacy is. In short, what does it mean to say that a political principle or
rule is legitimate? So far I have talked of political legitimacy in general terms. I have
said that it involves reasonable people having sufficient moral reason to coordinate on
a political principle or rule that is coercively enforced. Let me now be more specific
about what that means.
I take “reasonable people having sufficient moral reason to coordinate on a polit-
ical principle or rule that is coercively enforced” to mean the justification of political
authority and the justification of coercion. An example of the first justification is the
justification of principles or rules that describe what justice requires. This justifica-
tion establishes the authority of these political principles or rules which means they
are principles or rules that people ought to obey. An example of the second justifica-
tion is the justification of the use of coercive power to enforce the principles or rules.
This justification establishes the permissibility of using coercive power to enforce po-
litical principles or rules. These dual justifications are then cashed out more simply as
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reasonable people having sufficient moral reason to coordinate on a political principle
or rule that is coercively enforced. A moral reason here is a reason that reasonable peo-
ple see as a moral reason from their point of view. These are reasons that they see as
having the type of normativity that makes coercively enforced political principles or
rules authoritative. A theory of political legitimacy then explains the existence condi-
tions of reasonable people having sufficient moral reason. It explains how reasonable
people, despite their disagreements about justice, can have sufficient moral reason to
coordinate on a political principle or rule that is coercively enforced.
Now this might strike some readers as odd. If political legitimacy is about justify-
ing the authority of a political principle or rule, why do we need any mention of coer-
cion? Conversely, if political legitimacy is about justifying the coercion to enforce a
political principle or rule, why do we need any mention of authority? To answer both
questions, and to explain why I use the idea of political legitimacy above, let me clear
the ground by considering two popular ways of thinking about political legitimacy.
On one way of thinking about political legitimacy it involves justifying political
authority (Raz 2006, 1986; Bird 2014; Simmons 2001; Edmundson 1998; Green 1988).
It involves justifying a political principle or rule about what individuals, social insti-
tutions and social systems ought to do and what they owe to each other. In short,
establishing that the political principle or rule is authoritative. Here political legiti-
macy does not involve justifying the use of coercive power or any notion of coercion
at all. It involves justifying a political principle or rule, that may or may not be en-
forced by coercion, as a political principle or rule that ought to be obeyed.
On this view, a theory of political legitimacy that takes reasonable disagreement
about justice seriously responds to the fact that reasonable people each claim moral
authority over one another. This is because they view the political principle or rule
they propose as an expression of what justice requires. A theory of political legitimacy
then justifies whose political principle or rule is the one that reasonable people ought
to obey. This means, explaining why reasonable people have sufficient moral reason
to coordinate on a particular political principle or rule over another. The underlying
idea is that political legitimacy is not about justifying coercion. It is about justifying
political authority.
But, on another way of thinking about political legitimacy it involves justifying
the use of coercive power (Rawls 2005; Ripstein 2004; Buchanan 2002; Nagel 1991,
1987). Here political legitimacy here is not about establishing a political principle or
rule as authoritative. Rather political legitimacy is about justifying the use of coercive
power to enforce a particular political principle or rule.
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On this view, a theory of political legitimacy that takes reasonable disagreement
about justice seriously responds to the fact that reasonable people aim to use coer-
cive power against each other to enforce the political principles or rules they see as
expressions of what justice requires. What needs to be established is whose use of co-
ercive power is morally permissible. The theory then explains what justifies the use
of coercive power to enforce a political principle or rule. The underlying idea is that,
political legitimacy is not about justifying a political principle or rule as authoritative,
but about justifying the use of coercive power to enforce it.
Rather than trying to argue that one of those views of political legitimacy is the
correct one, I follow Thomas Christiano (2009: 240–243) and others in taking a
broader view of political legitimacy that incorporates both views.2 The idea being that
political legitimacy is about the justification of a political principle or rule as authorita-
tive and the justification of the use of coercive power to enforce that political principle
or rule. This amounts to the idea that political legitimacy involves justifying both the
moral authority of a political principle or rule and the use of coercive power to enforce
that particular political principle or rule. Both justifications together amount to rea-
sonable people having sufficient moral reason to coordinate on a political principle
or rule that is coercively enforced.
The reason for adopting this broader view of political legitimacy is that only a
theory that involves this view can fulfil its function of showing reasonable people
how to achieve a stable political order. To see why, consider what I said the point of
this thesis was. It was to argue for a theory of political legitimacy that takes reasonable
disagreement justice seriously. In such a situation reasonable people disagree about
the political principles or rules that should order a society so people can pursue their
conceptions of the good life and resolve claim disputes. That is after all the function
of justice.3 As such, the point of a theory of political legitimacy is to describe how
reasonable people who disagree about justice can live together in a shared social world
by explaining which political principles and rules that order a society can be justified
to them and continued to be justified to them over time.
This means, if political legitimacy was only about justifying the moral authority
2See Gaus (2011b: 460–470) for another example of a theory of political legitimacy that incorpo-
rates both aspects. Strictly speaking Christiano lists three aspects of political legitimacy with the cre-
ation of duties owed to the state being separate from the creation of duties owed between individuals.
For the purposes of this thesis nothing hangs on this distinction. A conception of justice and even
specific laws can do both.
3Rawls (1999: 5–6, 9) is perhaps the most prominent contemporary example of this way of viewing
justice, but many theorists – too many to mention here – have viewed justice in the same way. See
Schoelandt (2020) for a detailed overview.
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of a political principle or rule, the theory would not be able to say anything about the
moral permissibility of the coercion needed to enforce the political principle or rule
so it actually fulfils its function of ordering a society. It would not actually be able
to show why it is morally permissible to use coercive power against reasonable peo-
ple acting in ways they have insufficient moral reason to act, or against unreasonable
people acting for non-moral reasons. It would merely explain why reasonable people
ought to coordinate on a particular political principle or rule and not another. With-
out saying anything about the moral permissibility of coercively enforcing a political
principle or rule, the theory would be unable to show how to achieve a stable political
order amongst the unreasonable or immoral reasonable people who do not obey the
political principle of rule.
On the other hand, if political legitimacy was only about justifying the use of co-
ercive power that enforces a political principle or rule, the theory would say nothing
about why that political principle or rule in particular ought to be enforced. This
would mean a theory of political legitimacy would not actually be able to show why
reasonable people ought to coordinate on a particular political principle or rule, when
they disagree about which political principles and rules are morally authoritative.
Such a theory would merely justify the de facto authority of a political principle or
rule that is effective in using coercion to achieve a stable political order. Without any
appeal to reasonable people’s moral reasons, or more precisely what they each see as
moral reasons from their point of view, to obey a political principle or rule, a theory
of political legitimacy would be unable to show how to achieve a stable political or-
der amongst reasonable people. It would be unable to show why reasonable people
ought not violently resist the authority. Rather, it would describe an oppressive order
that reasonable people are justified in resisting.
To that end, any theory of political legitimacy that aims to take reasonable dis-
agreement about justice seriously requires the broader view of political legitimacy I
have outlined. It requires the view that political legitimacy is about both justifying
political authority and the use of coercive power. In short, it involves reasonable peo-
ple having sufficient moral reason to coordinate on a political principle or rule that is
coercively enforced.
2.2 Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments
Having settled what political legitimacy is, we are now in a position to see what it
means to theorise about political legitimacy. That is, what it means to argue for a the-
ory of political legitimacy that takes reasonable disagreement about justice seriously
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and help us achieve a stable political order. I have said that it involves a special sort
of argument: a Disagreement to Legitimacy argument. Disagreement to Legitimacy
arguments, as the name would suggest, are arguments that take disagreement as their
premise and conclude with a theory of political legitimacy. To see what that means
and what is distinctive about it, I propose the structure of a Disagreement to Legiti-
macy argument is as follows:
P1: Coordination on some political principle or rule that orders society
is necessary for reasonable people to pursue their conceptions of
the good life and resolve claim disputes.
P2: Reasonable people disagree about justice.
P3: Coercive coordination on a political principle or rule that ignores
reasonable disagreement about justice is oppressive and gives peo-
ple sufficient reason to violently resist.
P4: Some theory Y is the best explanation of reasonable disagreement
about justice.
C : Given theory Y, the correct theory of political legitimacy is X.
Before unpacking the premises of the argument, I want to note that the argu-
ment is not strictly a deductive argument. It is an argument that reflects a process of
reflective equilibrium where the conclusion is taking to be in equilibrium (ie. coher-
ent) with the four premises. This means our evaluation of the conclusion should be
a judgement about whether a particular theory of political legitimacy is actually in
equilibrium with the array of considered judgements and social facts that make up
the premises and not whether it is strictly derivable from the four premises.
The most important part of a Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments is its first
three premises because they collectively establish a problem: the problem of norma-
tive instability.4 The problem of normative instability is that when the facts in the
first three premises hold, reasonable people do not have sufficient moral reason to
coordinate, or maintain coordinating on a political principle or rule and they cannot
achieve a stable political order when they desperately need to. In both cases, society
4I use the label “problem of normative instability” to group together similar and related problems
that others like Gerald Gaus (2011b: 22–23, 261, 2011a: 306), Jonathan Quong (2011: 40), and Matt
Sleat (2013: 74) have referred to as the, “two puzzles of moral authority”, “problem of justificatory
instability”, “The Justificatory Problem”, “the puzzle of how legitimate political principles are possi-
ble in light of the fact of reasonable pluralism”, and the “problem of not taking pluralism seriously
enough” respectively.
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will be disordered because either there is no way to resolve claim disputes between
reasonable people and their conflicting conceptions of the good life, or a political
principle or rule is insufficiently justified so they have reason to violently resist.
The fourth premise and the conclusion of Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments
collectively propose a solution to the problem of normative instability. The solution
begins by working out why reasonable disagreement about justice – the source of
normative instability – occurs and then proposing why in virtue of that, a particu-
lar theory of political legitimacy can solve the problem of normative instability. The
solution then involves two parts. The first is the explanation of reasonable disagree-
ment about justice because it describes what causes the problem of normative insta-
bility. Given reasonable disagreement about justice is merely a species of reasonable
disagreement generally, and no theorist typically seeks to explain reasonable disagree-
ment about justice in particular, the theories cited in this first part will typically be of
reasonable disagreements in general or at least of any moral and political topic. These
will then serve as the best explanations of reasonable disagreement about justice.
The second part of the solution is the theory of political legitimacy which is pro-
posed as the correct normative response to the forces causing the problem of norma-
tive instability. On this view the theory of political legitimacy is best thought of as
showing how it is possible, but not of course guaranteed, for reasonable people to
achieve a stable political order. It is a point in general and wide reflective equilibrium
coherent with the considered judgements implicit in the four premises.
But, why should we conceive of theorising about political legitimacy in this way?
I propose two reasons. The first and most important reason is that Disagreement to
Legitimacy arguments provide a clear framework for evaluating theories of political
legitimacy fairly. In short, we evaluate them based on how well they solve the problem
of normative instability within two fixed points. This means we evaluate the ability of
a theory of political legitimacy to show how reasonable people’s balance of reasons can
provide and continue to provide sufficient moral reason to coordinate on a political
principle or rule. We can make this more precise by evaluating how a theory fares on
two dimensions: creating a political order and maintaining a political order.
Creating a political order is the ability of a theory to show how reasonable people
can order their social world by coordinating on a particular political principle or rule
in the face of reasonable disagreement about justice. This amounts to showing how
there can be a balance of reasons amongst reasonable people such that they all have
sufficient moral reason to coordinate on a political principle or rule.
Maintaining a political order is the ability of a theory to show how reasonable
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people can maintain the political order in the face of both continued reasonable dis-
agreement about justice, and the reasonable set of circumstances a society is likely to
face over time. This amounts to showing how reasonable people’s balance of reasons
can be maintained in such a way that they continue to have sufficient moral reason
to coordinate on a political principle or rule despite both exogenous and endogenous
forces acting on their balance of reasons.
The framework also provides two fixed points for our reflective judgements when
evaluating theories of political legitimacy across both dimensions. Theories that legiti-
mate multiple conflicting political principles or rules do not solve the problem of nor-
mative instability because they do not create a political order for the whole of society.
They result in social disunity. Also, theories that only make it possible for a society
to successfully create and maintain a balance of reasons through coercion alone do
not solve the problem of normative instability either. These would be theories where
political principles or rules are legitimated because people fear coercion and not be-
cause they have sufficient moral reason to coordinate. Their reasonable disagreements
about justice are quashed by the oppressive use of coercion. This means that the the-
ory creates order in such away that it is disposed to fall into disorder because people
always have a reason to violently resist their oppression.
These dimensions of evaluation and fixed points provide a suitably neutral way of
describing the way theories of political legitimacy can solve the problem of normative
instability even if they intend to solve it in different ways. The balance of reasons to
coordinate can be cashed out as a strategic equilibrium, or as the outcome of non-
strategic reflection on moral reasons. We need not at this stage be committed to a
particular view of how people reason, their deliberative operations or how sufficient
justification is achieved for every single reasonable person. All this will be part of any
particular theory of political legitimacy that will be evaluated as we go.
The second reason why we ought to conceive of theorising about political legiti-
macy as making Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments is that it clarifies a contempo-
rary debate between political liberalism and political realism as a first-order normative
debate about political legitimacy. Since both views claim to take reasonable disagree-
ment about justice seriously, conceiving of theorising about political legitimacy as
making Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments shows how political liberals and po-
litical realists are actually in dialogue about a first-order normative issue. They are, on
the view I have proposed, making competing Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments.
They are in a first-order normative debate about theories of political legitimacy. A
side effect of this will be that it guarantees political liberalism and political realism as
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opposed to other theories about political legitimacy feature heavily in this thesis.
The existing debate between political realists and political liberals is a fractured
one that hinges on vague generalisations and slogans about the relationship between
morality and politics. For instance, political liberals claim to show how a political
principle or rule can be justified as moral principles or moral rules and “stable for the
right reasons” (Rawls 2005; Gaus 2011b; Quong 2011). But, political realists say that
this is a form of “political moralism” that makes “the moral prior to the political”.
They claim to offer an alternative approach that “gives a greater autonomy to distinc-
tively political thought” (Williams 2005; Galston 2010; Geuss 2008; Rossi and Sleat
2014). These slogans are then interpreted in different ways.
On one interpretation, theorists see the debate about political legitimacy to ac-
tually be a methodological debate about how to do political theory. Political realists
claim political theory ought to be done with a distinct methodology, specifically, in a
“practice-dependent” or “non-ideal” way (Sangiovanni 2008; Mason 2010; Finlayson
2017; Valentini 2012; Philip 2010, 2012). Some political liberals have responded that
ideal theory can do the same job as the purported non-ideal realist theories, and that
at worst ideal and non-ideal approaches to justice and legitimacy are complimentary
(Estlund 2017; Erman and Moller 2013b, 2015a, 2016).
On another interpretation, theorists see the debate about political legitimacy to
actually be a metanormative debate about the normativity involved in political theo-
rising. Political realists claim that we ought to think of political theory as metanorma-
tively autonomous from interpersonal morality. This means that political theory has
its own distinct normativity and the normative force of political principles depends
on facts and values that are completely different to that which moral principles de-
pend on (Newey 2010; Rossi 2012; Galston 2010; Jubb 2019; Jubb and Rossi 2015a,b).
Political liberals have responded in turn that this new distinct normativity is either
functionally too similar to moral normativity in which case it isn’t clear why moral
normativity can’t play the same role, is so distinct from moral normativity it is indis-
tinguishable from instrumental normativity, or is grounded in controversial concep-
tual distinctions that are not shared by all political realists (Maynard and Worsnip
2018; Erman and Moller 2013a, 2015b, 2018).
I have no quarrel with interpreting the debate about political legitimacy between
political liberals and political realism in these ways or for theorists who think those in-
terpretations are important to carry on debating. But, I do not think these are the only
ways to interpret the debate or that the debate about political legitimacy is limited to
a methodological or metanormative debate. Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments
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allow us to interpret the debate about political legitimacy between political liberals
and political realists in a different way: as a first-order normative debate about the
sufficient conditions for political legitimacy.5 This is because Disagreement to Legiti-
macy arguments show how political liberals and political realists can have a common
methodology and a common, or neutral, metanormative view.
Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments show that the way to theorise about po-
litical legitimacy can involve a methodology that both political liberals and political
realists share. Specifically, first finding the best explanation of reasonable disagree-
ment about justice and then proposing a theory of political legitimacy that, in light
of that explanation, shows how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order
within the two fixed points I mentioned previously.
Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments also show that the way to theorise about
political legitimacy can involve metanormative commitments that political liberals
and political can share. This is because Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments in-
volve two assumptions. The first assumptions is that the normativity involved in the-
orising about political legitimacy is ordinary moral normativity or the type of norma-
tivity that reasonable people believe makes it the case that they ought to coordinate
on coercively enforced political principles or rules. The second assumption is that
there is no restriction on how reasonable people achieve conclusive justification to
coordinate. This means that all the latitude that political realists want in the consider-
ations that can speak in favour or against coordination are possible. Considerations
can be potentially, agent-relative, agent-neutral, context-relative, context-neutral, or
some mix of all four. Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments allow us to see political
liberals and political realists as engaging in a first-order debate where there is enough
normative tools for each to propose a solution to the problem of normative instabil-
ity.
All this means that, by conceiving of theorising about political legitimacy as mak-
ing Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments, we can interpret the debate between po-
litical realists and political liberals as a first-order normative debate. They are both
making Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments, but propose different theories of po-
litical legitimacy given the premises. I believe this clarifies how many political liberals
and political realists theorise about political legitimacy.
To see this I submit we can reconstruct what some prominent political liberals
and political realists say when arguing for their theories of political legitimacy in the
5See Rossi (2019) on “ordorealism” and Jubb (2015) for political realists who interpret the debate
as I do.
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form of a Disagreement to Legitimacy argument:
Premises 1-3: For political liberals, the three premises are explicated in
three distinct ideas: the “objective circumstances of moderate
scarcity”, the “fact of reasonable pluralism”, and the “fact of op-
pression” (Rawls 2005: 36–37, 66).6 For political realists, the
three premises are explicated collectively in two ideas: the “circum-
stances of politics” which includes the “radical and permanent po-
litical disagreement” that makes coordination necessary, and the
idea that politics cannot merely involve “successful domination”
or in other words oppressive coercion (2013: 15, 46–57, 113–114;
2005: 3, 77).7
Premise 4: Political liberals cite the “burdens of judgement” as the best
explanation of reasonable disagreement (Rawls 2005: 54–58).8 Po-
litical realists tend to either agree with political liberals or cite
the “obscure mixture of beliefs (many incompatible with one an-
other), passions, interests” as the best explanation (2013: 133–134;
2005: 13).9
Conclusion: Political liberals conclude that a theory with “public jus-
tification” as its core normative standard is the correct theory of
political legitimacy (Rawls 2005: 70, 387–388).10 Political realists
conclude that a theory with “meeting the Basic Legitimation De-
mand” or an “acceptable solution to the first political question”
as its core normative standard is the correct theory of political le-
gitimacy (2013: 152–153; 2005: 4).
Seen this way, the debate between political liberals and political realists is at a first-
order normative level about the legitimacy of political principles or rules that are co-
ercively enforced.
Given all that, a Disagreement to Legitimacy argument is a plausible way to inter-
pret what a political liberal like Rawls (2005: xix) is saying when he writes:
Given the fact of the reasonable pluralism of democratic culture, the
aim of political liberalism is to uncover the conditions of the possibil-
6See also Gaus (2016: Ch. 3, 2011b: Ch. 1, 1999), Quong (2011: 36).
7See also Waldron (1999: 101–103).
8See Quong (2011: 37).
9See also McQueen (2018: 256–260) and Hall (2017: 285–286).
10See also Gaus (2016: Ch. 4, 2011b: Ch. 5, 1999), Quong (2011: 180–191).
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ity of a reasonable public basis of justification on fundamental political
questions.
It should, if possible, set forth the content of such a basis and why it
is acceptable. In doing this, it has to distinguish the public point of
view from the many nonpublic (not private) points of view. Or, alter-
natively, it has to characterize the distinction between public reasonable
and the many nonpublic reasons and to explain why public reason takes
the form it does (VI).
In the same vein, a Disagreement to Legitimacy argument is a plausible way to inter-
pret what a political realist like Sleat (2013: 47) is saying when he writes:
The persistence of disagreement is one of the fundamental and ‘stub-
born facts’ of political life which ensures that there is rarely any natural
harmony or order in human affairs. The most basic political question,
what I shall call ‘the political question’, is how we are to live together
in the face of such deep and persistent disagreement. The primary ob-
jective of politics must therefore be to provide a framework that creates
order and stability by establishing the terms on which we are to co-exist
and also the means for making future commonly binding decisions in
conditions of disagreement (including the procedures for altering the
terms of co-existence). Any successful answer to the political question
will therefore require a structure of institutions and practices that pro-
vides the basis for persons to live together under a common political
authority.
In sum, conceiving of theorising about political legitimacy as making Disagree-
ment to Legitimacy arguments shows that political liberals and political realists are
engaged in the same project. They are both offering, in light of an explanation of rea-
sonable disagreement about justice, competing theories of political legitimacy aimed
at solving the problem of normative instability.
The upshot of all this is that it shows why much of this thesis will focus on evalu-
ating various political liberal and political realist conceptions. Given the goal of this
thesis is to argue for a particular political realist conception of political legitimacy –
the Dual Convergent Conception – much of it, specifically Chapters 4 and 5, will be
devoted to showing how extant conceptions of political liberalism and political real-
ism do not solve the problem of normative instability. This will provide the negative
argument in favour of the Dual Convergent Conception.
FROMDISAGREEMENT TO POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 19
2.3 Reasonable Disagreement about the Good Objection
One objection to my characterisation of theorising about political legitimacy as mak-
ing Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments might be, that the interpretation of nor-
mative instability is wrong. This is because it is not consistent with what political lib-
erals, who I claim make Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments, are trying to solve.
The idea is that the most prominent version of political liberalism – a Rawlsian con-
ception – is premised on how disagreement about the good makes achieving a sta-
ble political order a problem and not disagreement about justice. As Paul Weithman
(2015: 75, 83–88, 2010: 319–321) and Jonathan Quong (2011: 36–37, 137–138) argue,
this is the view that the problem political liberalism seeks to solve is internal to liberal
political theory. Liberal institutions permit diverse conceptions of the good and so
produce reasonable disagreement about the good. The question is then how can lib-
eral political theory justify itself to people whor are committed to liberal values and
yet disagree about what is valuable in human life. How can it garner and maintain
their support once they go about their lives pursuing what they view as the good? This
is the stability problem that Rawls unsuccessfully tried to solve in Part III of A The-
ory of Justice and that Political Liberalism was aimed at solving. None of this involves
denying reasonable disagreement about justice exists, but rather that the central ani-
mus for the political liberal’s theory of political legitimacy is disagreement about the
good. As such a Disagreement to Legitimacy argument is the wrong way to conceive
of a political liberal’s argument for their theory of political legitimacy.
I believe this objection fails in at least two ways. The first way the objection fails
is that it rests on a contested interpretation of the Rawlsian conception of political
liberalism. The second way the objection fails is that it leads to a dilemma between
requiring an implausible reading of the “fact of reasonable pluralism” in Rawls’s con-
ception of political liberalism and relying on a plainly false view of what makes a the-
ory of political legitimacy necessary.
To the first way it fails, other political liberals like Gerald Gaus (2017: 27–30,
2014: 243–248), Kevin Vallier (2019: 5–7), David Thrasher (2018: 399–400), Brian
Kogelmann (2017), David Reidy (2007: 250–251), and Burton Dreben (2003: 320–
321) do not understand Rawls’s conception as arguing for a theory of political legiti-
macy purely on the basis of reasonable disagreement about the good. Rather they see
it as argued for on the basis of reasonable disagreement about justice which will in-
clude disagreements about the right and the good to varying degrees. To that extent,
I do not think the interpretation I have offered breaks significantly with the broader
tradition of interpreting the Rawlsian conception of political liberalism.
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However, independent of the interpretation of other political liberals, the objec-
tion fails for another more worrying reason. It faces the following dilemma. On one
horn the objection relies on a reading of Rawls’s notion of the “fact of reasonable plu-
ralism” as disagreements involving only conceptions of the good. This is what Rawls
would have to have thought about reasonable disagreement for the objection to go
through. If this were the case, then Disagreement to Legitimacy argument would in-
deed be the wrong way to think about Rawls’s project. But, this is an implausibly
narrow reading of reasonable pluralism for at least two reasons.
First, as Rawls (2005: xvii, 36–37) says the “fact of reasonable pluralism” involves
conflicting comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. These are doc-
trines that are both general and comprehensive. Which means they apply to a wide
range of subjects and involve a wide array of values. Rawls specifically contrasts
them with political conceptions of justice which are neither general nor comprehen-
sive. Rawls does not contrast them with political conceptions of the good, or some
other non-comprehensive doctrine of the good. The idea is that comprehensive doc-
trines lead us to derive conceptions of right and conceptions of the good that tell us
how we ought to conduct our lives and what is ultimately of value in all domains of
life. As such they yield comprehensive conceptions of justice that order our social life
in total according to a wide array of values and with regard to all domains of life.11
Therefore, simply as a matter of what Rawls contrasts the content of reasonable plu-
ralism with, we have good reason to think it involves disagreement about justice and
not merely disagreement about the good.
The second reason why the objection would rely on an implausibly narrow read-
ing of the fact of reasonable pluralism is because of the examples that Rawls uses to
illustrate comprehensive doctrines. When considering the comprehensive doctrines
that lead to the problem of normative instability, Rawls (2005: xviii, xx, 346, 489–
490) includes religious conceptions of justice like Catholic and Protestant Christian-
ity, and nonreligious conceptions of justice like utilitarianism, Millian and Kantian
liberalism, and socialism. These are doctrines that conflict on more than the good,
they also conflict about the right. As such, they would be involved in disagreements
about justice – about how to order a society according to a scheme of rights, opportu-
11See Gaus (2004) for helpful clarification of how comprehensive doctrines are related to concep-
tions of justice. Further evidence for this is that for Rawls (2005: 173–174) the good and the right are
complementary. This means a comprehensive doctrine of justice will contain both normative and eval-
uative content intertwined with each other. As such, a comprehensive doctrine will at the very least
have to include a thin notion of justice that pertains to what it is right to do even if it is merely ‘you
ought to always maximise the good or pursue what is necessary for realising the good’.
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nities, and resources amongst individuals, institutions and social systems – that might
stem from underlying normative or evaluative differences.
If the objectors abandon the reading of “fact of reasonable pluralism” as disagree-
ments involving only conceptions of the good, then they face the second horn of the
dilemma. Which is that if they want to maintain the objection they are committed
to saying that the only disagreements that matter for theorising about political legit-
imacy are disagreements about the ideas of the good in a conception of justice. The
idea being that only disagreements about the good make a theory of political legit-
imacy necessary. But, this is plainly false. Other aspects of a conception of justice,
namely ideas of the right, can also make a theory of political legitimacy necessary. Dis-
agreement about the principles or rules it is right to coordinate on and coercively en-
force, combined with agreement about the good to be furthered, would be enough
to make a theory of political legitimacy necessary. The use of coercive power would
be, as Rawls (2005: 37) is prescient to point out, oppressive in trying to create a soci-
ety unified under a single comprehensive doctrine. Insofar as conceptions of justice
include ideas of the right and the good, disagreement about the ideas of the right are
as capable of making political legitimacy necessary as much as disagreements about
the good.
To that end, Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments actually provide a better pic-
ture of the sort of disagreement that matters for theorising about political legitimacy.
It shows how disagreement about justice, which can include disagreement about ideas
of the right and the good, can play a role in making a theory of political legitimacy nec-
essary. In sum, the objection fails against my construal of theorising about political
legitimacy through the idea of Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments.
2.4 Fact-Sensitivity Objection
Another objection one might have to my characterisation of Disagreement to Legit-
imacy arguments is that whatever they conclude with they cannot be held to argue
for fundamental normative principles about political legitimacy. This is because, tak-
ing inspiration from Gerald Cohen’s (2008: 236–244) argument against Rawlsian
principles of justice, one might point out that fundamental normative principles are
fact-insensitive. But, the whole point of Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments in-
volves arguing for a theory of political legitimacy on the basis of how it responds to
the best explanation of reasonable disagreement about justice. In Cohen’s language
this would be a theory that is sensitive to the facts that explain why reasonable dis-
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agreement about justice occurs.12 But, the explanation of why these facts matter will
involve a further principle, a fundamental normative one. This principle would be
something like: ‘a society ought to care about the best explanation of reasonable dis-
agreement about justice to avoid the consequences of normative instability’. This is
the fundamental normative principle of political legitimacy that must be argued for.
This means that what Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments conclude with cannot
be a theory of political legitimacy. They, at best, argue for regulative principles that
serve the fundamental normative principles of political legitimacy.
I have no real response to this objection other than to make two remarks. One
about philosophical methodology and the second about the importance of making
Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments. The first remark is that the Fact-Sensitivity
Objection seems to rest on a fundamental difference in philosophical methodology.
As Cohen (2008: 3) concedes directly, “…there is a disagreement about how to do po-
litical philosophy, or indeed philosophy itself”. Much of this difference boils down
to what I take the aim of political theory to be, namely to formulate normative prin-
ciples that tell us how to live with others in a shared social world. Given that, political
theory is free to take into account facts about our shared social world to help us the-
orise about normative principles.13 As long as this theorising is done correctly and
the facts we take into account like the best explanation of reasonable disagreement
about justice are actually relevant for the problem at hand, then the principles we
arrive at will ipso facto be fundamental normative principles. To that end, I believe
fundamental normative principles can be fact-sensitive and there is nothing wrong
with this.
The second remark, since my first remark is unlikely to satisfy objectors, is that I
do not think the Fact-Sensitivity Objection provides any good reason to stop making
Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments even on the objectors grounds. This is be-
cause even if I was to concede that Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments ultimately
only conclude with regulative principles that serve fundamental principles of legiti-
macy, it is still worthwhile making them. This is because even if we accept the view
that the fundamental normative principle at work in Disagreement to Legitimacy ar-
guments is the principle that “a society ought to avoid the consequences of normative
12This is despite Cohen’s (I believe mistaken) view that the Rawlsian consensus principle of legiti-
macy is fact-insensitive (Cohen 2008: 297–298). Cohen seems to ignore that Rawls proposes his prin-
ciples precisely in light of his explanation of reasonable pluralism that his pure constructivist method
for arriving at principles of justice could not.
13See Larmore (2013) and Miller (2013: Ch. 2) on this way of doing political philosophy. I also
defend this view of political theory elsewhere (“The Independence of Political Theory”: ms).
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instability”, this does not help us choose normative principles that will actually help
us live with others in a shared social world. That normative principle is fairly uncon-
troversial and is shared by many political theories. The interesting and more pressing
question is how does a society actually go about avoiding the consequences of nor-
mative instability. For this we need to make Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments
and find a theory of political legitimacy. If one wants to think about such a theory as
containing non-fundamental normative principles then so be it. But, this does not
detract from the importance of trying to theorise about them.
3 Reasonable Disagreement about Justice as an Explanan-
dum
In the previous section I described the general methodology of this thesis. I described
what I will take political legitimacy to be and that Disagreement to Legitimacy argu-
ments is how we ought to conceive of theorising about political legitimacy which aims
to take reasonable disagreement about justice seriously. I also said that one upshot of
adopting this methodology is that it means that the first step of arguing for a theory
of political legitimacy is engaging in an explanatory project to find the best explana-
tion of reasonable disagreement about justice. This was because such an explanation
will tell us what causes the problem of normative instability and so allow us to formu-
late a theory of political legitimacy that responds correctly to this cause. To that end,
in this section I clear the ground for engaging in such an explanatory project. I will
establish what the explanandum is for such an explanatory project. In short, I will
argue for a specific view of what reasonable disagreement about justice is.
All this might seem confusing. At the outset I said that the point of this the-
sis would be to argue for a novel political realist conception of political legitimacy,
namely the Dual Convergent Conception. But, one of the reasons I gave in favour
of Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments was that they clarify a debate that has
emerged in recent years between political liberals and political realists. In doing so
I showed that political realists already offer what they take to be the best explanation
of reasonable disagreement about justice (ie. they either agree with political liberals
about the burdens of judgement or refer to reasonable people’s passions and emo-
tions). What more is there to do?
Well, as I’ll argue in Chapter 2, there are good reasons to think extant explanations
of reasonable disagreement about justice, like the burdens of judgement, are defective.
As I’ll show, current explanations offered by political liberals and political realists are
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inadequate. They are either poorly argued for, do not separate political liberals and
political realists, or are too vague and general to apply to real cases. In fact, this will
form one part of a broader argument against all current ways of explaining reasonable
disagreement about justice. This will culminate, in Chapter 3, with an argument for
a novel explanation. But, before I do any of this we need to be clear on what is being
explained, namely what is the explanandum of such an explanatory project.
In formulating reasonable disagreement about justice as an explanandum I start
with the thought that it must at least be prima facie fair in two ways. The first way the
explanandum should be fair is that it does not so heavily influence the explanatory
project to come that it ensures, before any evaluation, a particular explanation. This
can happen because a formulation of reasonable disagreement about justice can be
so precise to contain its own story of why it occurs. For instance, reasonable disagree-
ment about justice could be defined in such a way that it is whatever disagreement that
is the result of X sort of judgement making. This would undermine the point of the
explanatory project from the start. The second way the explanandum should be fair
is that it should not be designed to provide a rationale for any particular theory of po-
litical legitimacy. This would undermine the explanatory project altogether and the
evaluation of Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments. If, as I have argued we ought
to conceive of theorising about political legitimacy as Disagreement to Legitimacy ar-
guments, then we want the normative appeal of a theory of political legitimacy to
depend on how much better it is at solving the problem of normative instability than
its competitors. We do not want it be guaranteed beforehand. To that end, I propose
the way we ought to formulate reasonable disagreement about justice is to have an
explanandum that, at most, makes a theory of political legitimacy necessary. In light
of that, I submit that to explain reasonable disagreement about justice is to explain:
Reasonable Disagreement about Justice: A state of affairs of intractably conflicting
judgements about the institutions and outcomes justice requires, made by at
least two parties who both have, a minimal capacity for rationality and a mini-
mal capacity for sincerely making judgements that they think others can agree
to.
This formulation of reasonable disagreement about justice makes a theory of polit-
ical legitimacy necessary because it involves five important features. The first three
concern the type of conflict involved in the disagreement, and the last two concern
the type of people involved in the disagreement.
The first feature is that, the disagreement has to involve a conflict in the content
of people’s judgements. This means the disagreement involves a state of affairs of two
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people making judgements that are incompatible, such that they both cannot be true,
with respect to a particular object of thought.14 This ensures that the disagreement
meets a minimum threshold of genuineness and is not merely an illusory disagree-
ment where reasonable people’s judgements are actually compatible. Without this
feature, the entire premise of this thesis would not get off the ground. Rather than
looking for a theory of political legitimacy we would need to sort out how to label
things or work out why a disagreement is illusory.
The second feature is that, the disagreement has to involve conflicting judgements
about a particular subject: the institutions and outcomes that justice requires. Before
seeing why let me clarify what I mean by this. I mean that the judgements involved
in the disagreement have to be those where the object of the judgements are insti-
tutions and outcomes, and the criterion of judgement is justice. By “institutions” I
mean the constitutions, ordinary statute laws, and policies which Rawls (2005: 11–12)
referred to as the basic structure of a society. By “outcomes” I mean the distribution
of rights, opportunities and resources that those institutions produce. These institu-
tions and outcomes are then evaluated according to people’s beliefs about what jus-
tice requires, which results in a judgement about the institutions and outcomes that
justice requires. It is important to get clear about this because what I mean by “con-
flicting judgements about the institutions and outcomes that justice requires” is that
people conflict in their evaluation of institutions and outcomes in virtue of their con-
flicting beliefs about what justice requires.15 This means they make conflicting judge-
ments not in virtue of conflicting evaluations about what institutions and outcomes
satisfy an agreed upon set of beliefs about the requirements of justice. Rather they
make conflicting judgements in virtue of conflicting beliefs about the requirements
of justice are.
Reasonable disagreement about justice has to involve the sort of conflicting judge-
ments I have described above. Otherwise, there would be no need for a theory of
political legitimacy. If people merely disagreed empirically about the policies or laws
that best satisfy what justice requires, they would have two options open to them.
On the one hand they could simply appeal to the procedure that justice requires –
which recall by hypothesis they both agree on – for resolving disagreements about
14See Frances (2014: Ch. 1) and Gibbard (2003: Ch. 4) for this basic way of thinking about genuine
disagreement.
15See Valentini (2013: 183–187) for a helpful distinction between “thick disagreement about justice”
and “thin disagreement about justice” which corresponds to the distinction I make here. Although
Valentini ends up with a slightly different and more general formulation of reasonable disagreement,
the core distinction matters both for her account and mine.
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the policies and laws. On the other hand they could simply spend more time and ef-
fort explaining their evaluation of how some policies or laws satisfy the requirements
of justice to reach agreement. In both cases, they would then agree about the prin-
ciples or rules that people ought to obey and that can be coercively enforced.16 A
theory of political legitimacy and its claims about when reasonable people have suf-
ficient moral reason to coordinate on a political principle or rule that is coercively
enforced only becomes necessary when the options I mentioned are unavailable. It is
only when parties disagree about the institutions and outcomes that justice requires
that they require a theory which explains how reasonable people can have sufficient
moral reason to coordinate on a political principle or rule that is coercively enforced.
The third feature is that, the conflict in judgements over the institutions and out-
comes that justice requires have to be intractable. This means that the disagreement
persists despite the disagreeing parties explaining their beliefs about what justice re-
quires and their reasons for their judgements. Otherwise, we would not need a the-
ory of political legitimacy but rather more time for reasonable people to have their
disagreement and convince each other that their judgement about which institutions
and outcomes justice requires is correct. It is only when people need to realise some
institutions and distributive outcomes to order society but cannot because their dis-
agreement about justice persists despite their best efforts to resolve it, that a theory
of political legitimacy becomes necessary. Reasonable people require a theory to tell
them how their disagreement can be resolved or accommodated in such a way that
they can achieve a stable political order.
The fourth feature is that, the disagreement has to involve parties who both pos-
sess a minimal capacity for rationality because otherwise the person with the lower
capacity for making rational judgements should defer to the one whose capacity does
meet the minimal threshold for rationality.17 This is because if we assume, according
to the definition, that they both have a minimal capacity to sincerely make judge-
ments that they think others can agree to, then the person with the lower capacity for
rationality ought to defer. This is because part of being sincere is to see that the person
that meets the minimal capacity threshold for rationality is more disposed to getting
16But, note this does not exclude the fact parties might be having a reasonable disagreement about
the requirements of justice because of some foundational empirical disagreement.
17See, for similar construals of this aspect of reasonable disagreement, Gaus (2011b: 276–277) on a
“basic level of reasoning” which also allows for the possibility for reasonable people to engage in more
or less sophisticated reasoning above this level, and McMahon (2016: 61–66) on “reasonableness in the
competence sense” which involves the idea that “A person is reasoning competently in a particular case
when his drawing of a conclusion, or generating a cognitive product of some other kind, manifests the
proper functioning of the relevant mental capacities”.
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the right answer. It would be insincere of a person to insist on their judgement of a
matter when they know that they do not even meet the minimal threshold capacity
for rationality. This is because the person who does meet the threshold is more likely
to be sensitive to the moral reasons in the context and make a coherent calculation of
them. What ought to happen is that in deferring the person who meets the minimal
threshold capacity should explain how they deliberate, came to their judgement and
why the other has made a mistake.18
The fifth feature is that, the disagreement has to involve parties who both have a
minimal capacity for sincerely making judgements that they think others can agree to,
otherwise the entire point of taking reasonable disagreement about justice seriously
is undermined.19 This is because reasonable disagreements would include disagree-
ment between at least two kinds of people. One kind of person is the contrarian who
disagrees for the sake of disagreeing and not because they sincerely believe in the nor-
mative force of what they have judged justice requires. Since there is no amount of
agreement or disagreement that will move them to coordinate, either we are justified
in coercing them to avoid the consequences of not coordinating or we are justified
in concluding they do not really possess the minimal capacity for rationality because
they do not see the devastating consequences for social life if they do not coordinate
on a political principle or rule.
The other kind of person that would be included is the fundamentalist who in-
sists on the political principle or rule they believe justice requires no matter the cir-
cumstances. This person is subtly different from the contrarian because whilst they
do sincerely believe what they say, they do not make judgements they believe others
can agree to. They make judgements that do not appropriately respond to the fact
that they must try and live with others in a shared social world. Perhaps they do not
try and explain the reasons for their judgement or even try to bring themselves to see
their interlocutor’s point of view. They are making judgements about justice in bad
faith to dominate or gain power over their fellow citizens. In these cases, it seems co-
ercion is pointless because a stable political order is nigh impossible to create. Rather
18Note even in this situation one party could object that justice requires that people with greater
capacity ought not coerce those with a lower capacity. This would merely show that the parties now
suddenly do face a reasonable disagreement about justice for which they require a theory of political
legitimacy.
19See Gaus (2011b: 276, 288–292) and Carey (2018: 51–59) for a similar minimalist sincerity condi-
tion as opposed to the far more demanding notion proposed by Quong (2011: 265–273), and McMa-
hon (2016: 66–73) on “reasonableness in the concession sense” which involves a similar idea of making
judgements with a disposition “to respond to perceived disparities of concession by making or seeking
corrective concessions, provided that others are similarly disposed”.
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the parties should go their separate ways. A theory of political legitimacy has nothing
to recommend in such cases.
In sum, reasonable disagreement about justice is disagreement between those of
a certain moral character. It is disagreement between those who meet a minimal
threshold in capacity for reasoning and thinking about justice, and who in good faith
want to live in a shared social world with others. In short, it is disagreement between
morally decent people such that neither can claim to coerce the other without some
further justification.
It is worth clarifying at this stage how the explanandum of reasonable disagree-
ment about justice I have formulated differs from other notions of disagreement used
in philosophy and why those other notions would not do for our purposes. Firstly,
reasonable disagreement about justice is not faultless disagreement.20 This is disagree-
ment that is assumed to be about a topic that is beyond rational conflict. As such it
contains its own explanation, namely that it is caused by non-truth apt judgement
making. Although this is a conclusion we might arrive at by engaging in the explana-
tory project, it would not be fair to assume it beforehand.
Secondly, reasonable disagreement is also not peer disagreement.21 This is disagree-
ment between parties that are actually epistemically equal in all regards. This would
be an implausible picture of disagreements about justice. Society is obviously made
up of people with varying epistemic abilities and so idealising reasonable disagree-
ment to those that are equal in their epistemic abilities and have all the same evidence
would at worst involve no actual disagreement at all and at best involve an implausibly
small number of actual disagreements to be worth explaining.22
Finally, reasonable disagreement about justice is not disagreement between peo-
ple committed to intellectual modesty.23. This is the sort of disagreement some theo-
rists have tried to formulate where the very property of reasonableness is designed to
provide a justification for political liberalism. This would be unfair because it under-
mines the entire point of trying to find the best explanation of reasonable disagree-
ment about justice and evaluating competing theories of political legitimacy in light
of that explanation. After all we would already have a perfectly good reason to prefer
one theory of political legitimacy over another.
20See Kolbel (2004) on the details of this type of disagreement.
21See Kelly (2005) and Gutting (1982) on the details of peer disagreement and, Peter (2013) and van
Wietmarschen (2018) on its use in political liberalism.
22See Frances (2014: 166), King (2012), and Matheson (2014: 320–328) on similar points about the
irrelevance of peer disagreement.
23See Leland and van Wietmarschen (2012) for this sort of way of formulating reasonable disagree-
ment with regard to political liberalism.
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All this achieves the goal of this section which was to lay the groundwork for the
explanatory project in this thesis in a fair way. Reasonable disagreement about justice
as I have described it is prima facie neutral and fair between different explanations of
it and different theories of political legitimacy which will be tested by the best ex-
planation of it. It is in simple terms a neutral way of describing what Rawls (2005:
55) describes as reasonable disagreement: disagreement between people who have a
capacity for a sense of justice and a conception of the good to an sufficiently equal
degree. It does not presuppose any controversial feature of people or disagreement
that advantages any particular explanation or particular theory of legitimacy in some
pre-theoretic way. To that end, it is the suitable explanandum for the explanatory
project in this thesis. It describes what impedes stable political order and so makes a
theory of political legitimacy necessary.
4 Road Ahead
In this chapter I argued for a particular view of what it means to argue for a theory
of political legitimacy that takes reasonable disagreement about justice seriously. I
first settled the details of what I take political legitimacy to be on the basis that only
a broad view of political legitimacy that includes both the justification of political au-
thority and the use of coercive power can show us how to achieve a stable political
order. I then argued that theorising about political legitimacy involves making Dis-
agreement to Legitimacy arguments on the basis of two reasons. The first reason is
that Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments provide a clear framework for evaluating
theories of political legitimacy fairly. The second reason is that the arguments clarify a
contemporary debate between two views of political legitimacy both of which claim
to take reasonable disagreement about justice seriously.
An upshot of all that was that it showed that arguing for a particular theory of
political legitimacy involves two stages. First, finding the best explanation of reason-
able disagreement about justice, and second, arguing that in light of that explanation
a particular theory of political legitimacy does best at solving the problem of norma-
tive instability. The rest of this thesis takes up these two stages. In Chapter 2, using
the explanandum I argued for in §3, I evaluate competing explanations. I conclude
that all extant explanations are found to be lacking. In Chapter 3, I propose a novel
explanation – the Diverse Packages Theory – and argue that it does better as an expla-
nation than extant explanations.
With the Diverse Packages Theory as the best explanation of reasonable disagree-
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ment about justice in hand, I then begin the second stage of the thesis. This involves a
negative and positive argument for a novel theory of political legitimacy: the political
realist Dual Convergent Conception. In Chapter 4, I argue that in light of Diverse
Packages Theory, no conception of political liberalism is a satisfactory theory of po-
litical legitimacy because they fail on at least one of the two dimensions of normative
stability. This I argue motivates a general shift to political realism. In Chapter 5, I
argue that in light of the Diverse Packages Theory, no extant conception of political
realism is a satisfactory theory of political legitimacy either. In Chapter 6, I propose
the Dual Convergent Conception avoids the problems of its competitors and man-
ages to show how reasonable people can create a stable political order. That it, unlike
its competitors, takes reasonable disagreement about justice seriously and as a result





This chapter begins the first part of my Disagreement to Legitimacy argument. It
begins the explanatory project of finding the best explanation of reasonable disagree-
ment about justice. In the previous chapter I cleared the ground for this by settling the
details of what it means to take reasonable disagreement about justice as an explanan-
dum. In this chapter I evaluate extant theories that aim to explain that explanandum
and argue in favour of a particular type of theory: Concept Possession and Use theo-
ries. I show that it both avoids the problems that beset the other extant theories and
is the most explanatorily powerful. But, I conclude that the only extant theory that
instantiates it has some serious flaws that should worry us. This will eventually lead to
my argument in Chapter 3 where I propose an alternative instantiation of it: Diverse
Packages Theory.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In §2, I detail two enrichments to the theoretical
landscape of theories that will frame the argument in this chapter and the next. The
first involves settling the idea of explanation that I will use for evaluating theories and
the second involves settling the taxonomy of theories that will be considered.
In §3, I consider the Imperfection Family of theories that explain reasonable dis-
agreement and argue that the two types of theories in this family face some serious
problems. I argue that they either, rule out the existence of reasonable disagreement
itself, cite facts that do not make a difference between disagreement and agreement,
or fail to justify the normative standard that would pick out the fact that does make
a difference.
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In §4, I consider the Historical-Psychological Family of theories and argue that
the only type of theory in this family that actually aims to explain reasonable disagree-
ment also faces some series problems. I argue that it, either cannot explain or offers
an implausible explanation of disagreements that arise because a person changes their
judgement through reflecting on the deliberative process. I conclude that this is be-
cause these types of theories rely on a specific theory of moral psychology with inse-
cure empirical grounds.
In §5, I consider the Conceptual Family of theories. I argue that one type of theory
in this family – Concept Use theories – whilst avoiding the objections that faced the
Imperfection and Historical-Psychological Family of theories faces a serious problem.
It inherently cannot explain reasonable disagreements that are deep disagreements
and so is explanatorily weak. I argue, however, that another type of theory – Con-
cept Possession and Use theories – does better and therefore stands out as compara-
tively the best explanation of reasonable disagreement. This is because it avoids the
objections that face the Imperfection and Historical-Psychological Families, and can
explain reasonable disagreements that are deep disagreements. Given that, it offers
the most powerful explanation of reasonable disagreement. But, I argue, this comes
at the cost of two unique problems. I argue that, rather than giving us reason to re-
ject Concept Possession and Use type of theories, it motivates us to look for a better
instantiation of it, which I take up in the next chapter.
2 Two Enrichments
The argument in this chapter is framed by two enrichments of the theoretical land-
scape. In this section I lay out both of these enrichments. In §2.1 I clarify what it
takes for a theory to count as giving an explanation of reasonable disagreement about
justice. Specifically, I detail what it means to cite difference makers in order to ex-
plain reasonable disagreement about justice. This sets the terms on which different
views will be evaluated. In §2.2 I lay out the taxonomy of theories I use in this chap-
ter. Specifically, I detail how this is an expanded taxonomy from the one found in the
extant literature and how it will involve three families of theories: the Imperfection
Family, the Historical-Psychological Family and the Conceptual Family.
2.1 The Idea of Explanation
Explanations of any kind are judged by how well they explain the explananda they
target. When sorting and evaluating theories that explain anything, what is relevant
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is the different ways they explain a given explanandum. This is no different for ex-
plaining reasonable disagreement about justice. To that end, recall from Chapter 1
the explanandum at the centre of this thesis:
Reasonable Disagreement about Justice: A state of affairs of intractably conflicting
judgements about the institutions and outcomes justice requires, made by at
least two parties who both have, a minimal capacity for rationality and a mini-
mal capacity for sincerely making judgements that they think others can agree
to.
Now as I said in the previous chapter, reasonable disagreement about justice is merely a
species of reasonable disagreement generally, and no theorist typically seeks to explain
reasonable disagreement about justice in particular. This means that evaluating theo-
ries that explain the explanandum above will involve evaluating theories that aim to
explain reasonable disagreement in general or at least of any moral and political topic.
Such theories will then by definition explain reasonable disagreement about justice.
With that out of the way, the explanandum above, given it is a state of affairs, sug-
gests a particular type of explanation, namely a causal explanation. In simple terms
‘evaluating theories’ is a matter of evaluating theories’ competing causal explanations
of reasonable disagreement. A state of affairs is explained by a causal process or se-
quence of states of affairs that lead up to it. This amounts to explaining the causal
process that leads reasonable people to make the sort of intractably conflicting judge-
ments that comprise reasonable disagreements about justice.
But, what does it actually mean to explain a state of affairs by describing the states
of affairs that lead up to it? It means offering a contrastive explanation that describes
what makes the difference between the state of affairs to be explained – the explanan-
dum – being realised and a state of affairs that is not realised – the contrast class.1
For reasonable disagreement the contrast class is the state of affairs where reasonable
people make the same judgement. This is, in short, reasonable agreement.
Contrastive explanations cashed out in terms of describing ‘difference makers’ in-
volves making counterfactual dependence claims. In the counterfactual dependence
claims about reasonable disagreement the antecedent will be a negation of the pro-
posed difference making state of affairs and the consequent will be a negation of rea-
sonable disagreement or in other words what is in the contrast class for reasonable
1In describing what it means to explain a moral phenomenon like reasonable disagreement about
justice, I rely on the general picture of causal explanations advanced by James Woodward (2003: 9–
12) and Bas Van Fraassen (1980: 134–157). This does not commit me to an particular view of scientific
explanation, but rather only to a general idea of causal explanations appropriate for the kind of task
this thesis aims to do in moral philosophy.
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disagreement. All this amounts to a contrastive explanation that describes the state
of affairs that makes the difference between reasonable disagreement and reasonable
agreement.
I submit that a contrastive explanation that describes differences makers is the
idea of explanation that ought to concern us because it is the sort of explanation that
allows theorists to make Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments. The point of the ex-
planatory project, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, was to work what causes the problem
of normative instability and therefore, allow us to evaluate which theories of politi-
cal legitimacy do best at dealing with it. If an explanation of reasonable disagreement
about justice is really going to help us in that evaluation then what is most relevant for
us is that the explanation give us an account of why reasonable disagreement about
justice is instantiated rather than not. And this is what a contrastive explanation that
describes differences makers does. It captures the dependence between some partic-
ular states of affairs – the difference makers – and the instantiation of reasonable
disagreement about justice.
2.2 The Expanded Taxonomy
The idea of explanation I have detailed suggests a taxonomy where theories belong
to different families based on the sort of difference makers they cite for explaining
why reasonable disagreement occurs. One starting point could be the taxonomy in-
troduced by Andrew Mason (1993).2 Mason (1993: 2–3) divides theories into two
families: the “Imperfection conception” and the “Contestability conception”. Using
that taxonomy, the Imperfection conception would include theories that explain rea-
sonable disagreement by saying reasonable disagreement occurs because at least one
of the disagreeing parties makes their political judgement using “defective reasoning”.
In contrast, the Contestability conception would include theories that explain reason-
able disagreement by saying that reasonable people use political terms which allow for
different applications, without any form of intellectual error, as long as there is some
freedom of expression (Mason 1993: 3). But, this division of families is too course-
grained to distinguish between theories that give different explanations for why “po-
litical terms allow for a variety of different applications”.
To deal with this I suggest a taxonomy of three families: Imperfection, Historical-
2To be precise Mason evaluates explanations of ‘political disagreement’ in general. But, his account
will do as a relevant starting point since explanations of reasonable disagreement are a subset of the
explanations he is concerned with. Moreover many of Mason’s examples are of how theories explain
reasonable disagreements (Mason 1993: 7–12, 117–119).
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Psychological and Conceptual. Whilst keeping Mason’s original category of the Im-
perfection family of theories, I suggest dividing the Contestability family into the
Historical-Psychological and Conceptual families. This means that theories that in
the Imperfection family argue for facts about intellectual error as the difference mak-
ers. Theories in the Historical-Psychological family explain why “political terms allow
for a variety of different applications” by citing particular token psychological and his-
torical facts about reasonable people which affects their moral judgement making, as
difference makers. Theories in the Conceptual family explain why “political terms al-
low for a variety of different applications” by citing facts about the role of concepts in
the cognitive process of moral and political judgement making, as difference makers.
It is important to note that theories in the Historical-Psychological family should
not be thought of as concerned with any and all historical and psychological facts
that might underwrite an individual’s moral judgement making. After all there is a
sense in which all explanations involve historical and psychological facts. If reason-
able disagreement about justice is a state of affairs of conflicting judgements about
the institutions and outcomes justice requires, then it involves mental states causing
other mental states over time. Any explanation of why these judgements conflict will
involve reference to historical and psychological facts. This will be true for theories
in the Imperfection and Conceptual families. Facts about intellectual error and con-
cept possession and use, are at a more fundamental level historical and psychological
facts. They are going to be facts about what physically goes on in the mind over time.
This way of thinking about the theories in the Historical-Psychological family would
make them trivially true. This sort of trivially true explanation is not the sort that is
relevant for us.
What is relevant for us, are explanations that argue for some particular historical
and psychological facts that when tokened differently produce conflicting political
judgements. Of course, logically, there are many types of theories that could offer
explanations like these. After all there are many types of particular historical and
psychological facts that could plausibly be connected to moral and political judge-
ment making. But, I take it to be fairly plausible that trying to find explanations that
cite particular historical and psychological facts as difference makers, lends itself to
restricting one’s view to the type of theories best supported by empirical moral psy-
chology. As we will see, this is precisely the type of theory I consider as part of the
Historical-Psychological family.
In sum, with the two enrichments in hand – the idea of explanation and the ex-
panded taxonomy – what follows in the next three sections are arguments against the
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Imperfection Family, the Historical-Psychological Family and in favour of a particular
version of the Conceptual Family, Concept Possession and Use theories.
3 Imperfection Family
I’ve said that the Imperfection Family can be summarised as the family of theories that
argue facts about intellectual error are what make the difference between reasonable
disagreement and reasonable agreement. These facts about intellectual error generally
fall into two categories. They can be about a defect in reasoning, or about the use of an
incorrect type of reasoning for moral and political matters. Theories that cite the first
category of facts I’ll call Defective Reasoning theories. Theories that cite the second
category of facts, I’ll call Wrong Type of Reasoning theories.
In §§3.1–3.2 I argue that both types of theories are inadequate explanations of
reasonable disagreement. The Defective Reasoning theories rule out reasonable dis-
agreement altogether. The Wrong Type of Reasoning theories either cite facts that
do not make a difference between disagreement and agreement, or fail to justify the
normative standard that would pick out such a fact. As a result, I conclude that no
theory in the Imperfection Family is an inadequate explanation.
3.1 Defective Reasoning
I said earlier Defective Reasoning theories cite facts about defects in reasoning as the
intellectual error that makes the difference between reasonable disagreement and rea-
sonable agreement. The most obvious and I think most common, way to do this
involves the familiar idea that disagreement arises because at least one individual is ig-
norant about some pertinent fact, or infers incorrectly when reasoning and forming
a judgement. This is a familiar idea because it is a type of explanans we often give for
disagreements that are not about moral and political matters. Disagreements in the
natural sciences, economics, history, or political science are usually thought to arise
by some form of ignorance or reasoning mistake which each side is trying to identify.
Of course there are different ways to cash out this general idea. One could cash it
out epistemically. This would involve citing facts about people’s ignorance of moral
facts, the correct principles of rationality, or mistakes in applying such principles, as
the intellectual error that causes disagreement.3 The idea would be that reasoning
3See David Enoch (2011: 186–197, 207–214), Russ Schafer-Landau (2003: Ch.9), David Brink (1989:
197–210), David Wiggins (2006: 366–367) and John McDowell (1998: 162) for this sort of explanation.
See Dworkin (2011: 441–446) for an overview of how the latter two’s views may be construed this way.
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about moral and political matters is like reasoning about any other matter. As such,
getting the right answer requires attending to the moral facts and using the correct
principles for rational thought. When one is ignorant of those facts or applies the
principles incorrectly one is likely to arrive at any one of the whole range of wrong
answers. At least one person doing this is what causes disagreement.
Another way one could cash out the general idea of intellectual error is linguis-
tically. This would involve citing facts about people’s ignorance of the meaning of
moral terms, or mistakes in inferring from the meaning of one moral term to another,
as the intellectual error that causes disagreement.4 The idea here would be that moral
and political terms have meaning and behave linguistically like any other terms. As
such, using moral and political terms to make moral and political judgements requires
attending to facts about what moral words mean and using them correctly given their
meaning. When at least one person is ignorant of what their words actually mean or
make mistakes in using them according to what they mean they will end up in a dis-
agreement.
But, no matter how the general idea is cashed out Defective Reasoning theories
cannot actually explain reasonable disagreement because they face a dilemma about
its very existence. On one horn, Defective Reasoning theories entail that reasonable
disagreement is not actually intractable understood in the sense of a disagreement per-
sisting despite parties explaining their reasons for their judgements. This is because
they could, according to Defective Reasoning theories, simply reason longer and ac-
quaint themselves better with the relevant facts. After all what causes disagreement
is not reasoning well enough or being ignorant of the moral facts.
On the other horn, if Defective Reasoning theories maintain that reasonable dis-
agreements are in fact intractable, then they are committed to saying that the peo-
ple involved are not really being sincere in their judgement making. This is because
the only way their disagreement could be intractable given they could choose to rea-
son longer and acquaint themselves with the relevant facts, is if reasonable people are
making some wilful fault in their inferences or being wilfully ignorant of the relevant
facts. But, part of what was settled as the explanandum that needs to be explained in
the last chapter was that reasonable disagreement about justice involves intractably
conflicting judgements made by people who sincerely want to make judgements that
they think others can agree it. It is not plausible to think that people who are sincere
in this way are wilfully ignorant of the relevant facts or wilfully making mistakes in
4See Andrew Mason (1993: 72–75) on how a Locke’s (2008: 307–309, 314–315, 322–327) theory of
language could be used to formulate such an explanation.
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reasoning.
Given the dilemma, I believe it is safe to leave aside Defective Reasoning theories.
No matter how they are cashed out they rule out one of the properties that constitute
reasonable disagreement. To that end, I submit, we reject the Defective Reasoning
theories and consider a more plausible type of theory within the Imperfection Family.
3.2 Wrong Type of Reasoning
Another type of theory within the Imperfection Family involves citing facts about the
use of the wrong type of reasoning for making moral and political judgements. These
are what I call Wrong Type of Reasoning theories which R.M Hare (1981) and Joshua
Greene (2013) propose. These theories avoid the problem faced by the Defective Rea-
soning theories by simply denying that some fact about a defect in at least one party’s
reasoning is what makes the difference between disagreement and agreement. As such
it does not face the dilemma that Defective Reasoning theories do. Rather, Wrong
Type of Reasoning theories rely on the idea that reasonable disagreement about jus-
tice occurs because individuals choose a type of reasoning that is unsuited to the task
of making political judgements about what justice requires.
Wrong Type of Reasoning theories begin by making a distinction between the
type of reasoning suited to moral and political matters – “critical thinking” for Hare
(1981: 40) and “manual mode reasoning” for Greene (2013: 133-134) – and the type of
reasoning that causes disagreement. Hare (1981: 40) describes this distinction and the
motivation for it when he says:
…however well equipped we are with these relatively simple, prima
facie, intuitive principles or dispositions, we are bound to find ourselves
in situations in which they conflict and in which, therefore, some other,
non-intuitive kind of thinking is called for, to resolve the conflict…
What will settle the question is a type of thinking which makes no
appeal to intuitions other than linguistic. I stress that in this other kind
of thinking, which I am calling critical thinking, no moral intuitions of
substance can be appealed to.
For Hare, explaining why reasonable disagreement occurs amounts to picking out the
type of reasoning about moral and political matters which doesn’t lead to conflict. For
Hare (1981: 40–42, 153–160), intuitions are unsuited for this task because people will
inevitably differ in their intuitions because of their different “upbringings and past
experience”. Using different intuitions either directly, or indirectly by constructing
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what Hare (1981: 40-41) calls “prima facie principles”, to make judgements will result
in conflicting political judgements. We are not justified in picking one intuition over
another because it is an open and substantive question which kind of upbringing or
set of experiences are the correct ones to have. The conflict between two such judge-
ments persists by trying to arbitrate between them using further intuitions, when we
ought to use “critical thinking”.
This is a type of reasoning that seeks to universalise our judgements from the sit-
uation being judged to “any of the other precisely similar situations”. According to
Hare (1981: 42) what this sort of universalizing amounts to is the following:
What critical thinking has to do is to find a moral judgement which the
thinker is prepared to make about this conflict-situation and is also pre-
pared to make about all the other similar situations. Since these will in-
clude situations in which he occupies, respectively, the positions of all
the other parties in the actual situation, no judgement will be acceptable
to him which does not do the best, all in all, for all the parties.
The core idea here is that making the correct choice in the type of reasoning to use
– critical thinking – will involve finding moral and political judgements that univer-
salise across contexts and people’s particular positions in those contexts. Doing this
will yield judgements that “do the best, all in all, for all the parties”. Not engaging in
this sort of reasoning is what leads to reasonable disagreement. This is because it will
involve making judgements that are not acceptable to all parties because they will be
picking out what is morally significant for only some individuals in some contexts.
Unlike Hare, Greene (2013: 14–15, 23, 26) begins with a distinction between two
kinds of disagreements: first-order moral disagreements and second-order moral dis-
agreements. First-order moral disagreements are disagreements between those who
share our basic moral intuitions about what individuals ought to do. Second-order
moral disagreements, are disagreements about what our society ought to do with
those who do not share our basic moral intuitions about what individuals ought to
do. Greene argues that using moral intuitions to reason is helpful for resolving the
first kind of disagreement, but not the second kind. Using intuitions works for the
first kind because we are disagreeing with those who share our intuitions and resolv-
ing a disagreement amounts to clarifying our intuitions or adjusting them to chang-
ing circumstances. But, these strategies do not work for the second-order moral dis-
agreements because they involve disagreements about what is intuitively of value or
normatively required.
Greene introduces, with empirical justification, a model for how people reason
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about moral and political issues that is supposed to explain why moral intuitions do
not help resolve the second-order disagreements and what kind of reasoning does
help us. Greene (2013: 117, 2014a: 696–707) proposes the “dual-process” theory of
moral judgement making. The core idea being that human beings have two ways of
reasoning to make judgements. On the one hand we can use an “automatic” mode
of reasoning that involves making intuitive judgements. Even though we might then
rationalise these judgements using deliberative reasoning, for Greene, their founda-
tion is in intuition or emotion. On the other hand we can use a “manual” mode of
reasoning which involves making judgements by considering what is of fundamen-
tal value, abstractly and counterfactually in a conscious and explicit way. Roughly,
Greene (2013: 120, 137–141) believes automatic and manual mode reasoning corre-
spond to how we ought to be forming judgements when faced with two different
kinds of decisions. When making decisions with those who share our intuitions we
ought to use the automatic mode, but when faced with those who do not share our
intuitions we ought to use the manual mode.
According to Greene (2013: 54, 62–63, 2014a: 698), humans use the automatic
mode of intuitive reasoning because we are evolutionarily “hardwired” to cooperate.
This disposition means that individuals favour a style of reasoning that is quick and
efficient for judging others and situations relevant for the cooperative success of the
group. However, this style of reasoning is only successful in small communities where
for the sake of cooperation individuals tend to conform and share each other’s intu-
itions. But, when faced with situations where communities that do not share intu-
itions must reason together, reasoning with intuitions leads to disagreement. What
causes these disagreements is a state of affairs where individuals choose the “auto-
matic” mode of reasoning. This causes individuals with different moral intuitions
to form conflicting moral and political judgements.
In sum, Wrong Type of Reasoning theories like Hare and Greene’s explain rea-
sonable disagreement about justice by citing the fact that reasonable people choose
the wrong type of reasoning, namely a type of reasoning that uses intuitions, to make
their moral and political judgements. Explaining reasonable disagreement about jus-
tice in this way also avoids the problem that faced Defective Reasoning theories.
Hare and Greene do not rule out disagreement between reasonable people. The
kind of intellectual error Hare and Greene’s theories cite does not involve saying that
at least one of the disagreeing parties has made a factual or inferential mistake. Rather
Hare and Greene only say that there is a correct view about the sort of reasoning
reasonable people ought to use to make moral and political judgements when they
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are trying to live in a shared social world. It is an intellectual error in this choice of
reasoning that causes reasonable disagreement about justice.
Hare and Greene’s theories also do not rule out reasonable disagreement involv-
ing intractably conflicting judgements. On their theories it is perfectly understand-
able why this occurs. As Greene (2013: 62–63, 2014b: 1018) argues, individuals from
different communities continue using their respective intuitions to reason because
doing so has been successful in the past. Likewise, Hare (1981: 39) argues that moral
and political judgements formed by reasoning at the intuitive level are “necessary for
human moral thinking”. This is because intuitive reasoning yields simple general prin-
ciples from which we can learn how to make moral and political judgements quickly
for a great variety of situations. In short, it is successful in helping us make personal
decisions and also collective decisions with others that largely share our intuitions and
sentiments. The versatility of using intuitive reasoning means that reasonable people
are not motivated to suddenly switch to a type of reasoning that would allow them
to agree with each other.
But, I submit, Hare and Greene’s theories face a number of problems when we
look closer at their claims about what precisely makes one type of reasoning erroneous
and another the correct for making moral and political judgements.5 For Hare (1981:
39–41) this comes down to the idea of universalisability. Reasoning that aims to make
judgements that universalise across similar situations and regardless of the judgement
makers role in those situations will be the correct type of reasoning. For Greene (2013:
117) the relevant idea is that manual mode reasoning involves the capacity to consider
what is of fundamental value, abstractly and counterfactually. This allows people to
put aside their conflicting intuitions. For Hare (1981: 111–115) and Greene (2013: 171–
174) the judgements that will tend to emerge from their the correct type of reason-
ing are utilitarian ones or judgements that pass the utilitarian normative standard for
right action or rules.
On Hare and Greene’s theories then, reasonable people can avoid disagreeing only
if they make the correct choice when reasoning about political matters. That is, only
if they set aside, or at least limit the influence of, moral intuitions and emotions. But,
even on Hare and Greene’s own examples where their respective explanations are sup-
posed to work there is still an open question whether the difference makers they cite
do cause disagreement rather than agreement. This is because in the case of Hare
many moral and political theories claim to offer judgements that satisfy universalis-
5See Kumar and May (2018: 34–39) for a version of this criticism target specifically at Greene’s
theory.
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ability. In short, universalisability is a too minimal, and too widely shared, idea to
really select some type of reasoning as a cause of disagreement. Disagreement occurs
even with the correct choice of reasoning. In Greene’s case, the difference makers fail
to show that either, instances of manual mode reasoning will involve deliberations of
the same sort and the use of the same values, or that some amount of autonomic in-
tuitive reasoning will not be present. In short, the difference makers do not actually
establish that choosing the correct type of reasoning can avoid disagreement.6
For instance, Hare (1981: 155) considers the example of a disagreement involving
the just administration of the right to free speech. In the example, a “public author-
ity” refuses an openly racist organisation from reserving the use of a public hall. The
disagreement emerges when, as Hare (1981: 155) says:
The racist organization then protests that it is being denied its right to
free speech. The public authority counters that it has an obligation
to preserve the right of minorities not to have hatred preached against
them, and that the public has a right to be protected against outbreaks
of violence.
For Hare what makes the difference between disagreement and agreement in the case
above is that at least one of the parties makes their normative judgement by appealing
to, or with the justification of, intuitions. Specifically that the racist organisation and
the public authority will merely justify their judgements about the free speech rights
justice requires by citing further intuitions. What the parties ought to do, according
to Hare (1981: 156), is step back and recognise that the only way to avoid disagreement
is to apply a mode of critical thinking which weighs up what ought to be done accord-
ing to the “logical considerations established by an understanding of the words used
in the questions we are asking, and compelling on anybody who is using the words in
the same senses”. For Hare (1981: 156) this means deciding what is just to do because
it conforms to principles “on the ground that they are the set of principles whose
6Of course there is another way to criticise Greene’s theory which involves criticising his epistemo-
logical and empirical claims. This is to criticise the distinction between intuition based judgement mak-
ing and abstract, counterfactual, critical reflection based judgement making. This amounts to showing
that their evaluation of the former is unreliable or epistemically suspect in some way compared to the
latter. See Prinz (2016) and Driver (2016) for arguments of this kind. I avoid this sort of criticism for
two reasons. The first reason is that much more empirical work needs to be done to decide whether
intuition based judgement making is completely separate from any form of reasoning or deliberation.
The second reason is that such arguments do not target the core claim of the Wrong Type of Reason-
ing version which is that there is a fact of the matter about what type of reasoning one ought to use in
deliberative about moral and political matters and that the wrong choice causes disagreements.
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general acceptance in the society in question will do the best, all told, for the inter-
ests of the people in the society considered impartially”. The idea is that adopting a
type of reasoning that seeks to universalise our moral judgement making in the way
utilitarianism asks of us will lead to agreement. A failure to do this will lead to dis-
agreement. In the case above, Hare believes that using critical thinking and seeking to
universalise our judgements will lead us to judge that the public authority ought to
guarantee broad freedom of speech qualified by restrictions on what specific things
may be said. This best approximates what, according to Hare, the utilitarian would
judge.
The problem with all this is that many mutually incompatible theories about
justice propose, or at least aim to propose, normative standards that satisfy the idea
of universalisability. Kantians, virtue ethicists, contractualists or any variety of non-
Kantian non-consequentialist deontology can all propose normative standards that
conform to the idea of universalisability.7 For instance in the case of the racist or-
ganisation, libertarians will counter that their judgement about the free speech rights
stems from it being a natural right and the principle that individuals have a natural
moral right to live and pursue projects as long they do not harm an other’s right to
do the same. And, they have come to this principle by thinking about the sort of
rights all individuals have regardless of who they are or their projects. As such, they
will claim that the right to free speech is something that all individuals have where as
no individuals have the right to not be subject to hate speech. The point here is that
non-utilitarians can equally claim to be following normative standards that satisfy
universalisability. This leaves it open for two individuals to use critical thinking and
yet continue to disagree because the political judgements they make can conform to
the universalising of different normative standards. Both the libertarian and Hare’s
utilitarian can claim to use a type of reasoning that looks to universalise their moral
judgement making. It is merely that they both disagree about the normative standard
that correctly does this job.
Given all that, the use of intuitive reasoning is not really what makes the differ-
ence between reasonable disagreement and reasonable agreement. After all, the sort
of reasoning that was supposed to make the difference by satisfying universalisability
– critical thinking – can also lead to disagreement. This means that Hare does not ac-
tually tell us why reasonable disagreements occurs rather than reasonable agreements.
Rather Hare only contrasts two ways that disagreement can arise. He does not tell us
why the wrong choice of making judgements with intuitive reasoning leads to reason-
7See George Sher (1984: 183–184) for similar criticism.
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able disagreement, but critical thinking does not.
This is similar to Greene’s example of abortion. Greene (2013: 309, 322) uses abor-
tion as a case study for his explanation by taking the real example of disagreement
between “pro-choice” and “pro-life” judgements in the United States of America.
What interests us is whether Greene’s difference maker – manual mode reasoning
– actually makes the difference between disagreement and agreement. Greene strips
the disagreement down to what he considers to be two honest positions. This means
stripping the positions of judgements that appeal to phenomena the other side does
not accept, like souls or “confident talk about a ‘right to life’ and a ‘right to choose”’.
Greene (2013: 321–322) then summarises the disagreement as a clash of political judge-
ments formed by the use of moral intuitions about the innocence of human souls and
the coercion of women. Greene summarises the “pro-life” position as:
You can’t rightly kill an innocent human soul. I know that this is partly
a matter of faith. And I understand that we’re supposed to respect each
other’s beliefs. Bur I just can’t see letting people kill something, even
if it’s small, so long as there might be a human soul in there. I know
that’s hard on a lot of people who don’t want to be pregnant. But, those
people made a choice to have sex (except in the case of rape, which is
different), and killing something that maybe has a human soul is not a
legitimate way to undo that choice. That’s how I feel.
He then summarises the “pro-choice” position as:
Forcing a woman to do that seems worse to me than killing a froggy little
human. Third trimester fetuses, however, don’t look froggy. They look
like babies. And killing babies is clearly wrong. So if the fetus you’re
carrying looks kinda froggy, then I think it’s okay for you to kill it, if
that’s your choice. But, if your fetus looks like a real baby, and not a
little froggy thing, then I think you have to let it live, even if you don’t
want to. That’s how I feel.
According to Greene, using manual mode reasoning in this case amounts to weigh-
ing up the consequences of acting on each of the opposing political judgements and
choosing the one that brings about the best consequences measured against a com-
mon currency of human values. Which currency? According to Greene (2016: 175,
2013: 161), the common currency of human values is happiness, or qualitatively posi-
tive experiences. The justification for this currency is that it is what all human beings
intrinsically value and so it is impartial with respect to a disagreeing party’s intuitions
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and it is general enough to use in manual mode reasoning in a range of disagreements
regardless of the specific judgements in play. As Greene (2016: 175) says:
…I argue that deep pragmatism (utilitarianism, properly understood
and wisely applied) is our best bet for a global “metamorality,” a higher-
order normative standard that adjudicates among competing tribal val-
ues and interests, just as a single tribe’s value system adjudicates among
the competing values and interests of its individual members. I do not
claim that deep pragmatism is the moral truth, only that it’s our most
promising metamorality.
The point of all this is that given Greene’s theory, when we take happiness or qualita-
tively positive experiences as the common currency of human values and combine it
with the account given of manual and automatic reasoning, we get an explanation of
why reasonable disagreement occurs and how it can be avoided.
When applied to the example of abortion, the consequences of the “pro-choice”
judgements are that forcing women into pregnancies can, when the woman does not
want to have the pregnancy, place great emotional strain and perhaps lead her to care
less for the new born child. All round the consequences of legalising abortion is that
it prevents having to forcing women to do something against their will that create
lots of unhappiness. For Greene, once we leave aside the pro-life judgements based
on metaphysical beliefs about the soul which pro-choicer’s do not share, we can weigh
the consequences of the “pro-choice” judgement in purely manual mode reasoning.
Pro-life judgements would lead to more people existing and would most likely result
in a net gain in happiness. According to Greene the choice of manual mode reasoning
leads us to accept the “pro-choice” judgement. This is because it is too much to ask
of “nonheroic people” that they weigh their own happiness less than the happiness
of non-existent lives with the potential to be happy. To that end Greene (2013: 325–
326) thinks more happiness is created by arbitrarily drawing a line between when a
human can be killed in the womb and when it can’t rather than “Disrupting people’s
sex lives, disrupting people’s life plans, and forcing people to seek international or
illegal abortions”. This is the conclusion Greene thinks each party would reach if they
used pure manual mode reasoning. Reasonable disagreements about the laws relating
to abortion would be avoided. It is because individuals choose not to reason about
issues using manual mode reasoning that disagreement arises and persists. Using the
automatic mode of reasoning by appealing to moral intuitions and parochial values
is what causes reasonable people to disagree.
There are, I submit, three problems with Greene’s explanation. The first problem
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is that the explanation does not actually justify why manual mode reasoning would
entail the sort of calculation about demandingness that Greene supposes in the abor-
tion case. The second problem is that it does not establish that manual mode reason-
ing, at least in the abortion case, relies on intuitions any less than automatic mode
reasoning. The third problem is that Greene’s explanation does not establish that
happiness is the common currency of reasonable people’s shared moral values.
The first problem emerges because Greene’s argument for why manual mode rea-
soning (and not automatic mode reasoning) resolves a disagreement like the abortion
case is that it hinges on a particular view about the calculation that would be involved
in using manual mode reasoning. Specifically the calculation is that it is too demand-
ing to ask of living people to prefer to bring about more potentially happy people
through outlawing abortion than to prefer the happiness of living people who do
want to get an abortion. Greene refers to this demandingness as consequences that are
“too good” because it demands restrictions on other aspects of life like contraception
and abstinence. But, on the other hand as Greene (2013: 325) says “the pro-choicer’s
utilitarian arguments are not too good. They’re just plain good”. They appropriately
weigh up the consequences of “Disrupting people’s sex lives, disrupting people’s life
plans, and forcing people to seek international or illegal abortions”. Simply put man-
ual mode reasoning would lead us to the pro-choicer’s judgement because of how that
type of reasoning forces us to accurately weigh the consequences of abortion.
But it seems entirely consistent that someone might make the very opposite
weighing of the consequences of the pro-life or pro-choice positions when using man-
ual mode reasoning. This is not philosophical speculation. Kahane et al. (2012) have
shown that that manual mode judgement making cuts across non-utilitarian judge-
ments. In short, people do make non-utilitarian judgements when using their manual
mode reasoning. Greene does not offer any principled reason why the moral demand-
ingness of the pro-life judgement’s consequences are decisive in not taking it seriously.
This is a straightforward case of either probabilities that are vague or indeterminate
because the consequences involve humans who do not exist yet. Greene’s judgement
that the pro-life judgement is too demanding assumes a particular view about how
potentially happy non-existent people will be. But, a range of plausible conflicting
judgements appear possible when guessing how non-existent people will turn out or
the happiness they will derive from their experiences. For instance the pro-lifer could
point to the equally demanding consequences for women who want to become preg-
nant and yet live in a society that assumes the rational course of action is to have an
abortion given their financial situation. The pro-life could also temper Greene’s ar-
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gument by point to the possibility of people who have abortions who would have
had happier lives if they had been prevented from doing so. The pro-lifer could argue
that a society in which not having abortions becomes a norm is one where society will
see the need to improve the financial situation of those with children. This would
definitely not have the demanding consequences that Greene supposes. The point
of all this is simply that much more needs to be said to establish that manual mode
reasoning would yield the sort of calculations about demandingness that entail the
pro-choicer’s judgement about abortion rights.
The second problem with Greene’s explanation arises because even if we assume
that the calculations involved in manual mode reasoning can be shown to resolve
reasonable disagreements, it is not clear why it would not involve the use of moral in-
tuitions. For instance, Jesse Prinz (2016: 57–60) argues experimental evidence shows
that the intuitions that characterise automatic mode reasoning are equally present in
cases where people make the utilitarian judgements that characterise manual mode
reasoning. He argues the more plausible interpretation of Greene’s studies is that
some people regulate their emotions in different ways no matter how they make their
moral and political judgements.
Also, James Woodward (2016: 87–93, 104–105) argues experimental evidence
shows that the neural structures that Greene classifies as used for automatic mode
reasoning – ventromedial prefrontal cortex, orbital frontal cortex, anterior cingulate
cortex, insula and amygdala – are actually all used in information processing and that
Greene’s view relies on the mistaken assumption that evaluative and practical judge-
ments could be made without those neutral structures. Woodward argues that these
neural structures are crucial in processing uncertain consequences and any sort of
value like human happiness. The point here is that when making judgements with
the sort of utilitarian calculation that Greene says will avoid disagreement we do not
know the probability distributions on the various effects of our actions. This means
that it is not obvious that judgements made using manual mode reasoning will be
much different from the judgements reached by automatic mode reasoning. This is
because the range and depth of information that needs to be considered when using
manual mode reasoning consistently in political disagreements will involve estimates
which will be open to the same kinds of differences as the intuitive differences in au-
tomatic mode reasoning. Woodward argues that when people use the sort of manual
mode reasoning that Greene thinks will avoid disagreements like in the abortion case,
they will really be making complex calculations that involve reasoning about how best
to calculate and increase happiness given all the information they have about the past
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and the future. This sort of reasoning is not merely tallying happiness or unhappiness,
but also calculating the best strategy to increase happiness in the long-term. Wood-
ward thinks this sort of complex calculation will at best allow and at worst require
making judgements using one’s emotions or intuitions. If this is the case then man-
ual mode reasoning is as likely to lead to disagreements as automatic mode reasoning.
Given all this, Greene’s explanation of the abortion case does not hold. As an exam-
ple of manual mode reasoning it shows reasonable disagreement can arise and persist
despite the use of such reasoning.
The third, and most worrying problem for Greene’s explanation is that even if we
grant that the calculations involved in manual mode reasoning can be largely done
without the presence of moral intuitions, he provides no justification for happiness
as the currency of those calculations. Whilst Greene’s justification for manual mode
reasoning as resulting in broadly consequentialist normative judgements is supported
by considerable empirical evidence, the theory of value that Greene needs to justify
manual mode reasoning as the right type of reasoning is not supported by the same
evidence. Greene’s (2013: 190–192) only justification for happiness as the common
currency in our shared moral values is a series of rhetorical questions about why we
“care” about certain states of affairs. Greene’s conclusion is that all our desires and
concerns are grounded in improving the quality of experiences for ourselves or oth-
ers and decreasing the harm and displeasure. But, this is a conjecture. It is entirely
consistent with the “pro-life” position that those who hold it do not take happiness
as what grounds all our desires and concerns. In fact we might think that part of what
a reasonable disagreement concerning abortion is really about is precisely what in the
consequences of our judgements we ought to care about. Greene gives us no reason
why those who endorse a ground other than happiness are being any more irrational
or incoherent than those who endorse happiness as the ground.8 Greene cannot jus-
tify citing the difference maker he does without giving us such a reason. For Greene’s
theory to work he needs to justify the causal claim that it is only the intuitive automo-
tive mode of judgement making that makes the difference in bringing about a state
of affairs of disagreement rather than agreement. But, this is precisely what Greene
cannot do without assuming happiness as the normative standard for when political
judgements are erroneous. It is consistent with Greene’s theory that two individuals
each of whom uses manual mode reasoning but who take different things as the ‘com-
8See Kahane (2016: 291–292) for a similar point but in relation to treating Greene’s explanation
as a debunking explanation of the reliability of intuition based judgement making. Kahane argues
that characterising intuitions as less reliable ways of making true judgements fails without assuming
utilitarianism as the normative standard for judgements.
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mon currency’ of all our desires and concerns will result in a reasonable disagreement.
Greene’s theory needs to go beyond conjecture and until his theory does so it cannot
cite the difference maker it aims to.
Given all these problems, I submit, it is safe to reject the Wrong Type of Reason-
ing theories. I argued in various ways against both Hare and Greene that, either they
cannot actually justify why a particular type of reasoning ensures reasonable disagree-
ment will not occur, or they cannot establish a clear enough distinction between the
correct type of reasoning and the incorrect type of reasoning, or they do not establish
the normative standard that distinguishes the correct type of reasoning will not itself
be the subject reasonable disagreement. Taken collectively I believe this gives us good
reason to reject the Wrong Type of Reasoning theories and as a consequence reject
the Imperfection Family.
4 Historical-Psychological Family
In the last section I argued that we ought to reject the Imperfection Family of theories
for explaining reasonable disagreement on the basis that both of the types of theories
in that family fail. The Defective Reasoning theories either rule out reasonable dis-
agreement about justice altogether, and the Wrong Type of Reasoning theories either
cite a fact that does not make a difference between disagreement and agreement, or
fail to justify the normative standard that would pick out such a fact.
One obvious way to try and avoid these problems is to leave aside the notion of
intellectual error that characterises the Imperfection Family of theories. Rather than
looking for difference makers in facts about the sort of intellectual error that can occur
in moral and political judgement making, we might think a better explanatory strat-
egy is to look for difference makers in facts about the psychology and histories of the
judgement makers and how these facts affect what judgements they make. Theories
like this comprise the Historical-Psychological Family.
As I have already mentioned, the strategy of looking to particular facts about
the psychology and histories of the judgement makers to explain reasonable disagree-
ment, lends itself to the type of theories best supported by empirical moral psychol-
ogy. The most developed contemporary theory like this is Jonathan Haidt’s Moral
Foundations Theory. It proposes differences in moral intuitions and constructed life
narratives as the psychological and historical facts that make the difference between
reasonable disagreement and reasonable agreement.
This might seem odd. After all, there are other theories of moral psychology
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about the nature of moral judgement making. For instance, there is a long-tradition
in psychology from Piaget and Kohlberg, to Turiel, and more recently Nichols on the
nature of moral development and the capacity for moral judgement making.9 Why
not focus on these? I offer two reasons.
The first reason is that, as I just said, they have so far been concerned with provid-
ing empirically grounded accounts of people’s capacity for moral judgement making.
They have not focused on explaining psychological differences in judgement makers
as a way to explain the type of moral and political disagreement between reasonable
people. This is the core phenomenon in reasonable disagreement about justice. As
such, they simply have not targeted the explanandum I am considering in this the-
sis. In contrast, Haidt’s (2012: 9) Moral Foundations Theory aims to explain as he
says, “…why it’s so hard for us to get along…why we are so easily divided into hostile
groups, each one certain of its righteousness”. Haidt’s focus on the “righteous mind”
is a focus on a state of affairs where each participant in a reasonable disagreement in-
sists their judgement is correct despite interaction with other parties. This focus is
also borne out in the examples that Haidt uses. Particularly the ones between the
major political parties in the USA. Haidt’s focus in all this is precisely at what leads
reasonable people (ie. those with a minimally adequate level of moral development)
to form into distinct disagreeing groups within and across cultures.
The second reason for not focusing on the long tradition of moral psychologists
is that the little that these theories do have to say about disagreement largely involves,
in the case of Piaget (1965) and Kohlberg (1984) citing a lack of moral development,
and in the case of Turiel (2002) and Nichols (2004) citing differences in intuitions
and information assumptions about their social world, that produce different core
normative theories that people use to make judgements. In Piaget and Kohlberg’s
case the explanation collapses into a type of theory in the Imperfection Family (which
we already rejected). In Turiel and Nichols’s case the explanation ends up being the
sort of historical-psychological explanation I argued was too general to be relevant for
our purposes. This of course doesn’t mean that they are not relevant for explaining
reasonable disagreement whatsoever. As I’ll show later in this section, they provide
compelling evidence against aspects of Haidt’s theory and show how we need to go
beyond moral psychology for an adequate explanation of reasonable disagreement.
With all that in mind, the rest of this section proceeds as follows. In §4.1 describe
Haidt’s theory and detail how it proposes to explain reasonable disagreement. In §4.2
9There are of course more theorists in the tradition but I mention the most prominent touchstones
for philosophy.
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I argue that it cannot do what it aims to do and how as a result we have good reason to
reject the view. I will argue that the theory fails on the measure of explanatory power
because it cannot account for disagreements that result from people changing their
judgements through reflection. The theory both runs contrary to the obvious fact
that people do change their minds through reflection and relies on a model of moral
cognition that is itself empirically contested. Both of these problems mean it offers
an implausible explanation of reasonable disagreement about justice.
4.1 Moral Foundations Theory
For Haidt, the facts that make the difference between reasonable disagreement and
reasonable agreement are the differences in reasonable people’s moral intuitions, or
more specifically the pattern of moral intuition in their cognitive process of making
moral and political judgements (ie. their moral cognition). Haidt (2012: 147, 194–195,
198) argues these differences in a person’s moral intuitions are modelled as “moral
matrices” within the framework of six foundational dimensions of morality. Each
dimension corresponds to a particular intuitively desired or hated type of personal
and social activity. This framework of the foundational dimensions of morality is
a result of the kinds of personal and social actions that were naturally selected for.
Haidt (2012: 94–96, 158–160, 214) cities anthropological studies as the primary evi-
dence that the framework exists across cultures and particular human communities.
What determines the particular moral matrices that particular individuals have on this
framework, are the intuitions people are born with and childhood experiences that
reinforce these intuitions.
An individual’s moral and political judgements are caused by the combination
of genes which determine a brain structure with a pattern of moral intuitions and
then childhood experiences that reinforce particular intuitions over others (Haidt
2012: 166, 328–336). This is why the moral matrix that leads a person to make par-
ticular moral and political judgements persist despite interaction with those they dis-
agree with. The unalterable causal influence of one’s genes and childhood experiences
continue to determine one’s brain structure into adulthood. This explains the evi-
dence that Haidt (2012: 118–119) points to where adults experience disagreement that
persists despite deliberation with other interlocutors. Making sense of or explaining
their childhood experiences – understood by Haidt as the ‘construction of life narra-
tives’ – solidifies an individual’s particular moral matrix for what she considers to be
morally right or just. This is because as Haidt (2012: 334) says human beings construct
narratives as part of a process to confirm their identity within their community. Indi-
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viduals see their childhood experiences of being taught a preference for certain moral
sentiments as part of their intrinsic identity. For Haidt the construction of life nar-
ratives is a psychological fact about how human beings reflect on their childhood ex-
periences. This fact of life narrative construction “binds and blinds” by which Haidt
(2012: 366) means the life narratives reinforce the determining forces of one’s genes
and childhood experiences.
For Haidt (2012: 42–45, 121), all of this theory so far is situated in a particular
dialectic where he is arguing against what he calls the “Rationalist”. He dubs the “ra-
tionalist delusion” as the view that abstract deliberative reasoning – understood as the
weighing of evidence, desires, norms and the reasons they all generate – plays the cen-
tral role in determining the moral and political judgements individuals form. Haidt’s
(2012: 27, 34–36, 41–42) main evidence against the “rationalist delusion” are the ex-
periments he cites that show children and adults across cultures make moral and po-
litical judgements without abstract reflective reasoning. Haidt argues that this points
to something other than reasoning playing the central role in generating moral and
political judgements. In addition, Haidt presents evidence that shows what appears
to look like reflection when making moral and political judgements is actually post-
hoc rationalising which involves looking for reasons for a judgement that has already
been made. Haidt (2012: 43–45, 59–63) cites evidence that children invent harms and
victims of harming in the face of questioning about their moral and political judge-
ments. With such evidence Haidt argues that the Rationalist view is unsupported
by modern theories of moral psychology. Rather the anthropological, psychological
and neuroscientific evidence he cites supports his theory of moral psychology and the
difference makers that it cites as the facts that cause reasonable disagreement.
All of this comes together in what Haidt (2012: 71) calls the “Social Intuitionist
Model” of moral judgement making. On this model, moral judgement making be-
gins with moral intuitions which are a form of cognition. The particular set of moral
intuitions an individual has and is disposed to employ make up their moral matrix.
This matrix is determined by her genes and personal childhood experiences. The fir-
ing of a particular moral intuition in response to some personal or social activity, then
causes reasonable people to make moral and political judgements. These judgements
are either reinforced by other people’s intuitions, judgements and reasoning or rein-
forced by our post-hoc reasoning. In both cases an individual forms a narrative that
confirms certain parts of their moral matrix over others. From there the cycle begins
again with reasonable people’s moral intuitions firing and causing moral and political
judgements. In sum, when an individual’s genes and personal history diverge from
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her interlocutor a disagreement is caused. This is because these are the facts that cause
reasonable people to have different moral matricies and different moral matricies be-
tween reasonable people is the fact that makes the difference between reasonable dis-
agreement and reasonable agreement.
All this immediately improves on the Imperfection Family of theories in two ways.
The first way is that, Haidt’s theory does not rule out the very phenomenon being
explained. It does not rule out disagreements being intractable or between reasonable
people. The second way is that it avoids having to ground the difference makers in any
property of reasoning, substantive normative standard or any facts that might itself be
the subject of reasonable disagreement. It only needs to cite differences in a restricted
set of facts about a reasonable person’s psychology and history as difference makers
which might in turn ground various things about human reasoning.
4.2 Reflective Judgement Making
There are, I submit, two problems with Haidt’s theory. Both of which arise because
of how he responds to cases of reflective judgement making. The first problem is that
Haidt’s response – that such cases are rare if they occur at all – is not supported by
the empirical evidence on how people make moral and political judgements. The sec-
ond problem is that Haidt’s response, and broader theory, relies on an implausible
model of cognition for moral judgement making because it also runs contrary to lots
of empirical evidence. I believe both problems give us good reason to reject Haidt’s
theory, and accept a more modest view of the psychological basis of moral and polit-
ical judgement making.
The two problems with Haidt’s theory emerge when we consider cases where rea-
sonable people make new moral or political judgements after reflecting on their pre-
vious judgements. This sort of reflective judgement making can occur in two ways.
One way is that reasonable people in reflecting on their previous judgements, recon-
sider how much weight or how much emphasis they placed on one part of their moral
matrix over another. This can then lead them to rerun their judgement making in a
more deliberative way and make a new different judgement. A clear example of this is
when people hear new arguments or have new experiences and weigh up deliberative
considerations differently.
Another way reflective judgement making can occur is when reasonable people
reflect on the place of deliberative considerations in their reasoning itself. After hear-
ing entirely new arguments, having new transformative experiences or by simply ques-
tioning why they have certain intuitions or take certain considerations seriously they
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may drop a consideration altogether or adopt new ones. This then leads to a new de-
liberative process and making a different judgement. A clear example of this would
be when people ask themselves why they have certain long held assumptions. They
may find they can’t see them as plausible any longer and discharge them or replace
them with new assumptions.
In both ways that reflective judgement making can occur reasonable people can
find themselves in disagreement with new interlocutors or in renewed disagreement
with old interlocutors. That this occurs is obvious and beyond doubt. Whilst it might
be plausible to imagine reflection plays no role in any initial judgement making in
children or adolescents, it is obvious it plays a role when individuals mature and begin
to think reflectively. From ordinary people to moral philosophers, people make new
judgements through reflection and find themselves in new reasonable disagreements.
But Haidt’s theory, I submit, does not have the ability to cite the facts that explain
how those cases of reasonable disagreement arise. This is because the whole theory is
based around showing how intuitions are the sole cognitive element that cause peo-
ple to make moral judgements. Even when people make new judgements that con-
flict with earlier ones it is because their intuitions change according to other people’s
intuitions or judgements. This is a severe explanatory weakness. Reasonable disagree-
ments obviously occur as a result of reflective judgement making. Not explaining
such a case is worrying because Haidt’s theory was supposed to be an improvement
on the Imperfection Family of theories. But, theories in the Imperfection Family can
easily explain cases of reflective judgement making. They will simply cite the facts
about the intellectual error that individuals make in their process of reflection. If
theories like Haidt’s are supposed to be a serious improvement on the Imperfection
Family they need to at least say something that explains cases of judgement change
through reflection.
The two problems for Haidt’s theory arise because of how he responds to this
explanatory weakness. Haidt argues that reflective judgement making that results in
new judgements is rare. Whilst reflection is a possibility, judgement change occurs
most of the time, if not all the time, by the social influence of other people’s judge-
ments. Other people’s judgements trigger new intuitions that can change judgements.
But ultimately, moral and political judgements according to Haidt all start by the fir-
ing of moral intuitions. As Haidt (2012: 71) says:
We make our first judgements rapidly, and we are dreadful at seeking
out evidence that might disconfirm those initial judgments. Yet friends
can do for us what we cannot do for ourselves: they can challenge us,
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giving us reasons and arguments (link 3) that sometimes trigger new in-
tuitions, thereby making it possible for us to change our minds. We oc-
casionally do this when mulling a problem by ourselves, suddenly see-
ing things in a new light or from a new perspective (to use two visual
metaphors).…For most of us, it’s not every day or even every month that
we change our mind about a moral issue without any prompting from
anyone else. Far more common than such private mind changing is so-
cial influence.
Unfortunately Haidt provides little argument or evidence to support his claim that
judgement change through reflection is rare.10 In fact, Haidt (2012: 71, fn. 44) ac-
knowledges his lack of evidence, but does not see it as a problem when he says:
One of the most common criticisms of the social intuitionist model
from philosophers is that links 5 and 6, which I show as dotted lines,
might in fact be much more frequent in daily life than I assert. See, for
example, Greene, forthcoming. These critics present no evidence, but,
in fairness, I have no evidence either as to the actual frequency in daily
life with which people reason their way to counterintuitive conclusions
(link 5) or change their minds during private reflection about moral mat-
ters (link 6). Of course people change their minds on moral issues, but
I suspect that in most cases the cause of change was a new intuitively
compelling experience (link 1), such as seeing a sonogram of a fetus, or
an intuitively compelling argument made by another person (link 3). I
also suspect that philosophers are able to override their initial intuitions
more easily than can ordinary folk, based on findings by Kuhn (1991).
Haidt’s position here is to maintain that making new judgements through reflection
is rare and so any explanatory weakness is minimal. His main defence seems to be
that the empirical evidence supporting his theory of moral psychology with its So-
cial Intuitionist Model is compelling enough to show that most changes to earlier
judgements occur through new intuitions. On this view reflective and unreflective
judgement making involve distinct cognitive mechanisms. For Haidt, the latter is
what overwhelming produces moral and political judgements. Any appearance of re-
flection on how one made one’s political judgement is really post-hoc rationalisation
10Prinz (2016: 61–62) has the same worry, but goes further and says that it is unlikely Haidt can
ever provide evidence or this sort because it would involve a “massive reservoir of field data” of varied
people making moral judgements throughout their ordinary daily life.
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that involves convincing one’s self that we have good reason to make the judgement
in the first place (Haidt 2012: 366). The point here is that the best explanation of
reflective judgement making is that it is either rare or merely appears as such.
The first problem with Haidt’s response is that regardless of the evidence in favour
of the Social Intuitionist Model, the empirical evidence is not clear that reflective
judgement making is rare. Empirical evidence shows that when people are either,
primed by non-moral and non-political questioning that requires reflection to answer
correctly, or given time to reflect on their judgements, they do tend to be reflective and
reinforce or override the judgements they make based purely on initial intuitions.11
Importantly this evidence is of a random sample of participants and not university
students or philosophers who Haidt suspects do reflect and change judgements more
frequently than others. Aside from this, Daniel Jacobson (2012: 298–304) has argued
recently that much of Haidt’s interpretation of the empirical evidence relies on an
equivocation between whether people are unable to state a reason for their moral and
political judgements and whether people do not have any reason at all for their moral
and political judgements. It is evidence for the latter that would show that reflection
in moral and political judgement making is rare. But, Haidt only presents evidence
for the former. All this suggests that we have at least some reason to think reflective
judgement making is not as rare as Haidt thinks.
The second problem with Haidt’s response is that his model of moral cognition, is
not as clearly supported by the evidence as he claims. Recently some have argued that
a view that recognises deliberative reasoning and intuitions as both involved in moral
cognition to produce moral and political judgements is a better view than Haidt’s. For
instance, Kennett and Gerrans (2016: 76–82) argue that most of the evidence Haidt
cites as support for his model of moral cognition is based on individual responses
to cases where they are forced to make moral decisions which are “synchronic” (for
Kennett and Gerrans this means instantaneous verdicts unconnected over time). But,
moral decisions are not made this way in our daily lives; moral decisions involve delib-
eration over time and are often embedded in seeing ourselves as “diachronic agents”
where our actions over time are causally interconnected. This seems particularly rel-
evant because moral and political judgements are the sorts of judgements that have
multiple downstream effects that will give rise to making further judgements. Ken-
nett and Gerrans note that the separation of intuition based judgement making and
deliberative reasoning based judgement making is only supported if we view moral
and political judgements in a purely synchronic way. When viewed as more complex
11See Stanley Et Al. (2019) and Paxton Et Al. (2011: 8–11).
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cognitive acts we have reason to think that intuitions are not purely non-rational trig-
gers for political judgements, but rather ways to deliberate about various social, causal
and immediate pressures that will affect our actions. The use of intuition to make
judgements contains reasoning of a sort.
Some have taken the further step to question Haidt’s claims about intuitions as
cognitive acts. Particularly that intuitions are not triggers for judgement making that
are “fixed and stereotyped responses to environmental conditions that are unaffected
by learning and experience” (Woodward 2016: 93). Rather intuition based judgement
making is a form of cognition that is moulded by reflection. For instance, Hanno
Sauer (2015: 161–163, 2012: 266–270) has shown that there is empirical evidence that
moral intuitions are not merely modified by other people’s judgements, but also by
reflection that builds up considerations that speak in favour of or against particular
intuitions.
Contesting Haidt’s theory on empirical grounds like this is not meant to cast
doubt on the very attempt to offer an empirical basis for moral judgement making.
Rather the evidence merely shows that we do have reason to think that the use of re-
flective deliberative reasoning to make moral and political judgements is not as rare
as Haidt claims and that Haidt’s view of moral cognition is not as well supported by
evidence as he claims. This does not mean that new empirical evidence could not pos-
sibly support Haidt’s model of the human mind and political judgement making. It
only shows that the reasons we had to adopt Haidt’s theory are not as strong as they
first seemed when we considered judgement change through reflection. It fails to ex-
plain a significant case set of reasonable disagreements. This is because it relies on a
disjointed view of what goes on in people’s minds when they make moral and political
judgements. It relies on a disjointed model of moral cognition.
Given these empirical doubts, the more plausible view of moral cognition is that it
involves cognitive acts on a spectrum from unreflective intuitive to reflective delibera-
tive.12 The more complex or greater number of inputs to the cognitive mechanism, by
which I mean the host of desires, emotional dispositions, evidence and information
that typically count as deliberative considerations, the more reflective and deliberative
our judgement making is. The fewer or less complex the inputs, the more unreflective
and intuitive our judgement making is. In fact Prinz (2016: 67–68) and, Kennett and
Fine (2009: 88–91) have argued the empirical evidence actually shows an integrative
model of moral and political judgement making is right.13 On this view, the brain
12See also LaFollette and Woodruff (2015: 457–459) on a similar point.
13See Patterson et al. (2012), Young and Dungan (2012), and Schuler and Churchland (2011) on this
as well.
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is seen as having areas with different functions, with moral and political judgements
being caused by a mix of emotional dispositions and deliberative reasoning. This sup-
ports the more modest theory of moral cognition proposed by Shaun Nichols (2004:
27–29, 62, Ch6.). The idea being that the most plausible view of the psychological
foundations of moral and political judgement making lie somewhere between the
complete rationalist view and complete intuitionist view like Haidt’s. That rather,
it involves people possessing a normative theory of moral and political beliefs that
are entwined with moral emotions such that depending on how the emotions are
regulated and sorted, judgements according to the normative theory will range from
intuitive to reflective.
Given the two problems in Haidt’s response to cases of reflective judgement mak-
ing and the countervailing evidence in favour of a more modest model of moral and
political judgement making we have good reason to reject Haidt’s theory and move
to what I call the Conceptual Family of theories in the next section. This move is not
about ignoring psychological evidence or trying to explain reasonable disagreement
with abstract entities. Rather it is to accept the general view of moral cognition I have
mentioned and looking at facts about the role of concepts in the cognitive process of
judgement making.
5 Conceptual Family
So far I have argued that we have good reason to reject the Imperfection and
Historical-Psychological Family of theories for explaining reasonable disagreement.
In this section I consider an alternative that attempts to avoid those problems: the
Conceptual Family. This family involves theories which cite facts about the role of
concepts in moral and political judgement making as difference makers. This strategy
involves proposing a model of the cognitive process of moral and political judgement
making that treats concepts as the explanatorily significant element. This strategy,
allows theories to assume a general view of moral cognition where a plurality of psy-
chological and historical facts sit at the foundation of judgement making. But, rather
than trying to identify any particular psychological and historical facts, theories cite
facts about the role of concepts as a particular information structure in moral cogni-
tion, and how this role is affected by a plurality of more foundational psychological
and historical facts.
The facts that these theories cite fall into two types. One type of fact is differences
in how people use concepts to form conflicting conceptions to explain reasonable
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disagreement. Conceptions are general beliefs, typically principles that describe re-
quirements, that people hold about justice or morality generally.14 People then use
these conceptions to make specific judgements about institutions and outcomes. I
call theories that cite this type of fact Concept Use theories. Another type of fact is
differences in how people possess concepts, and how they use them to form conflict-
ing conceptions. I call theories that cite this type of fact Concept Possession and Use
theories.
Given all that, the rest of this section proceeds as follows. In §5.1 I argue Con-
cept Use Theories, whilst avoiding the objections that faced the Imperfection and
Historical-Psychological Family of theories cannot explain reasonable disagreements
that are deep disagreements and so is explanatorily weak. In §5.2 I argue that this
leaves Concept Possession and Use theories as comparatively the best explanation of
reasonable disagreement. This is because it can avoid the objections that faced the-
ories that take up the Imperfection and Historical-Psychological views, and explain
reasonable disagreements that are deep disagreements. Given that, it offers the most
powerful explanation of reasonable disagreement. But I argue, the only extant theory
that instantiates the type of theory suffers two serious problems. I argue, however,
that rather than giving us reason to reject Concept Possession and Use theories, it mo-
tivates us to look for a better instantiation of it, which I take up in the next chapter.
5.1 Concept Use
As I have mentioned, Concept Use theories cite facts about differences in how people
use concepts to form conceptions (ie. general beliefs about what justice or morality re-
quires) to explain reasonable disagreement. One useful starting point to understand
what this involves is what John Rawls (2005: 54–58) gestured towards with the “bur-
dens of judgement” as the sources of reasonable disagreement.15 For Rawls, there are
six sources of reasonable disagreement:
1. The complexity and conflicting nature of empirical evidence.
2. Differences in the weight people afford deliberative considerations for making
judgements.
14For this distinction between concepts and conceptions, see Rey (1985, 1983) for its early use in
the philosophy of language and mind and Rawls (2005: 14, fn.15, 1999: 5–6, 9) for its use in political
philosophy.
15See also Vallier (2019: 19–25) on Hayek’s “scales of value” as a similar starting point.
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3. Differences in how we use concepts because of their inherent vagueness in cer-
tain hard cases.
4. Differences in people’s personal experiences affect how they weigh evidence
and values.
5. Differences in the kinds of deliberative considerations relevant to certain cases
makes it difficult to weigh them against each other.
6. Social institutions are limited in the values they can embody which makes it
difficult to weigh and prioritise some values over others.
These sources illustrate the sort of facts Concept Use theories cite in their explanatory
models. They all involve various ways reasonable people’s weighing of deliberative
considerations is affected in such a way that people form conflicting conceptions, and
make conflicting political judgements. The only issue is that Rawls offers no account
of how the sources interact in a cognitive process where concepts are used to make
moral and political judgements and why they are the sources that explain reasonable
disagreement. This is the crucial departure point for Concept Use theories. They offer
an explanatory model that explicates how the burdens operate in a cognitive process
to affect how people use concepts to form conceptions.
Andrew Mason (1993) and Christopher McMahon (2009) propose theories of
this variety. They propose explanatory models that cite differences in people’s psy-
chological dispositions and personal experiences, as the facts that make the difference
between reasonable disagreement and reasonable agreement. This involves describ-
ing how psychological dispositions and personal experiences affect how reasonable
people weigh up deliberative considerations such that they form conflicting concep-
tions, and then make conflict political judgements according to them. Mason and
McMahon theories then differ on the details of how to cash out the cognitive process
of using concepts to form conceptions in their respective explanatory models.
The key notion in Mason’s explanatory model is the idea of essentially contestable
concepts. Mason (1993: 58) unpacks this as follows:
Key political concepts such as ‘democracy’ and ‘social justice’ are essen-
tially contested. They accredit a complex, valued achievement. Differ-
ent elements in this achievement may be weighted differently by differ-
ent contestants.
The idea here is that some concepts admit conflicting ways of forming conceptions
because they involve considerations that are sufficiently complex to such that they
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permit reasonable people to weigh them differently. For Mason (1993: 59), explain-
ing why this happens involves an explanation of why moral and political concepts are
actually contested. Mason’s explanation for this, after significant revisions and qualifi-
cations to W.B. Gallie’s original account, is that, “When there is some measure of free-
dom of thought and expression, political disagreement will emerge because different
uses of a number of political concepts are reasonable and, under these circumstances,
there will be a diversity of rational and non-rational causes of political belief forma-
tion.” The idea here is that when we assume people are reasonable and not under
some external coercion to believe what they believe, there will be different rational
and non-rational factors which affect how they weigh the deliberative considerations
provided by the content of their concepts to then form conflicting political beliefs (ie.
conceptions).
But what are the “rational and non-rational” factors that affect how people form
conceptions? These are, as Mason (1993: 15, 99–100) says, “the reasons that people
have for making the judgements” or in other words their deliberative considerations,
and the “psychological propensities or personal experiences” that affect how parties
weigh the deliberative considerations provided by a concept. This means that even
when reasonable people make no mistake in reasoning, they can form conflicting con-
ceptions that entail conflicting judgements because of the differences in their psycho-
logical propensities and personal experiences that affect how they weigh the delibera-
tive considerations associated with some concept. Given that these propensities and
personal experiences cannot be erased, they give rise to conceptions that conflict to
such an extent that they lead to judgements that conflict intractably.
In sum, Mason’s explanatory model cashes out the cognitive process of using con-
cepts to form conceptions with the idea that some moral and political concepts are
essentially contestable. This means that what explains reasonable disagreement are dif-
ferences in reasonable people’s psychological propensities and personal experiences
causing them to weigh the deliberative considerations provided by their moral and
political concepts in different ways. When, for instance, the concept justice is con-
tested in this way reasonable people form conflicting conceptions of justice which in
turn entail intractably conflicting political judgements about what institutions and
outcomes justice requires.
Another way to explain reasonable disagreement is to cash out the cognitive pro-
cess of using concepts to form conceptions by focusing on how reasonable people
learn how to use moral and political terms like “justice”. This is what McMahon
(2009: 3–4) does with his novel metaethical theory of “moral nominalism”. McMa-
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hon explains the basic idea of moral nominalism when he says:
I have chosen this label because the possession of a moral concept is un-
derstood to consist in the mastery of the use of a moral term, which in
turn is explained without invoking moral properties.
On this view, what is relevant for understanding the cognitive process that leads peo-
ple to make moral and political judgements is how reasonable people learn how to use
moral and political terms. For McMahon (2009: 55–58) learning how to use moral
and political terms involves developing both an association with the set of features
of a state of affairs that the moral and political terms apply to and a set of “extrap-
olative dispositions” for using the term. The features are a set of morally relevant de-
liberative considerations that a person learns to associate with a term’s concept. The
“extrapolative dispositions” are dispositions individuals have for weighing the deliber-
ative considerations and forming conceptions or altering them when they encounter
new states of affairs and have to use the term in question again. When reasonable
people must use a moral or political term to make a judgement, their extrapolative
dispositions will motivate them to extrapolate the use of a concept from what they
have learned from their past personal experiences to the new case. The particular way
they use their concepts to either confirm or alter their conceptions will depend largely
on the extrapolative dispositions they develop and the particular personal experiences
they have where those dispositions are activated or developed further.
On this model, reasonable people disagree because the precise nature of the peo-
ple’s personal experiences and the extrapolative dispositions they develop are what
determine how they use their moral and political concepts to form conceptions. The
conceptions reasonable people form by using their concepts will conflict because rea-
sonable people have different personal experiences of learning how to use moral and
political terms so that they develop different extrapolative dispositions for using the
concepts associated with the terms. As McMahon (2009: 77) says of the dispositions:
The extrapolative dispositions, that, according to moral nominalism,
underlie the correct use of normative and evaluative terms will differ to
a certain extent from person to person, even if the cognitive and moti-
vational capacities of the people involved are functioning properly and
they are employing a common set of terms. The dispositions may con-
verge in a particular case, but there is no rational requirement that they
do so.
Reasonable people will develop different dispositions because reasonable people will
EXPLAINING REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT ABOUT JUSTICE 63
differ in the personal experiences where they learn how to use moral and political
terms. As McMahon (2009: 78) says:
Because of their different experiences, they are likely, even when reason-
ing competently, to respond in different ways to the cases in the com-
mon set constructed by shared deliberation. It is partly because large
modern polities contain people who have diverse personal experiences
that reasonable disagreement has a prominent place in the life of such
polities.
On McMahon’s model then, reasonable people make conflicting moral and political
judgements because they differ in their extrapolative dispositions and their personal
experiences with regard to learning how to use moral and political terms. These dif-
ferences in personal experiences and extrapolative dispositions affect how reasonable
people use their concepts to form their conceptions of those moral and political con-
cepts, which then leads to making conflicting moral and political judgements. This
difference in how reasonable people use their concepts to form conceptions is then
what makes the difference between reasonable disagreement and reasonable agree-
ment. Since reasonable people cannot change or choose the circumstances in which
they develop their extrapolative dispositions or, largely, the nature of experiences they
have where they are forced to alter their conceptions, any conflict in judgements ends
up an intractable conflict (McMahon 2009: 55–63, 78, 81). Learning how to use moral
and political concepts involves experiences with parents and one’s wider society that
involve developing extrapolative dispositions. These early circumstances are largely
outside a person’s control and go on to determine the way they make their political
judgements in the future.
In sum, like Mason’s model, McMahon’s model explains reasonable disagreement
about justice by citing differences in reasonable people’s psychological dispositions
and personal experiences causing them to weigh the deliberative considerations pro-
vided by their concept of justice in different ways. On McMahon’s model, these
dispositions are the extrapolative dispositions that he proposes are developed when
individuals learn how to use moral and political terms like justice. It is this learn-
ing process and the use of concepts it involves that causes reasonable people to form
conflicting conceptions of justice and in turn make intractably conflicting political
judgements about what institutions and outcomes justice requires.
To get a clearer idea of how Mason and McMahon’s models explain reasonable
disagreement about justice, consider the following case:
Abortion: Barry and Nora are discussing the laws concerning abortion
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that their society ought to enact. Barry judges their society ought to
enact laws that permit abortion in the first trimester because he believes
respecting women’s bodily autonomy is what justice requires. This is be-
cause respecting women’s bodily autonomy outweighs the value of hu-
man life in a fetus. Nora, on the other hand, judges their society ought to
outlaw abortion in the first trimester barring exceptional circumstances
because she believes preserving the value of human life is what justice
requires. This is because the instrumental and non-instrumental value
of human life outweighs women’s bodily autonomy.
Concept Use theories like Mason and McMahon’s explain this case by citing facts
about the cognitive process involved in reasonable people making their political judge-
ments. They cite a difference in Barry and Nora’s psychological dispositions and per-
sonal experiences that lead them to weigh their deliberative considerations differently
and form conflicting conceptions of justice. Mason would cite differences in Barry
and Nora’s “psychological propensities and personal experience” with respect to abor-
tion and pregnancies, whilst McMahon would cite their “extrapolative dispositions”
and their learning experiences for the term “justice”, “autonomy”, and perhaps “mur-
der”. In both models, the point is that Barry and Nora’s different personal experiences
cause them to be disposed to weigh the value of life and bodily autonomy differently,
and as a result form conflicting conceptions of justice. This causes them to make con-
flicting judgements about the institutions and outcomes related to abortion that jus-
tice requires.
This type of explanation covers cases of reflective and unreflective judgement mak-
ing because in both the structure of the cognitive process is the same except for how
much effort reasonable people put into considering the weights they give their delib-
erative considerations. The more they rehearse their deliberations and question how
to weigh certain considerations, the more reflective their judgement making. The less
they rehearse and question, the more unreflective and intuitive. The point here is
that Concept Use theories can easily explain cases like Abortion because they cite facts
about the cognitive process that causes parties to make conflicting judgements about
what justice requires. This explanation works regardless of whether a particular act of
judgement making involves reflection or not.
Taking stock for a moment, it is worth considering how Concept Use theories like
Mason and McMahon’s improve on the Imperfection and Historical-Psychological
family of theories. The first improvement is that, Mason and McMahon’s theory
avoid all the problems that face the Imperfection Family. They manage to explain
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reasonable disagreement without ruling it out and without assuming a normative
standard that will itself be the subject of reasonable disagreement. This is because
facts about how concepts are used to form conceptions are not the sort of facts that
speak to any form of intellectual error.
The second improvement is that Mason and McMahon’s theories can easily ex-
plain cases of reflective judgement making. This is because they assume a general the-
ory of moral psychology of the sort argued for by Nichols (2004). This means they
need not take any controversial empirical positions about the psychological founda-
tions of moral and political judgement making. It merely has to cite what reason-
able parties do with their concepts when they reflect on the judgements they have
made and how this is affected by their psychological dispositions and personal experi-
ences. To that extent, reflective judgement making simply involves reasonable people
rehearsing and reconsidering how they weigh their deliberative considerations. If they
differ in their dispositions that affect how they weigh certain deliberative considera-
tions this will result in slightly different conceptions and hence different moral and
political judgements. That people can reflect in this way, change their judgement and
end up in disagreements is easily explained.
But despite all this, Concept Use theories face a major explanatory weakness. Not
all cases of reasonable disagreement are like Abortion. Some are ‘deep disagreements’
and Concept Use theories cannot explain them. Cases of reasonable disagreement
that are deep disagreements involve a conflict at a deeper level of thought, namely
about the deliberative considerations that ought to be used in the cognitive process
of moral and political judgement making. These are cases where reasonable people
conflict about what the deliberative considerations with respect to some moral or po-
litical issue are, and not merely about how to weigh those considerations. Whilst Ma-
son and McMahon’s theories can explain the latter they cannot explain the former.
Theorists have described this sort of disagreement as a conflict of, “worldviews”, “per-
spectives” or “fundamental commitments”.16 There are generally two types of deep
disagreement. The first type are disagreements like the following:
Nationalisation: Bryan and Elizabeth are discussing the economic struc-
ture their society ought to have. Elizabeth judges their society ought
to nationalise, at the very least, some key industries because a society’s
productive capacity being for the mutual benefit of all is what justice
16See Ranalli (2018b: 2–4, 2018a: 1–2), Hazlett (2014: 12–13), Pritchard (2018), Kappel (2018),
Adams (1985) and Fogelin (1985) for an overview of deep disagreement in epistemology, and Gaus
(Gaus 2018, 2017, 2016) and Muldoon (2016) in political philosophy.
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requires. Bryan judges their society ought not to nationalise any indus-
tries because protecting people’s natural moral right to their body and
private property is what justice requires. This is because he believes natu-
ral moral rights are what matter, benefiting everyone with society’s pro-
ductive capacity is irrelevant and has nothing to do with what justice
requires. On the contrary, Elizabeth believes materially benefiting peo-
ple is what matters, natural rights to private property are irrelevant and
have nothing to do with what justice requires.
This is a case of a reasonable disagreement about justice that is a Direct Deep Disagree-
ment because it involves reasonable people disagreeing about the considerations that
ought to be used to deliberate about what justice requires. As such it is a disagreement
that involves a conflict about the inputs to the cognitive process of deliberation that
leads to people forming conceptions of justice and eventually judgements about what
justice requires. Contemporary examples of this type of reasonable disagreement are
those between those with distinct moral views on the political spectrum from libertar-
ians, socialists, religious integralists and liberals. It is not disagreement within those
groups but between them where each thinks the other is mistaken about what the
relevant deliberative considerations are for deliberating about what justice requires.
Another type of deep disagreement that is subtly different to Nationalisation is
the following:
Indirect Abortion: Barry and Nora are discussing the abortion laws their
society ought to enact. Nora judges their society ought to outlaw abor-
tion because she believes, although it does restrict women’s autonomy,
fetuses are innocent persons which means killing them is murder and
laws against murder are what justice requires. Barry, on the other hand,
judges their society ought to enact laws that permit abortion in the first
trimester because, whilst he agrees justice requires laws against murder,
he believes fetuses in the first trimester are not people, so killing them is
not murder and so permitting abortion to protect women’s autonomy
is what justice requires.
This is a case of Indirect Deep Disagreement because it involves reasonable people dis-
agreeing indirectly about the considerations that ought to be used to deliberate about
what justice requires. This captures the thought that Barry and Nora disagree about
the considerations that ought to be used for deliberating about justice, by way of dis-
agreeing about the content of a particular consideration and not about whether that
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consideration ought to be used at all. For instance, both Barry and Nora agree that the
‘no-killing-moral-persons’ consideration ought to be used for deliberating about jus-
tice, but they disagree about its content. They disagree about who counts as a moral
person. As such, it is still a disagreement that involves a conflict about the inputs
to the cognitive process of deliberation that leads to people forming conceptions of
justice and eventually judgements about what justice requires. Examples of this sort
of disagreement go beyond abortion and moral personhood. Many contemporary
disagreements like that over the use of female or woman, a religious or civil idea of
marriage, and a structural or individualistic idea of coercion in law and morality are
cases of Indirect Deep Disagreement. Many reasonable disagreements about justice
hinge on a disagreement about those choices.
The point of deep disagreements like Nationalisation and Indirect Abortion is
that they place Concept Use theories in a dilemma. On one horn, if they accept they
are genuine cases of disagreement, then they have to concede that they do not have
the explanatory resources to explain them. And, therefore that they have a serious ex-
planatory weakness. This is because the disagreements involve a conflict about what
the deliberative considerations ought to be for deliberating about some moral or po-
litical matter. This conflict is not a difference in how reasonable people perform this
deliberation, but a difference in what they view as the appropriate inputs to that de-
liberation itself. Mason and McMahon’s theories, however, do not have the resources
to explain this. Their entire focus, in extending Rawls’s burdens of judgement, was to
explain reasonable disagreement by citing facts about how people weighed the delib-
erative considerations differently and so formed slightly different conceptions of jus-
tice. Since these conceptions involve general beliefs and principles about what justice
requires, this would cause people to make different judgements about what justice re-
quires. But, cases of deep disagreement outstrip the resources of that explanation. In
cases of deep disagreement, it is perfectly possible that people weigh their deliberative
considerations the same and yet have conflicting views about which considerations to
weigh.
One the other horn, Concept Use theorists could deny that deep disagreements
are actually genuine. They could say that they are verbal disagreements because they
do not contain any conflict over the first-order issue that their judgements are about.
Rather the disagreements involve a conflict about the deliberative process that ought
to be used when making moral and political judgements. But, the parties to the dis-
agreement both agree about what moral and political judgements are correct relative
to each other’s deliberative considerations and as such do not conflict over the truth
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of each other’s judgements. To that end, it does not matter that Concept Use the-
ories do not have the explanatory resources to explain them. They are not genuine
disagreements at all. What the parties in deep disagreements ought to do is resolve
their verbal disagreement first and then come back to the table.
The problem with this response is that it is deeply counterintuitive. We have a
strong intuition, or at least I do, that cases of deep disagreement are genuine disagree-
ments about first-order moral and political issues. In Nationalisation and Indirect
Abortion the parties explicitly deny their interlocutor’s judgement about what jus-
tice requires. They conflict on the truth or correctness of these judgements. But, as
stipulated, they conflict in this way in virtue of a disagreement about what the con-
siderations ought to be used for deliberating about justice. This is because parties to
the disagreements know that what considerations are used to deliberate about justice
will directly affect the moral and political beliefs they form about the requirements
of justice and how people act given those beliefs. Moreover, many of our most con-
tentious disagreements in contemporary political life appear to be like this. Unlike
paradigmatic verbal disagreements they seem to be worth having, and many of the
participants in them on both sides seem to find them worth having, precisely because
they are seen to matter for how coercive political power will eventually be justified or
used. To that end, the Concept Use theories must concede that in denying that rea-
sonable disagreements which are deep disagreements are genuine, they are committed
to a deeply counterintuitive result about many cases of reasonable disagreement.
Where does this leave us? It leaves us, I submit, with good reason to reject Con-
cept Use theories. Although they are an improvement on the Imperfection and
Historical-Psychological family of theories, they face a dilemma between explanatory
weakness, and counterintuitively explaining away deep disagreements as verbal dis-
agreements. What can avoid this dilemma is, I submit, theories with a better explana-
tory model that can actually explain cases of deep reasonable disagreement. It is to
this type of theory I turn to in the next section.
5.2 Concept Possession and Use
In the last section I mentioned that one way to avoid the dilemma that Concept Use
theories face as a result of deep disagreements is to find a better way to explain rea-
sonable disagreement by citing facts about the role of concepts in people’s moral and
political making. This is where Concept Possession and Use theories come into play.
They propose an explanatory model that cites how the possession of a concept in ad-
dition to its use affects how people form conceptions and as a result make moral and
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political judgements.
The core idea is that this way of cashing out the role of concepts in the cogni-
tive process of moral and political judgement making can explain cases of reasonable
disagreement that are deep disagreements. This is because facts about how people
possess concepts will be facts about the deliberative considerations a concept pro-
vides when forming conceptions. Given that, deep disagreements involve a conflict
over what the relevant deliberative considerations are when making moral and politi-
cal judgements about some particular issue, facts about how people possess concepts
would explain this conflict.
Ronald Dworkin’s theory of interpretive concepts offers an explanation of this
sort by cashing out concept possession and use with the idea of possessing and us-
ing interpretive concepts. The core idea being to distinguish the type of concept in-
volved in reasonable disagreements as a way to individuate the facts about concept
possession and use that make the difference between reasonable disagreement about
reasonable agreement. As such, Dworkin’s (2011: 159–160) theory starts with making
a distinction between “criterial”, “interpretive” and “natural-kind” concepts on the
basis that it provides the best way to make sense of how reasonable people can have
conflicting views of what the deliberative considerations ought to be when forming
conceptions.17 The best way to understand the distinction and its explanatory role
is to contrast what Dworkin thinks it means to use criterial concepts as opposed to
interpretive concepts. Dworkin (2011: 160) says of criterial concepts:
…criterial and natural-kind concepts do have something important in
common. People do not share a concept of either kind unless they
would accept a decisive test – a kind of decision procedure – for fi-
nally deciding when to apply the concept (except in cases they agree are
marginal). Genuine disagreement about application is ruled out once
all pertinent facts are agreed upon.
The idea here is that criterial concepts are concepts where their use has a precise criteria
and the acceptance of the same criteria for use determines whether reasonable people
share the concept. On this view, states of affairs or objects fall into the extension of
the respective criterial concept if they meet the criteria for that concept. Facts about
those states of affairs and objects will determine whether they meet the criteria. This
means that a disagreement where the conflicting judgements are made using criterial
concepts is explained by the fact that either, the disagreeing parties do not share the
17Nothing in how Dworkin’s theory explains reasonable disagreement hinges on natural kind con-
cepts and so I will not discuss them any further.
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same criteria in which case it is a verbal disagreement between two different concepts,
or the disagreeing parties do not agree on facts about the world that would determine
whether something meets the criteria they both share in which case at least one of
the disagreeing parties would be making a straightforward intellectual error. Given
that, reasonable disagreements cannot be explained by facts about how we possess and
use criterial concepts. Such an explanation would succumb to all the problems that
plagued the Imperfection family of theories, or implausibly rule out all reasonable
disagreements as verbal disagreements.
This is why Dworkin proposes that moral and political concepts are not criterial.
Moral and political concepts – the concepts available to individuals when making
political judgements about justice – are interpretive. Dworkin (2011: 6) describes in-
terpretive concepts generally, when he says:
We must therefore recognize that we share some of our concepts, in-
cluding the political concepts, in a different way: they function for us
as interpretive concepts. We share them because we share social prac-
tices and experiences in which these concepts figure. We take the con-
cepts to describe values, but we disagree, sometimes to a marked degree,
about what these values are and how they should be expressed. We dis-
agree because we interpret the practices we share rather differently: we
hold somewhat different theories about which values best justify what
we accept as central or paradigm features of that practice. That struc-
ture makes our conceptual disagreements about liberty, equality, and
the rest genuine.
There are two features of interpretive concepts that need to be teased out from that
passage. The first is that for Dworkin, moral political concepts as interpretive con-
cepts describe values. These values involve an interpretation of what is of value and
ought to be furthered in a particular social practice of using that concept. To that
end, the content of interpretive concepts involve values that are the result of an inter-
pretation of the function of the concept itself.
The second feature of interpretive concepts is that if their content are values iden-
tified by interpreting the function of using that concept in a social practice, then to
use an interpretive concept is to engage in conceptual interpretation. It is to identify
what is of value or disvalue by interpreting the purpose of identifying what is of value
or disvalue in the social practice that we are engaged. This interpreting then estab-
lishes the content of the concept and the values that people use to form conceptions
and making judgements. But, Dworkin (2011: 162–163) does warn that there is a non-
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foundationalist circularity to his theory. In specific reference to the interpretation of
moral concepts he says:
But can interpretive arguments about justice escape a narrow circular-
ity?…There is no circularity in interpreting a statute by supposing it to
serve the value of equality. But moral concepts themselves designate val-
ues. How can someone identify the value latent in the practices of justice
without appealing, unhelpfully, to the concept of justice itself?…We de-
fend a conception of justice by placing the practices and paradigms of
that concept in a larger network of other values that sustains our con-
ception. We can in principle continue this expansion of our argument,
exploring other values until, as I said, the argument meets itself. The
circularity, if any, is global across the whole domain of value.
On this view conceptual interpretation involves the possession of other interpretive
concepts. This is what Dworkin (2011: 154) means when he says that conceptual in-
terpretation is “pervasively holistic”. The use of interpretive concepts relies on the
interpretation of a network of concepts we possess. As Dworkin (2011: 154) says:
Interpretation is pervasively holistic. An interpretation weaves together
hosts of values and assumptions of very different kinds, drawn from
very different kinds of judgment or experience, and the network of val-
ues that figure in an interpretive case accepts no hierarchy of dominance
and subordination. The network faces the challenge of conviction as a
whole; if any one strand is changed, the result may be locally seismic.
The result of this is that the use of an interpretive concept involves relying on the
network of other interpretive concepts.18 This means what is identified as valuable
or disvaluable in a shared social practice will rely on people using other interpretive
concepts and so any single act of interpretation is guided by how it fits with the entire
web of interpretations.19
At this point we might wonder how reasonable people can be said to possess and
use the same concept if they differ in their interpretation of what they are doing with
the concept? To solve this Dworkin proposes that in the case of interpretive concepts
what it means to have “an understanding that their correct application is fixed by the
18The point here is that the circularity is justified by Dworkin’s stronger thesis about the indepen-
dence and holistic unity of the true interpretations of all our values. See Winter (2016) and Knight
(2006) for discussion of this view.
19See Plunkett and Sundell (2013b: 251–252) for this broad understanding of Dworkin’s theory.
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best interpretation of the practices in which they figure” is that all agree on certain
paradigm uses of the concept. As Dworkin (2011: 160–161) explains:
People participate in social practices in which they treat certain concepts
as identifying a value or disvalue but disagree about how that value
should be characterized or identified. The concept of justice and other
moral concepts work in that way for us.…We do not agree about what
makes an act just or unjust, right or wrong, an invasion of liberty or an
act of tactlessness. But we agree sufficiently about what we take to be
paradigm instances of the concept, and paradigm cases of appropriate
reactions to those instances, to permit us to argue, in a way intelligible to
others who share the concept with us, that a particular characterization
of the value or disvalue best justifies these shared paradigms.
The point here is that sufficient agreement about paradigm uses of a concept, which
for Dworkin means particular judgements, will ensure that everyone is using the same
interpretive concept. This will be the case even if people interpret the content of the
concept so differently they hold vastly different beliefs about what the appropriate
values are when engaging in the share social practice of using that concept.
Putting all this together we get the following explanation of reasonable disagree-
ment. The facts that make the difference between reasonable disagreement and rea-
sonable agreement are facts about conceptual interpretation. This is because the con-
cepts that feature in reasonable disagreements are moral and political concepts which
in turn are interpretive concepts. This means for Dworkin’s theory the difference
makers are facts about how reasonable people possess different interpretations of the
moral or political concept they use, to make moral or political judgements. The fact
that they differ in their interpretation of the concept means they will make conflict-
ing moral and political judgements. But, what are these facts about differences in
the conceptual interpretation that cause people to interpret a moral or political con-
cept differently? The relevant facts on Dworkin’s view are an individual’s experiences
and the innate dispositions that affect their conceptual interpretations across their
network of interpretive concepts. As Dworkin (2011: 150-151) says:
Disagreement is patent, but its source almost always is obscure, buried
in a large variety of unarticulated assumptions about law or art or liter-
ature or history that rarely surface and that can be explained only as the
upshot of some combination of inherent taste, training, acculturation,
allegiance, and habit.
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We can for the sake of simplicity group “inherent taste” and “habit” under the label
of psychological dispositions, and “training, acculturation, allegiance” under the la-
bel of personal experiences. This means that differences in conceptual interpretation
involve differences in people’s psychological dispositions and personal experiences re-
lating to the interpretation of a concept. In the case of a concept like justice, dif-
ferences in people’s psychological dispositions and personal experiences affect how
they interpret the purpose and aim of the social practice of using the concept of jus-
tice. For Dworkin (2011: 162) this social practice is one where people theorise and
make judgements about what society’s institutions ought to be like and how indi-
viduals ought to be related to one another under those institutions. But, recall that
interpreting the purpose and aim of a social practice that involves using the concept
justice involves relying on one’s network of interpretive concepts and the values
they describe. This means that reasonable disagreement about justice is produced
because reasonable people’s different psychological dispositions and personal expe-
riences cause them to rely on the network of their interpretive concepts in slightly
different ways. This difference will then support forming conflicting conceptions of
justice and making conflicting judgements about the institutions and outcomes that
justice requires.
This means that ordinary cases of reasonable disagreement like Abortion are ex-
plained by differences in reasonable people’s psychological dispositions and personal
experiences causing them to interpret the concept of justice such that they weigh
a shared set of values in different ways. In these cases reasonable people share the in-
terpretation of their network of interpretive concepts to a sufficient degree that they
identify the same values as the best interpretation of the aim and purpose of the so-
cial practice of using justice as a concept. But, their psychological dispositions and
personal experiences cause them to weigh these values differently such that they form
conflicting conceptions of justice and make conflicting political judgements accord-
ing to them.
In the case of reasonable disagreements that are deep disagreements, the expla-
nation is that reasonable people differ in the interpretation of their network of in-
terpretive concepts such that they identify different values as the best interpretation
of the aim and purpose of the social practice of using justice as a concept to form
conceptions of justice. This is what explains how a reasonable disagreement can turn
on a conflict about what the appropriate inputs to deliberation are for forming con-
ceptions of justice and making judgements about what justice requires. In the case
of a Direct Deep Disagreement like Nationalisation, the disagreement is explained
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by differences in reasonable people’s dispositions and personal experiences causing
the parties to identify different values as relevant for the best interpretation of the
concept of justice. But, in the case of a Indirect Deep Disagreement like Indirect
Abortion, the disagreement is explained by differences in reasonable people’s disposi-
tions and personal experiences causing the parties to interpret the concept of moral
personhood differently and therefore, in virtue of that, interpret justice slightly
differently.
In sum then, on Dworkin’s theory reasonable disagreement is explained by dif-
ferences in reasonable people’s psychological dispositions and personal experiences
affecting their interpretations of the moral or political concept they are using. The
differences result in either weighing shared values differently or identifying different
values as the best interpretation of the aim and purpose of making judgements us-
ing the concept in question. This way of cashing out the cognitive process of how
reasonable people use moral and political concepts to make moral and political judge-
ments improves on Concept Use Theories whilst maintaining the advantages over the
Imperfection and Historical-Psychological families. It improves on Concept Use the-
ories because it allows for an explanation of reasonable disagreements that are deep
disagreements as genuine disagreement. And, it does this, whilst still being able to
explain reflective judgement making unlike theories in the Historical-Psychological
family, without any notion of intellectual error like the Imperfection family.
But the improvement over Concept Use theories comes at a cost. Specifically,
Dworkin’s theory of interpretive concepts faces two problems, the Virtue of Reason-
ableness Problem, and the Regression of Interpretation Problem. The Virtue of Rea-
sonableness Problem is that since on Dworkin’s theory all moral and political con-
cepts are interpretive concepts, reasonableness itself will end up being an interpretive
matter and therefore, whether Dworkin’s theory explains reasonable disagreement
will itself be the subject of reasonable disagreement. The Regression of Interpreta-
tion Problem is that, given the nature of conceptual interpretation, when reasonable
people in deep disagreements try to communicate why they make their judgements,
Dworkin’s theory entails that they will descend into a regression of interpretation.
Both problems show that we have good reason to reject Dworkin’s theory.
The Virtue of Reasonableness Problem arises because on Dworkin’s theory, the
notion of reasonableness is, or at least partly, a moral concept. Recall from Chapter 1,
that part of the idea of people being reasonable was that they had a minimal capacity
for sincerely making judgements that they think others can agree to. For Dworkin
(2011: 102–103) this is captured by the idea of “moral responsibility”. As Dworkin
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says:
In this chapter we consider moral responsibility as a virtue. We begin
with one aspect of that virtue. Morally responsible people act in a prin-
cipled rather than an unprincipled way; they act out of rather than in
spite of their convictions. (Dworkin 2011: 103)
Count the ways in which someone might fail to act out of the principles
he professes. The most obvious is crude insincerity. The leader who takes
his country to war pretending to follow principles that in fact have no
grip on him, principles that he has no intention of following when it is
inconvenient for him to do so, is crudely insincere. (Dworkin 2011: 104)
On this view, “moral responsibility” is what captures at least part of the idea of peo-
ple being reasonable. They have a certain moral character where they make sincere
judgements and not ad-hoc or unprincipled ones. This fits with the way Dworkin
describes moral responsibility as a virtue and by extension a behaviour or disposition
to behave in a way that is valued. The value of sincere moral and political judgement
making is furthered by having coherent judgements. If this is the case it seems clear
that reasonableness, or at least part of it, is an interpretive concept. This is because
Dworkin proposes that all moral and political concepts are interpretive concepts.
But this is a problem. If reasonableness is an interpretive concept then it will be
a matter of interpretation whether there is any reasonable disagreement. If this is the
case, then whether Dworkin’s theory can actually explain reasonable disagreement
will be a matter of interpretation. But, this would make the explanation viciously cir-
cular. This is because whether the explanation works would be a matter of reasonable
disagreement. Recall, that to count as an explanation is to describe the facts that make
the difference between reasonable and unreasonable disagreement. If that difference
is itself interpretive, then Dworkin’s theory will itself be the subject of reasonable
disagreement and working out whether it works would require conceptual interpre-
tation. This will in turn mean, whether a political judgement is reasonable will be
decided by an individual’s interpretation. But, without a shared interpretation, it
will mean there is no genuine case of reasonable or unreasonable disagreement. In
effect, a part of the explanandum – a disagreement’s reasonableness – would be part
of the supposed explanans – Dworkin’s theory – and so there is no non-circular way
of identifying a genuine case of reasonable disagreement.
Aside from the Virtue of Reasonableness Problem, there is another even more
worrying problem for Dworkin’s theory, the Regression of Interpretation Problem.
This problem arises when reasonable people try to communicate their reasons for why
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they make their judgements they must interpret their concept and communicate this
act of interpretation to others. After all according to Dworkin’s theory the main rea-
son people make the moral and political judgements they do is because they interpret
a concept a particular way. But, since interpretation is as Dworkin (2011: 154) says
“pervasively holistic”, communicating the interpretation of any one moral concept
will mean having to communicate the interpretation of our entire network of inter-
pretive concepts. But, of course at some point this will run out and they will have to
communicate how they interpret the idea of “interpretation” itself. This is because,
as Dworkin (2011: 131) says, “Interpretation is therefore interpretive, just as morality
is moral, all the way down”. If interpretation itself is an interpretive concept, then
the only way to communicate it in a non-circular way is to interpret what one does
when one interprets “conceptual interpretation”. But that concept, in virtue of be-
ing what it is connects to all of one’s other interpretive concepts. Since Dworkin does
not place any principled constraints on when interpretation ends, there seems to be
a clear danger that Dworkin’s theory will entail a regression of interpretation.
But this is clearly not what happens in cases of reasonable disagreement. It seems
clear that the disagreeing parties do manage to communicate why they make their re-
spective judgements and have their interlocutors understand this reason. In fact this
was what deep disagreements are predicated on. Disagreeing parties do understand
their interlocutor’s reasons because they reject them as relevant deliberative consider-
ations. It is then implausible that parties descend into a regression of interpretation
that leads to them never being able to intelligibly communicate what they are saying
and why they are saying it.
The right response to all this is, I think, to concede that although we have good
reason to reject Dworkin’s theory, that reason does not speak against Concept Posses-
sion and Use theories per se. This is because the underlying issue in both the Virtue
of Reasonableness and Regression of Interpretation Problems, is that in an effort to
cash out facts about how concept possession and use cause reasonable disagreement,
Dworkin takes the extreme step of proposing an entirely new type of concept, in-
terpretive concepts. It is the wide scope of these concepts – covering all moral and
political concepts – that causes the Virtue of Reasonableness Problem.20 And, it is
the way ‘conceptual interpretation’ makes the content of all interpretative concepts
interconnected that gives rise to the Regression of Interpretation Problem. But, a
Concept Possession and Use theory need not rely on such an idiosyncratic theory of
20See Plunkett and Sundell (2013b: 253–255) on this problem of Dworkin’s theory giving a very wide
scope to what can qualify as an interpretive concept.
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concepts. There is nothing inherent to the idea of explaining reasonable disagreement
by citing facts about how concepts are possessed and used that weds us to proposing
an entirely new and empirically unsupported type of concept.
Dworkin’s theory also shows that Concept Possession and Use theories are the
best type of theory for explaining reasonable disagreement. After all, Dworkin’s the-
ory does explain deep disagreements without falling prey to the problems faced by the
Imperfection and Historical-Psychological theories. As such it is the most explanato-
rily powerful theory we have looked at so far. This shows that citing facts about how
reasonable people possess and use concepts, is the most explanatorily powerful way
of explaining reasonable disagreement.
All this means the promise of Concept Possession and Use theories can be sal-
vaged. But, what we require is a theory that preserves the improvements of Dworkin’s
theory and does not succumb to the problems that it faces. Salvaging Concept Posses-
sion and Use theories is what I turn to in the next chapter. I will argue for a novel the-
ory that makes use of recent developments in the philosophy of language on metalin-
guistic negotiations. This follows a similar attempt by Plunkett and Sundell (2013b)
to make use of the idea of metalinguistic negotiations to show how Dworkin’s theory
of interpretive concepts is not required to explain legal disagreements. In the next
chapter I attempt the same task with with reasonable disagreement.
6 Conclusion
The point of this chapter was to argue in favour of Concept Possession and Use as
a type of theory for explaining reasonable disagreement about justice. I did this by
first arguing that theories in the Imperfection and Historical-Psychological Families
face a range of problems that show they are inadequate explanations. I argued the
Imperfection Family of theories either cite facts that do not make a difference between
disagreement and agreement, or fail to justify the normative standard that would pick
out the fact that does make a difference. I then argued the Historical-Psychological
Family of theories cannot explain cases of disagreement that arise when people change
their judgement through reflection.
This then motivated the Conceptual Family of theories which held the promise of
avoiding the problems that faced the Imperfection and Historical-Psychological Fam-
ilies, by citing facts about the role of concepts in the cognitive process that leads rea-
sonable people to make their moral and political judgements. I argued that although
Concept Use theories make good on this promise they face a dilemma when faced
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with cases of reasonable disagreement that are deep disagreements. They either have
to acknowledge them as genuine disagreements in which case they have to admit they
do not have the resources to explain them, or they have to counterintuitively deny
they are genuine.
I then argued that Concept Possession and Use theories avoid the dilemma by
accepting deep disagreements are genuine and citing differences in how people possess
a concept itself as well as how they use it as difference making facts. Whilst this yielded
the most powerful explanation, I argued the only extant theory that instantiates it –
Dworkin’s theory of interpretive concepts – faces two serious problems. I argued that
it makes the reasonableness of a disagreement the subject of reasonable disagreement
itself, and entails that any attempt by parties to communicate why they make their
judgements results in a regression of interpretation.
But I argued this does not condemn the Concept Possession and Use theories
itself but only Dworkin’s specific theory. This is because the problems Dworkin’s the-
ory faces stem from the theory’s commitment to interpretive concepts as a completely
novel and unique type of concept. But, nothing in the idea of Concept Possession and
Use commits us to proposing such a concept. Therefore, Concept Possession and Use
theories could be salvaged if we could find a theory that preserves the improvements
of Dworkin’s theory and does not succumb to the problems that it faces. This is what




In the previous chapter I argued for Concept Use and Possession as the best type of
theory within the Conceptual Family of theories for explaining reasonable disagree-
ment about justice. Theories of this type explain reasonable disagreement about jus-
tice by citing facts about the possession and use of concepts in moral and political
judgement making. I showed theories of this type improve on Concept Use theories,
the Imperfection family of theories and the Historical-Psychological family of theo-
ries.
But, all was not rosy for Concept Use and Possession theories. I argued that al-
though they can explain cases of deep disagreement, unlike Concept Use theories, the
way they do it leaves them open to the Virtue of Reasonableness Problem and the
Regression of Interpretation Problem. Recall, the Virtue of Reasonableness Prob-
lem is the idea that Concept Use and Possession theories make the reasonableness of
a given disagreement a matter of reasonable disagreement itself. The Regression of
Interpretation Problem on the other hand is the idea that Concept Use and Posses-
sion theories entail that any attempt by reasonable people to communicate why they
make their judgements will descend into a regression of interpretation.
But I concluded that all was not lost because Concept Possession and Use theories
could be salvaged. This was because the problems it faces are not inherent to Concept
Possession and Use theories, but unique to the only extant theory that instantiates it:
Dworkin’s theory of interpretive concepts. I argued that the way Dworkin’s theory
takes the extreme step of proposing interpretive concepts as a completely novel and
unique type of concept is the source of the problems. But, if a theory could be devel-
oped that did not rely on such a theory of concepts the Concept Possession and Use
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version could be salvaged.
In this chapter I attempt that salvage project by explicating and arguing for Di-
verse Packages Theory as a novel explanation of reasonable disagreement. The core
idea of the theory being an explanatory model with two distinctive features. The first
feature is that by making use of innovations in the philosophy of language, it can
read cases of reasonable disagreement as either canonical disputes or as metalinguistic
negotiations. The second feature is that it can explain why reasonable disagreements,
read in one of those two ways, occur by describing how reasonable people possess and
use ‘diverse concept-conception packages’. I argue that this theory can explain cases
of deep disagreement, and so retains all the explanatory power of Dworkin’s theory,
and can also avoid the Virtue of Reasonableness problem and the Regression of Inter-
pretation Problem. Given that, it is the best explanation of reasonable disagreement.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In §2 I motivate and describe the two moving
parts of Diverse Packages Theory. In §3 I apply the theory’s explanatory model to the
cases of reasonable disagreement that motivate it and show it explains them. In §4
I describe the advantages of Diverse Packages Theory over its competitors. In §5 I
consider and respond to three potential objections against the theory.
2 Diverse Packages Theory
The aim of Diverse Packages Theory is to offer the best explanation of reasonable dis-
agreement. Recall that this means explaining the following:
Reasonable Disagreement about Justice: A state of affairs of intractably conflicting
judgements about the institutions and outcomes justice requires, made by at
least two parties who both have, a minimal capacity for rationality and a mini-
mal capacity for sincerely making judgements that they think others can agree
to.
Like the other theories I have looked at so far, Diverse Packages Theory targets that
explanandum by aiming to explain reasonable disagreements in general, no matter
their topic. To that end, the core idea of Diverse Packages Theory is to propose an ex-
planatory model that explains why reasonable disagreements occur by reading them
in one of two ways. It can explain them, depending on the cases at hand either by
reading them as canonical disputes, or by reading them as metalinguistic negotiations.
The idea being that this allows the model to parse any case of reasonable disagreement,
whether they are ordinary disagreements or deep disagreements, as a genuine disagree-
ment. In short, it vindicates the intuition that these cases involve at least two people
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who each hold mental content of some kind (eg. beliefs, plan, judgement) that con-
flict in such a way that they both cannot be true. The theory then explains why these
disagreements occur by citing differences in how reasonable people possess and use
‘concept-conception packages’ to make their moral and political judgements. To get
an idea of what that means and what sort of explanatory model it involves, in what
follows I lay out its two moving parts.
2.1 Canonical Disputes and Metalinguistic Negotiations
The first moving part is the idea that reasonable disagreements are not all genuine in
the same way. That is to say, by making use of Plunkett and Sundell’s (2013a,b) inno-
vative analyses of normative and evaluative disagreements, reasonable disagreements
can sometimes be canonical disputes and sometimes they can be a particular form of
non-canonical dispute, a metalinguistic negotiation.
When disagreements are canonical disputes they are genuine in virtue of a con-
flict in what speakers literally express. For any given case of disagreement, reading it
as a canonical dispute then involves two suppositions. The first supposition is that it
hinges on a conflict in the mental content that speakers literally express, or would liter-
ally express. The second supposition is that as result of the first supposition the speak-
ers must mean the same thing by their words because otherwise they would not con-
flict in what they literally express. They would be expressing mental contents with dif-
ferent truth-conditions. To see the motivation for reading reasonable disagreements
in this way, consider the following case from Chapter 2:
Abortion: Barry and Nora are discussing the laws concerning abortion
that their society ought to enact. Barry judges their society ought to
enact laws that permit abortion in the first trimester because he believes
respecting women’s bodily autonomy is what justice requires. This is be-
cause respecting women’s bodily autonomy outweighs the value of hu-
man life in a fetus. Nora, on the other hand, judges their society ought to
outlaw abortion in the first trimester barring exceptional circumstances
because she believes preserving the value of human life is what justice
requires. This is because the instrumental and non-instrumental value
of human life outweighs women’s bodily autonomy.
This is a familiar sort of case that haunts much of our political life. The best way to
explain why a case like Abortion is a genuine disagreement is to read it as a canonical
dispute. This involves first positing that it involves a conflict in the mental content
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the interlocutors literally express, and second, that as a result the interlocutors mean
the same thing by their words. In the case of Abortion, there is clear evidence for
making both suppositions. On the first it is clear that what Barry and Nora literally
express, or more accurately what they would literally express, are conflicting beliefs
about the abortion laws justice requires. In short, they express beliefs that cannot
both be true. On the second, assumption, if Barry and Nora do literally express con-
flicting beliefs, they must mean the same thing by “justice”. Otherwise their beliefs
would not actually be in conflict because they would have different truth-conditions
for beliefs about the abortion laws justice requires. If Barry and Nora mean different
things by “justice” then the way they use the term could be perfectly compatible. This
would mean that Abortion was not a disagreement at all. But given the evidence, it
is clear that Barry and Nora express conflicting beliefs and therefore they must mean
the same thing by their words.
But Diverse Packages Theory recognises that not all reasonable disagreements are
like Abortion. By which I mean they are not all cases of disagreement that hinge on
the beliefs that reasonable people would literally express. Rather, as we saw in Chap-
ter 2, there are cases of deep disagreement. These are cases where reasonable people
disagree about the deliberative considerations that ought to be used to make moral
and political judgements. To get a sense of what this means consider again the follow-
ing simple case of reasonable disagreement which is a deep disagreement we first saw
in Chapter 2:
Nationalisation: Bryan and Elizabeth are discussing the economic struc-
ture their society ought to have. Elizabeth judges the nationalisation, at
the very least, of some key industries is just because a society’s produc-
tive capacity being for the mutual benefit of all is what justice requires.
Bryan judges the nationalisation of any industries is unjust because pro-
tecting people’s natural moral right to their body and private property
is what justice requires. This is because he believes natural moral rights
are what matter, benefiting everyone with society’s productive capacity
is irrelevant and has nothing to do with what justice requires. On the
contrary, Elizabeth believes materially benefiting people is what matters,
natural rights to private property are irrelevant and have nothing to do
with what justice requires.
Bryan and Elizabeth’s disagreement does not seem to hinge on what they would lit-
erally express, namely their conflicting beliefs about the economic structure justice
requires. Rather it hinges on what they think are the relevant deliberative consid-
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erations for deliberating about justice. Bryan thinks the protection of natural moral
rights is the relevant consideration (and nothing else), and Elizabeth thinks materially
benefiting people is the relevant consideration (and nothing else).
This rings true not merely of Nationalisation, but also of many contemporary
political disagreements. For instance consider disagreements over whether the United
Kingdom ought to leave or remain in the European Union, or whether transwomen
are women, or whether private healthcare insurance markets constitute freedom. All
these disagreements seem to hinge not on the beliefs or judgements reasonable people
literally express, but on something like their entire view of how reasonable people
ought to go about deliberating when making moral and political judgements about
those issues.
But all this presents a problem. If these cases of deep disagreement do not hinge
on a conflict over what is literally expressed, then an explanatory model that only
treats reasonable disagreement as a canonical dispute is compelled to rule such cases as
merely verbal disagreements. They would not qualify as genuine disagreements. This
is because canonical disputes are disagreements that are genuine in virtue of involving
a conflict over what is literally expressed. But, this contradicts the strong intuition we
have that cases of deep disagreement like Nationalisation and other contemporary
political debates, are genuine. They are not disagreements about labelling parts of the
world in different ways. They are disagreements where the reasonable people express
views about what their social world ought to be like that cannot both be true.
Of course one way to go would be to declare that despite our intuition these deep
disagreements are not in fact genuine disagreements. If they do not hinge on what
is literally expressed then ipso facto they cannot possibly involve a conflict in mental
contents. But, this is plainly unjustified. We do not have any reason, independent of
any particular explanation of reasonable disagreement, that defeats our intuition that
deep disagreements are genuine.
Instead of this, I propose making use of recent work in the philosophy of language
on “non-canonical disputes”. The idea being that one way to vindicate the intuition
that cases of deep disagreement are genuine is, I submit, to follow what Plunkett and
Sundell (2013a: 11–13, 2013b: 247–248) argue about normative and evaluative disagree-
ments in general, and go beyond treating all reasonable disagreement as canonical dis-
putes. We need to treat some cases of reasonable disagreement as non-canonical dis-
putes. This means recognising that some cases of reasonable disagreement are genuine
not in virtue of a conflict in the mental content that speakers literally express. Rather
they are genuine in virtue of a conflict in the mental content that speakers pragmati-
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cally express. This means that cases of deep disagreement like Nationalisation, do not
involve reasonable people literally expressing some mental content. Rather they are
pragmatically expressing some conflicting mental content that is nevertheless related
to the subject matter of their discussion.
But this raises the question of what precisely is being pragmatically expressed in
such disagreements? It certainly cannot be reasonable people’s beliefs about the in-
stitutions and outcomes that justice requires. After all, those are literally expressed.
For this, I propose we use what Plunkett and Sundell say about a special type of non-
canonical dispute: a “metalinguistic negotiation”. A metalinguistic negotiation is, as
Plunkett and Sundell (2015: 837–851; 2013a: 13–18, 2013b: 256–266) have argued, a
disagreement that is non-canonical in virtue of consisting of a conflict about what a
word ought to mean. This means the content that is pragmatically expressed is a ‘met-
alinguistic belief’ about what the meaning of a word ought to be.1 This also means
that disagreeing parties mean different things by, at least, one of their words. This is
because it is the use of words with different meanings that pragmatically expresses the
belief about what the word ought to mean.
To get a better sense of what all that means, consider the following case:
Spicy Soup: Oscar and Callie are cooking soup for a party and are in a
heated debate about its spiciness. They both taste the soup and, Oscar
with the taste palates of the party guests in mind judges that the soup
is spicy. But Callie with her long experience tasting chillies in mind dis-
agrees and judges the soup not spicy at all.2
The point of Spicy Soup is that we have a strong intuition that it is a genuine dis-
agreement. But, if it is read as a canonical dispute it would not be. This is because it
does not seem to hinge on what Oscar and Callie believe about the soup, but rather
what they think the threshold for spiciness should be. To solve this we can read it
as a metalinguistic negotiation. This means supposing two things. The first supposi-
tion is that Oscar and Callie’s disagreement involves a conflict in the mental content
that speakers pragmatically express, namely their metalinguistic beliefs about what
the meaning of “spicy” ought to be. The second supposition is that, as a result of the
first supposition, they must mean different things by “spicy”. It is, after all, the use
of “spicy” with different meanings that pragmatically, rather than literally, expresses
their metalinguistic belief about what it ought to mean.
1See also Chalmers (2011: 522-523) on these implicit metalinguistic beliefs.
2This is a slightly modified case that Plunkett and Sundell (2013a: 14–15) use to illustrate the power
of reading disagreements as metalinguistic negotiation.
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Why should we suppose these things? With the first supposition, I agree with
Plunkett and Sundell (2013a: 19–20) that one piece of evidence for this is whether
disagreeing parties are likely to carry on disagreeing even when they both agree about
what their terms currently mean in the community at large or according to some au-
thoritative third-party. This clearly seems to be the case in Spicy Soup. Oscar and
Callie seem disposed to carry on their disagreement even if they could agree on what
“spicy” means to other third-parties or how it is defined in a recipe book. This is be-
cause many normative consequences could flow from whether it is resolved on Oscar
or Callie’s behalf. Amongst other things it could affect whether the soup ought to
be served, whether it ought to be praised more or less by the party guests, or even
whether Oscar and Callie ought to cook at all.
With the second assumption, I agree with Plunkett and Sundell (2013a: 15) that
one piece of evidence for this is whether disagreeing parties are disposed to use their
terms in different ways, or, as Plunkett (2015: 847) says whether “speakers are dis-
posed to systematically use a term in divergent ways in the same (non-defective) con-
ditions”. More simply, one piece of evidence for the second supposition is that the
meaning of our words depends on our patterns of using that word. To that extent
Oscar and Callie do seem disposed to systematically use “spicy” in divergent ways in
the process of cooking the soup. By this I mean they are not disposed to suddenly
use the term in the same way to refer to the same things as “spicy”. To that end, it
seems plausible to conclude they mean different things by “spicy”. All in all, given
the first supposition, it seems that Oscar and Callie clear are disposed to use “spicy”
in systematically divergent ways. Therefore, if word use is a guide to its meaning, it
seems plausible to conclude that they mean different things by “spicy”.
Now, with all that in mind, I propose extending the strategy of vindicating the
intuition that a disagreement is genuine through the idea of metalinguistic negotia-
tion to, and only to, those cases of reasonable disagreement that are deep disagree-
ments.3 This means only reading as metalinguistic negotiations those reasonable dis-
agreements that hinge on a conflict about the considerations relevant for deliberating
about what justice requires (like in Nationalisation), rather than for example a con-
flict about whether justice requires Tax A, as metalinguistic negotiations.
Before moving to more concrete examples, it is work getting a bit clearer on how
this startegy is supposed to work. The idea is that the conflict that reasonable dis-
3Note, Plunkett and Sundell (2013a: 7, 18–25, 2013b: 265–266) believe a metalinguistic analysis gen-
erally (not merely metalinguistic negotiation) can be plausibly extended to all kinds of normative, and
evaluative disagreements. But, they do not touch upon how it can be used in the context of reasonable
disagreements and particular deep disagreements.
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agreements that are deep disagreements hinge on – a conflict about the considera-
tions relevant for deliberating about what justice requires – is itself the result of some
first-order reasonable disagreement unrelated to the question of what justice requires
(or morality generally). These first-order reasonable disagreements will of course be
canonical disputes that hinge on various metaphysical, epistemic, axiological, logical,
and scientific topics like the existence of certain properties, the nature of certain beliefs
and knowledge, the value of certain properties or states of affairs, or even perhaps the
correctness of certain logical systems. When someone deliberates about what justice
requires using some consideration that features in these reasonable disagreements on
the various metaphysical, epistemic, axiological, logical, and scientific topics they end
up having, I submit, a metalinguistic negotiation. This means explaining the essential
difference involved in a conflict about the considerations relevant for deliberating
about what justice requires (or morality generally) not as a metaphysical, metaethi-
cal or logical phenomeon, but rather as a normative-semantic one. This normative-
semantic difference is what interlocutors pragmatically express, namely conflicting
beliefs about what the meaning of a word ought to be (in Nationalisation the word
would be “justice”). They pragmatically express this conflict by making judgements
using the word with a different meaning ot their interlocutor. This reading of certain
reasonable disagreements as metalinguistic negotiations is defended, as in the case of
Spicy Soup, on the basis of how people are disposed to carry on disagreeing despite
what ”justice” currently means in their community, and because they are disposed to
use ”justice” in systemically divergent ways.
All this means that as reasonable disagreements about metaphysical, epistemic,
axiological, logical, and scientific topics increases it is likely, although not guaranteed
that metalinguistic negotiations will also increase. Of course this is not guaranteed
because people could, despite having wide ranging reasonable disagreements about
various metaphysical, epistemic, axiological, logical, and scientific topics, simply agree
that none of those topics are relevant for deliberating about justice. The dynamic be-
tween reasonable disagreements unrelated to justice (or morality generally) and met-
alinguistic negotiation is ultimately a contingent matter. The reasonableness of any
given disagreement is separate from it being a metalinguistic negotiation, even un-
reasonable disagreements can also be metalinguistic negotiations. If there is a deep
disagreement that hinges on a conflict about the considerations relevant for deliberat-
ing about what justice requires (or morality generally), and the people involved either
do not sincerely make judgements they think others can agree to, or they fail to meet a
minimum threshold of rationality (ie. they do not respond to moral reasons or make
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a coherent calculation of them) their deep disagreement will be an unreasonable dis-
agreement. Such a disagreement is still a genuine disagreement though and reading
it as a metalinguistic negotiation tells us why and how it is genuine.
To move from the abstract to the concrete, reading a case like Nationalisation as
a metalinguistic negotiation involves two suppositions. The first supposition is that
their disagreement is genuine in virtue of involving a conflict in their metalinguistic
beliefs about what the meaning of “justice” ought to be which they would pragmat-
ically express, if they were to express their judgements about what justice requires.
The second supposition is that Bryan and Elizabeth mean different things by “jus-
tice”. Supposing those two things allows us, despite such a case not hinging on what
reasonable people would literally express about what justice requires, to say that it is
in fact a genuine case of disagreement.4
This strategy seems to hold because the reasons for those suppositions in a case
of deep disagreement like Nationalisation are the same as it was for Spicy Soup. For
the first supposition, it seems Bryan and Elizabeth are disposed to carry on disagreeing
even when they both agree about what “justice” currently means in the community at
large or according to some third-party. After all, they are not pointing to dictionaries
or articles in philosophy journals to defend their moral and political judgements. At
least one of them thinks those facts are irrelevant. Rather, they are likely to persist in
their disagreement because they recognise that using “justice” with the meaning that
their interlocutor gives it has significant normative consequences for them. The idea
being that it matters what states of affairs are described as “just”. This is because it will
affect what normative demands are placed on them and what social arrangements will
be enforced with the use of coercive political power.
For the second assumption, it seems that Bryan and Elizabeth are disposed to use
“justice” in systematically divergent ways whenever they need to make judgements per-
taining to matters of justice. This is because, as we have already established, they dis-
agree about what the deliberative considerations ought to be when making moral and
4See Ball (2020) for someone who is sceptical of metalinguistic negotiation as a way to explain
deep disagreements. This is because understanding the participants as advancing a view about what
the meaning of word ought to be, either 1) entails that people are being unreasonable in trying to
advance the first-order issue (eg. the economic institutions and outcomes justice requires.) by asserting
a view about what the meaning of a word ought to be, or 2) fails to make sense of the reaction that a
reasonable person has to have to contest the first-order claim rather than contest the view about what
the meaning of word ought to be. I am not sceptical in this way. I think Ball’s analysis goes wrong
because he overlooks the way pragmatic expression is key to metalinguistic negotiation, and that he
places an epistemic standard of reasonableness on the participants that is either irrelevant to political
theory or a standard political theorist need not accept.
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political judgements, and what deliberative considerations are used will determine, in
some sense, how people use their moral terms across various contexts. The idea be-
ing that when people do not even agree about what deliberative considerations to use
they are disposed, across various contexts, to form conflicting beliefs about what their
moral terms apply to. If they then make their judgements accordingly they will ipso
facto use their terms in systematically divergent ways. To that end, if patterns of word
usage is a guide to a word’s meaning, then it is plausible that in Nationalisation Bryan
and Elizabeth mean different things by “justice”. To that end, it is plausible that Na-
tionalisation hinges on a pragmatically expressed conflict about what “justice” ought
to mean and that it is plausible that reasonable disagreements that are deep disagree-
ments can be read as metalinguistic negotiations.
2.2 Concept-Conception Packages
Taking stock for a moment, I have said that the idea of canonical disputes and met-
alinguistic negotiations gives Diverse Packages Theory the resources to read any case
of reasonable disagreement as genuine. It allows the theory’s explanatory model to
read cases of reasonable disagreement like Abortion and deep disagreements like Na-
tionalisation as genuine disagreements.
But of course none of this helps us explain why those reasonable disagreements
occur. That is where the second moving part comes in to play. The crucial idea being
that explaining why reasonable disagreements occur involves describing the differ-
ences in how people possess and use ‘concept-conception packages’. The basic idea
being that to explain why reasonable disagreements occur as canonical disputes or as
metalinguistic negotiations we need to look at what reasonable people say (or at least
what they would say) and describe the package of concepts and general beliefs about
the extensions of the concept (ie. conceptions) in their minds that cause them to say
those things. Doing this, I propose, begins with the thought that to explain a case
of reasonable disagreement we reformulate it into a basic linguistic exchange which
represents what people say or what they would say. The most general version of such
an exchange for reasonable disagreements would be something like:
Speaker 1: Society oughtϕ becauseϕ-ing is what [moral-standard-x] re-
quires.
Speaker 2: Society ought to not-ϕ because not-ϕ-ing is what [moral-
standard-x] requires.
In such an exchange, ϕ stands for an action or state of affairs to be realised, and
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“[moral-standard-x]” being a word or words like, “justice”, “promoting the good”
or simply “morality”. To draw out the key elements of the exchange that need to
be explained, I then propose a general, and fairly uncontroversial, linguistic analy-
sis. It first supposes that the speakers make conflicting judgements. This means that
Speaker 1 and Speaker 2 say sentences that that express judgements that cannot both
be true. To get a sense of what that means, we can say that each speaker makes judge-
ments according to the types of states of affairs they believe that are the extensions
of “[moral-standard-x]”, namely ϕ-ing or not-ϕ-ing. They do this on the basis of
the intension, or ‘meaning’ broadly construed, of “[moral-standard-x]” because the
meaning of a term constrains the extensions of that term. We can then say that a dif-
ference between speakers’ beliefs about the extensions of “[moral-standard-x]” and
the meaning of “[moral-standard-x]”, is what constitutes the conflicting judgements
that are then expressed in their disagreement.5
With this basic linguistic analysis on hand, the question is how should we under-
stand the causal process of Speaker 1 and Speaker 2 expressing conflicting judgements
according to their beliefs about the extensions of “[moral-standard-x]” and mean-
ing of “[moral-standard-x]”? I propose we understand it in terms of differences in
how they possess concepts as the building blocks of thought which correspond to the
meaning of terms, and how they use these concepts to form conceptions which are
general beliefs about the types of states of affairs in the extensions of those concepts.6
In short, we ought to understand it in terms of how reasonable people possess and
use diverse ‘concept-conception packages’.
This idea begins with the thought that for any individual speaker the meaning of
“[moral-standard-x]” involves possessing the concept moral-standard-x. This is
because most if not all moral and political terms are single lexical items whose seman-
tic content is associated with a unit of mental content which is a lexical concept. The
concept moral-standard-x is individuated by its conceptual content which is a
body of information that comes in two varieties: invariable and variable.7
5Again, this is not to say anything about the correct or true meaning of “[moral-standard-x]”.
Rather simply to analyse what it means for Speaker 1 and Speaker 2’s judgements express a conflict
in mental content, with reference to their ‘speaker-meaning’, so to speak, of “[moral-standard-x]”.
6The broad contours of this view, especially the distinction between concepts and conceptions is
not new. See Rey (1985, 1983) for its early use in the philosophy of language and mind and Rawls (2005:
14, fn.15, 1999: 5–6, 9) for its use in political philosophy.
7Note, this is not the distinction Plunkett and Sundell (2015: 837–838; 2013a: 15–16) make between
the “character” and “content” of a term. That distinction captures the way the meaning of words can
be variant or invariant with respect to context. The distinction I make between variable and invariable
content is much broader. It captures the way the content of a concept can vary between people but
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The invariable conceptual content of moral-standard-x does not vary be-
tween reasonable people. It remains constant and involves information about the
role or function of that concept in thought. Specifically, that it ought to be used in
deliberation for forming beliefs about the extensions of the concept. On the other
hand, the conceptual content that does vary between reasonable people is the vari-
able conceptual content of moral-standard-x. This involves information about
the morally relevant considerations to be weighed in deliberation for forming beliefs
about the extensions of the concept.
When the concept moral-standard-x is used according to its content, it pro-
vides the morally relevant considerations that reasonable people use to deliberate and
form a conception of [moral-standard-x] which is a collection of beliefs about the types
of states of affairs in their social world in the extension of moral-standard-x. This
comprises a ‘concept-conception package’ for “[moral-standard-x]” which is then
used to make moral and political judgements. Specifically, a speaker uses “[moral-
standard-x]” according to their conception of [moral-standard-x], which in turn has
been formed by using their concept of moral-standard-x.
The obvious question is why should we think of the causal process of Speaker 1
and Speaker 2 expressing conflicting judgements in this way? After all most philoso-
phers still think of concepts as abstract entities that are analysed by coming up with
definitions of terms composed of necessary and sufficient conditions, and concep-
tions are all the other beliefs about the objects that satisfy the conditions.8 Such a view
is at odds with what the idea of concept-conception packages supposes concepts are
and how they function. To that end, my defence of the idea of concept-conceptions
packages is that it is what is supported by the empirical evidence from contemporary
developmental psychology on what concepts are, how they are acquired, and how
they connect causally to how people use words.
In contemporary developmental psychology concepts are in the first instance
taken to be bodies of information with semantic structure embedded in certain cog-
nitive processes.9 This body of information is taken to represent the causal and ex-
not in whether it is an actual candidate for the concept and its use in moral and political judgement
making.
8See Margolis and Laurence (1999) for an overview of this view.
9Of course as with anything there is debate within the broader cognitive science whether all con-
cepts are like this. For instance, Machery (2015, 2009) has argued for a broader more general idea of
concepts as merely “bodies of knowledge that are used by default in the processes underlying the higher
cognitive competences”. See Carey (2015, 2011), Machery (2010) and Margolis and Laurence (1999) for
the specifics of this debate. I do not take a stand on this broader debate, but merely pick out the view
of concepts that most relates to the sort of concepts that are used in reasonable disagreements.
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planatory features of states of affairs that are salient for making the inferences and
predictions involved in categorising states of affairs to then form beliefs about what
the concept applies to. For instance, Susan Carey (2015, 2009: Ch. 10, 13) has argued
that empirical evidence on how children acquire and develop concepts shows that
the type concepts involved in articulating beliefs about moral standards consist of a
particular type of information structure: “intuitive theories”. As Carey (2009: 361)
says:
Intuitive theories play several unique roles in mental life. These include:
(1) representing causal and explanatory knowledge; (2) supporting in-
ferences and predictions; (3) providing the current best guess concern-
ing the essential properties of kinds, which in turn play a privileged role
in categorization decisions; and (4) on some views of conceptual con-
tent, determining those aspects of conceptual role that separate mean-
ing from belief.
The point here is that concepts have a distinct content and role. Their content involves
causal, explanatory and predictive information that describes the salient properties of
the states of affairs the concept applies to. Their role is to be used in categorisation
decisions to form beliefs about one’s social world.
These concepts are then differentiated from conceptions by the fact that empir-
ical evidence shows that the process of conceptual change and belief revision come
apart. As Carey (2009: 490, 522) says, “In some cases of knowledge acquisition we
merely change our beliefs about the world; in others we change the concepts in terms
of which those beliefs are composed”. As Carey (2009: 522–523) argues empirical evi-
dence shows that the former involves the typical ways that people change beliefs like
discovering new evidence and “testing hypothesis that are stated in terms of already
available concepts”. But, the latter involves a “bootstrapping” of new placeholder
information acquired by personal experiences according to the role of the concept in
thought. This is how the content of a concept is determined both by facts innate to the
psychology of individuals, and their social world. As Carey (2009: 522) says, “both in-
ternal conceptual role and causal connections between entities in the world and men-
tal symbols (both social/historical causal connections and physical causal connections
involving perceptual mechanisms and inferential processes) play roles in determining
content.”
This corresponds to the idea of concept-conceptions packages is several ways. The
first way is that the way I take the content of concepts to be bodies of information that
specify the morally relevant considerations for deliberating and forming beliefs about
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the extensions of the concept corresponds to the content of concepts Carey describes
as “intuitive” theories. The second way is that the way I take the role of concepts to in-
volve providing the considerations to be weighed in deliberation corresponds to how
Carey specifies the content of concepts are used in categorisation tasks to form beliefs
(ie. conceptions). Thirdly, the way I take the content of concepts to be determined
by people’s innate psychological dispositions and personal experiences corresponds
to how Carey specifies the bootstrapping process of concept acquisition and change.
To that end, I take it that the idea of concept-conception packages as a way to under-
stand how and why people use moral and political concepts to make judgements is
supported by the best empirical evidence on what concepts are actually like and how
people acquire them.
With the idea of a concept-conception package on the table we can then say that
when speakers diverge in either their concepts or conceptions, they possess and use
diverse concept-conception packages. This means that explaining the causal process of
Speaker 1 and Speaker 2 expressing mutually inconsistent mental contents amounts to
describing one of two sorts of facts. Either describing the facts that cause Speaker 1 and
Speaker 2 to use the concept they share differently in deliberation to form divergent
conceptions, or describing the facts that cause them to fix the conceptual content
of some candidate concept differently, and so possess divergent concepts. All in all
the basic point is that by making use of the idea of concept-conception packages we
can explain why reasonable disagreements as a matter of speakers expressing conflict
judgements occur.
2.3 The Explanatory Model
Putting the two moving parts together allows for a single explanatory model that can
explain all cases of reasonable disagreement. The first moving part – reading cases
as canonical disputes or metalinguistic negotiations – allows the model to correctly
parse reasonable disagreements as genuine disagreements. This means it does not, like
theories that focus purely on how concepts are used, declare deep disagreements as
verbal disagreements. It can correctly parse such disagreements as genuine by reading
them as metalinguistic negotiations. Which means that they hinge on pragmatically
expressed conflicting beliefs about what the meaning of moral or political term ought
to be. In addition it can also correctly parse ordinary reasonable disagreements as
genuine by reading them as canonical disputes. Which means that they hinge on a
literally expressed conflict judgements about the extensions of moral or political term.
The second moving part – the idea of Concept-Conception packages – allows the
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model to then causally explain why reasonable disagreements, once classified as canon-
ical disputes or metalinguistic negotiations, occur. When a given case of reasonable
disagreement is read as a canonical dispute, the model cites the facts that cause reason-
able people to diverge in their conceptions. These will be facts about the way reason-
able people use their concept to make their categorisation decisions in slightly differ-
ent ways to then form conflicting beliefs about the extensions of the concept. This
is because a canonical dispute is a disagreement that hinges on a conflict about what
is literally expressed. What is literally expressed in those disagreements are people’s
conceptions which are their general beliefs about the extensions of the concept they
are using. In such a case the model assumes that disagreeing parties share a concept,
but end up possessing and using diverse ‘concept-conception packages’ by diverging
in their conceptions.
On the other hand, when a given case of reasonable disagreement is read as a met-
alinguistic negotiation, the model first cites the facts that cause reasonable people to
diverge in their concepts and because of this divergence how they diverge in their con-
ceptions as well. These will be facts about the conflicting information reasonable peo-
ple use to make their categorisation decisions (because they possess conflicting con-
cepts) and then in turn form conflicting beliefs about the extensions of the concept.
This is because a metalinguistic negotiation is a disagreement that hinges on a con-
flict about what the meaning of a word ought to be which is pragmatically expressed
by their judgements. People’s possession and use of divergent concepts pragmatically
expresses their tacit beliefs about what the meaning of a word ought to be. In such
a case, the model supposes that disagreeing parties share neither concepts nor con-
ceptions, and so end up possessing and using diverse ‘concept-conception packages’
when making moral and political judgements.
3 Applying the Model
As I have said, the point of this chapter is to argue for and defend Diverse Packages
Theory as the best explanation of reasonable disagreement about justice. This will
involve two lines of argument. The first is that we have good reason to think it can
explain reasonable disagreements in the way I have claimed. This will involve applying
the model to the cases that motivate it and describing in more detail how the model
exactly works in the way I have summarised so far. This will explain precisely what it
means for reasonable people to diverge in either their concepts or conceptions.
The second line of argument is that Diverse Packages Theory has comparative ad-
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vantages over extant explanations of reasonable disagreement. This will involve show-
ing how it avoids the problems that blight the extant theories and still offers a more
explanatorily powerful and more parsimonious explanation. This section takes up
the first argument whilst the next section takes up the second.
3.1 Canonical Disputes and Divergent Conceptions
As I have said, one way Diverse Packages Theory’s explanatory model explains why
cases of reasonable disagreement occur is by reading them as canonical disputes, and
describing how people possess and use diverse concept-conception packages by di-
verging in the conception part of that package. To understand precisely what this
means consider again the sort of reasonable disagreement that motivates it:
Abortion: Barry and Nora are discussing the laws concerning abortion
that their society ought to enact. Barry judges their society ought to
enact laws that permit abortion in the first trimester because he believes
respecting women’s bodily autonomy is what justice requires. This is be-
cause respecting women’s bodily autonomy outweighs the value of hu-
man life in a fetus. Nora, on the other hand, judges their society ought to
outlaw abortion in the first trimester barring exceptional circumstances
because she believes preserving the value of human life is what justice
requires. This is because the instrumental and non-instrumental value
of human life outweighs women’s bodily autonomy.
In keeping with the explanatory model we reformulate the disagreement into a basic
linguistic exchange:
Barry: We ought to enact laws that permit abortion in the first trimester
because respecting women’s bodily autonomy is what justice re-
quires.
Nora: No, we ought to outlaw abortion in the first trimester barring
exceptional circumstances because preserving the value of human
life is what justice requires.
Barry: No it doesn’t, respecting women’s bodily autonomy outweighs
the value of human life in a fetus.
Nora: Yes it does, the instrumental and non-instrumental value of hu-
man life outweighs women’s bodily autonomy.
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Given what Barry and Nora say to each other, namely sentences that express conflict-
ing beliefs about the abortion laws justice requires, the model begins by reading Abor-
tion as a canonical dispute. This means first supposing that that their disagreement in-
volves conflicting judgements about the abortion laws justice requires that are literally
expressed. This is justified by the evidence of what Barry and Nora say to each other.
Second, it means assuming that Barry and Nora mean the same things by their words.
This is because otherwise they could not literally express conflicting judgements. They
would be literally expressing judgements with different truth-conditions, and there-
fore not having a disagreement at all.
The model then proposes that since the meaning of “justice” involves possessing
the concept justice, Barry and Nora must also share the concept justice. It then
proposes that given their disagreement is genuine in virtue of a conflict in their lit-
erally expressed judgements about what justice requires, they must have conflicting
general beliefs about the extensions of justice. This is because people make the lit-
erally expressed judgements according to those general beliefs. This amounts to say-
ing that Barry and Nora diverge in their conceptions of justice because conceptions of
justice are merely beliefs about ‘the right distribution of rights, opportunities and re-
sources amongst people, institutions and social systems’.10 In simpler terms, how the
speakers conflict about what they each take to be the right generalisation of what jus-
tice requires. Importantly, these conflicting beliefs can be either implicit or explicit
beliefs. If the beliefs are implicit they will likely simply be an array of case-specific
judgements. If the beliefs are explicit the representations will likely be specific norma-
tive principles.
The model then explains why Barry and Nora have divergent conceptions of jus-
tice despite sharing the concept justice by citing differences in their dispositions
for weighing deliberative considerations. It proposes first that the deliberative con-
siderations for forming conceptions of justice are provided by the conceptual con-
tent that individuates the concept justice and that the considerations are shared
because the parties share the concept. This, as we have seen, is in keeping with the
empirical evidence from developmental psychology on what concepts are and their
role in thought. The evidence shows that concepts are individuated by their content
10This explication of a conception of justice summarises what I take Rawls (1999: 5–6, 9, 54) to be
talking about in various places as the “proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social coop-
eration”, “the appropriate distributive shares” and the point of his own conception of justice being to
describe the right distribution of the chief primary goods – “rights, liberties, and opportunities, and
income and wealth” – that the basic structure of society – “the political constitution and the principal
economic and social arrangements” – can dispense.
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which is a body of information that people use to make categorisation decisions and
then on the basis of those decisions form beliefs about what the concept applies to.
This corresponds to the casual process of reasonable people’s shared concept of jus-
tice having content which reasonable people use to categorise their social world into
morally relevant considerations. When these considerations are weighed in delibera-
tion they allow reasonable people to form beliefs about what justice requires. When
speakers share a concept, the information that determines or is inputted into their
deliberations for forming conceptions is the same.
The model proposes that Barry and Nora form divergent conceptions because
their deliberative process is affected by psychological dispositions that are either in-
nate or acquired by personal experiences. Differences in reasonable people’s psycho-
logical makeup or personal experiences mean they have dispositions to assign differ-
ent weights to their various deliberative considerations.
In actual cases of course it would be an empirical matter what the specific delib-
erative considerations in play are, and what the dispositions and personal experiences
that affect the assignment of weights are. But with Abortion, the case itself provides
some evidence of what they could be. Barry and Nora clearly see that people’s auton-
omy, and the value of human life are the relevant deliberative considerations to be
weighing up when forming conceptions of justice. But something in Barry’s personal
experiences, or innate psychological make up means he has a disposition to assign
greater weight to the value of autonomy achieved by permitting abortion over the
value of human life. Perhaps he has been exposed through childhood to cases where
adults have not been able to exercise their bodily autonomy.
Nora, in contrast to Barry, is disposed to assign the considerations in exactly the
opposite way. Perhaps she has been exposed to cases where mothers and newborns
live happy lives that benefit themselves and their wider community. Whatever the
precise source of their dispositions the point is that their deliberative processes for
forming conceptions of justice are affected by their psychological dispositions to as-
sign different weights to their shared deliberative considerations. As a result, they
possess diverse ‘concept-conception packages’ by diverging in their conceptions.
When Barry and Nora use their diverse concept-conception packages they end up
making intractably conflicting political judgements which comprise Abortion. The
idea being that when they use the term “justice” according to their conception of jus-
tice, they make conflicting judgements about the institutions and outcomes justice
requires. This is because their conceptions of justice are their general beliefs about
the extensions of justice. As such, when they use “justice” according to these con-
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flicting beliefs, they will end up making judgements that conflict which they then
literally express.
Their judgements will conflict intractably because whether their dispositions are
innate or acquired by personal experiences, they cannot be altered or erased by simply
rehearsing their deliberation with others. Innate dispositions are after all innate, and
personal experiences are events in the past that cannot be changed. However, people
end up deliberating it will be caused by their sum of innate dispositions and personal
experiences interacting in particular ways. This does not of course mean that deliber-
ating with others can have no effect. Barry and Nora’s discussion might itself become
a new shared personal experience that compensates for their innate dispositions and
pushes them to agree. But given particular differences in dispositions and personal
experiences, those differences are what make the difference between Barry and Nora
having a reasonable disagreement and coming to a reasonable agreement.
In sum, one argument for Diverse Packages Theory is that its explanatory model
can explain why cases of reasonable disagreement like Abortion occur by reading them
as canonical disputes. By treating them as canonical disputes it correctly interprets
them as genuine disagreements in virtue of hinging on conflicting judgements that are
literally expressed by the disagreeing parties. This allows the model to explain them
by showing how people possess and use diverse concept-conception packages when
making moral and political judgements. It describes the dispositions and personal ex-
periences that affect how reasonable people weigh their shared moral considerations,
which causes them to form divergent conceptions of justice. When reasonable people
then go on to use their divergent concept-conception packages they end up making
conflicting moral and political judgements and so end up in reasonable disagreements
rather than reasonable agreements.
3.2 Metalinguistic Negotiations and Divergent Concepts
As I have said already, Diverse Packages Theory’s explanatory model can also explain
why cases of reasonable disagreement occur by reading them as metalinguistic nego-
tiations and describing how people possess and use diverse concept-conception pack-
ages, by diverging in their concepts. To understand better what that means consider
the type of case that motivated it, namely a reasonable disagreement that is a deep
disagreement:
Nationalisation: Bryan and Elizabeth are discussing the economic struc-
ture their society ought to have. Elizabeth judges their society ought
to nationalise, at the very least, some key industries because a society’s
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productive capacity being for the mutual benefit of all is what justice
requires. Bryan judges their society ought not to nationalise any indus-
tries because protecting people’s natural moral right to their body and
private property is what justice requires. This is because he believes natu-
ral moral rights are what matter, benefiting everyone with society’s pro-
ductive capacity is irrelevant and has nothing to do with what justice
requires. On the contrary, Elizabeth believes materially benefiting peo-
ple is what matters, natural rights to private property are irrelevant and
have nothing to do with what justice requires.
In keeping with the explanatory model we reformulate the disagreement into a basic
linguistic exchange to get the following:
Elizabeth: We ought to nationalise, at the very least, some key indus-
tries because a society’s productive capacity being beneficial to all
is what justice requires.
Bryan: No, we ought not to nationalise any industries because protect-
ing people’s natural moral right to their body and private property
is what justice requires.
Elizabeth: No we shouldn’t, benefiting everyone is what matters, natu-
ral rights to private property is irrelevant for justice.
Bryan: Yes, we should, natural rights are what matter, benefiting every-
one with society’s productive capacity is irrelevant for justice.
As we saw from §2.1 the best way to understand how and why a case like Nation-
alisation is a genuine disagreement is to read it as a metalinguistic negotiation. This
means the model supposes that Bryan and Elizabeth’s disagreement involves a conflict
over what they believe the meaning of “justice” ought to be which is pragmatically ex-
pressed by what they say to each other, and that as result they mean different things
by “justice”. What justifies these suppositions is that, again as we saw in §2.1, Bryan
and Elizabeth are disposed to use “justice” in systematically divergent ways, and they
are disposed to carry on disagreeing even when they both agree about what “justice”
currently means in the community at large or according to some third-party. These
two bits of evidence from Bryan and Elizabeth’s exchange justifies reading the case as
a metalinguistic negotiation.
The model then supposes that given the meaning of “justice” involves possessing
the concept justice, this means Bryan and Elizabeth diverge in their concept of jus-
tice. As a result, it supposes that their disagreement is genuine in virtue of their
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what they say to each other pragmatically expressing a conflict over what they believe
the content of justice ought to be. As such, the model then explains why Bryan
and Elizabeth hold such conflicting metalinguistic beliefs by explaining how Bryan
and Elizabeth possess and use diverse concept-conception packages by diverging in
the concept of justice they possess and use. After all possessing and using diver-
gent concepts is what pragmatically expresses one’s beliefs about what the content of
the concepts ought to be.
Since concepts are individuated by their conceptual content, explaining why
Bryan and Elizabeth possess and use divergent concepts of justice amounts to show-
ing how they can possess different conceptual content for the concept justice. To
avoid making Nationalisation a verbal disagreement this will be a matter of showing
how Bryan and Elizabeth only possess different variable content for justice, but
share the invariable content.
We can say that for the concept justice the invariable content that Bryan and
Elizabeth share amounts to a description like, ‘to form beliefs about the right or
morally correct distribution of rights, opportunities and resources amongst people,
institutions and social systems’.11 In short, it ammounts to something like ‘to form
the sorts of beliefs that are part of conceptions of justice’. This is because, as I have
said, the invariable content of a concept contains information that specifies the role
of the concept in thought, ie. its use in forming general beliefs about the extensions
of the concept. Given ‘distributions of rights, opportunities and resources amongst
people, institutions and social systems’ are the types of states affairs that are in the ex-
tension of justice, the role of the concept is to form beliefs about the distributions
that are actually in its extension, namely the right or morally correct distributions.
The variable content on the other hand will be a description of the considerations
morally salient for forming those beliefs (ie. conception of justice). As the linguistic
exchange makes plain, for Bryan the variable content will be something like ‘natural
moral rights to their body and private property are the morally relevant considera-
tions for justice’. For Elizabeth it will be something like, ‘productive capacity being
for the mutual benefit of all are the morally relevant considerations for justice’. In
real world cases, what these contents actually are will largely be an empirical matter.
But, for now it suffices that what it means for Bryan and Elizabeth to possess diver-
11This explication of the invariable content of justice follows Rawls’s (1999: 5–6, 9) distinction
between the concept of justice and conceptions of justice. The former describes the common function
of the latter. The explication of the conceptual content of justice here merely follows this idea with
respect to how I have so far described conceptions of justice as describing ’the correct distribution of
rights, opportunities and resources amongst people, institutions and social systems’.
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gent concepts of justice is that they possess conflicting variable conceptual content
for justice. Therefore, what it means to explain why Bryan and Elizabeth diverge
in their concepts amounts to explaining why they possess this conflicting conceptual
content.
The model explains why Bryan and Elizabeth possess conflicting conceptual con-
tent by citing differences in the facts that cause them to fix the content of justice
in conflicting ways. The question then is, differences in what facts cause reasonable
people to fix the content of justice in conflicting ways? The explanatory model cites
differences in psychological dispositions that are innate or acquired by personal expe-
rience. These psychological dispositions affect the cognitive process by which Bryan
and Elizabeth acquire concepts and slowly fix their content over time. Different dis-
positions will result in reasonable people either acquiring slightly different concepts
of justice or fixing the content of their existing concept of justice in slightly dif-
ferent ways over time.
Note, the use of “psychological dispositions” here is deliberately broad. This is be-
cause Diverse Packages Theory is neutral with respect to on-going debates in cognitive
science and developmental psychology about how concepts are precisely acquired and
how their content is fixed. Diverse Packages theory is neutral on whether distinct con-
cepts are acquired, by distinct personal experiences interacting with general learning
mechanisms in one’s cognitive architecture, by distinct innate learning mechanisms
that affect how experiences are taken as inputs for forming concepts, or by innate core
cognitive mechanisms interacting with innate conceptual primitives to construct new
concepts as a response to one’s personal experiences.12 These are all live options for
Diverse Packages Theory since the notion of a psychological dispositions can capture
the general causal capacities for individuals to acquire concepts in all those options.
A philosophical explanation need not take sides in this empirical debate.
With all that in mind, the model proposes that differences in Bryan and Eliza-
beth’s innate and acquired psychological dispositions cause them to possess and use di-
vergent concepts of justice. Although citing any particular dispositions is a matter
of empirical investigation, we can make certain guesses in Nationalisation to demon-
strate how the model works. For instance, Bryan is perhaps disposed to fixing the con-
tent of his concept of justice according to his early experiences reading books on
political economy that emphasise people’s natural moral rights. As such he fixes the
content of justice in a way that ensures “the protection of people’s natural moral
12See Carey (2015, 2011, 2009: Ch. 11) Hamlin (2015), Kalish (2015) and Hampton (2015) for a good
overview of these various positions.
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rights” as the only relevant consideration for justice. Elizabeth on the other hand fixes
the content of her concept of justice, perhaps according to her innate disposition
towards benefiting everyone equally, and perhaps her early experiences living in an
unusually egalitarian household. As such, she fixes the content of justice in a way
that ensures “equal beneficence to individuals” as the only relevant consideration for
justice. As I have said the notion of innate and acquired psychological dispositions
here is deliberately broad to include a wide range of concept acquisition and concept
change mechanisms. The important point is that Bryan and Elizabeth fix the content
of their concepts in different ways and therefore possess divergent concepts of jus-
tice.
The model then proposes that given Bryan and Elizabeth possess divergent con-
cepts of justice, they will form divergent conceptions of justice. This is because
when they use these divergent concepts they will provide conflicting sets of delibera-
tive considerations for forming conceptions of justice. As a result, let alone how they
weigh such considerations, the very fact they will be weighing different deliberative
considerations will result in Bryan and Elizabeth forming divergent conceptions of
justice. At this point, the model has once again explained how reasonable people,
Bryan and Elizabeth in this case, possess diverse concept-conception packages.
When Bryan and Elizabeth use their diverse concept-conception packages to
make their political judgements, they will make intractably conflicting political judge-
ments about what justice requires. This is because they make their political judge-
ments according to their conceptions of justice. But, importantly these judgements
do not conflict in virtue of being contents that cannot both be true. After all, the
truth-conditions for Bryan and Elizabeth’s judgements are different. Rather the
judgements Bryan and Elizabeth make conflict in virtue of what they would pragmat-
ically express. They would pragmatically express what they each believe the concept
of justice ought to be for making judgements about what justice requires. Given,
the concept justice constitutes the meaning of “justice”, this then explains how rea-
sonable people have a metalinguistic negotiation about what the meaning of “justice”
ought to be.
This conflict in political judgements is intractable because what causes it are dif-
ferences in dispositions that cannot be altered or erased by Bryan and Elizabeth re-
hearsing their deliberative process with each other. They cannot alter their innate
dispositions or the personal experiences that make them acquire the dispositions to
fix the content of their concepts in conflicting ways. Deliberation with others, as it
usually occurs, involves exchanging reasons for endorsing a particular conception of
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justice. Rehearsing one’s deliberative process for forming conceptions of justice with
those that disagree is not going to affect the conflict over what the concept of justice
ought to be.
But of course none of this is to disregard the attempt to change people’s concepts.
After all, one prominent research project in contemporary philosophy attempts to do
just this. For example, Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics are research
projects that have recently emerged with an aim to revise or replace the concepts we
use.13 But, to say that Bryan and Elizabeth make intractably conflicting political judge-
ments because they use divergent concepts is merely to recognise that the only way
Bryan and Elizabeth’s disagreement can be resolved is if at least one of them changes
their concept. The only way to effectively alter the content of one’s concepts is for the
deliberation with others about the content of justice to itself become an experience
that disposes them to change the content of their concept. But, this is a far cry from
deliberating with one’s interlocutor about much weight one is giving to a certain piece
of evidence or rehearsing whether one is applying a rule of inference correctly. Insofar
as the deliberation with others involves discussing the weights of various considera-
tion and trying to explain why some consideration is decisive for forming a particular
conception of justice it will not make them agree. Rather, they must deliberate about
how to correctly fix their concepts.
With all that, the model has explained how Bryan and Elizabeth possessing and
using diverse concept-conception packages causes them to have a reasonable disagree-
ment rather than reasonable agreement. Bryan and Elizabeth’s dispositions cause
then to possess divergent concepts, which cause them to form divergent conceptions.
When they use their respective concept-conception packages to make their judge-
ments they lead them to make judgements that conflict in virtue of pragmatically
expressing a conflict about what the meaning of “justice” ought to be for making
political judgements about what justice requires.
But of course Nationalisation is not representative of all forms of deep disagree-
ment. Deep disagreements can come in roughly two varieties: cases of Direct Deep
Disagreements and cases of Indirect Deep Disagreements. Direct Deep Disagreements
are cases where reasonable people disagree directly about what the deliberative con-
siderations ought to be for deliberating about some moral or political topic. In Na-
tionalisation this topic was justice. But, Indirect Deep Disagreements are not like this.
They are cases where reasonable people disagree indirectly about what the deliberative
13See Burgess and Plunkett (2013a,b) on Conceptual Ethics and Cappelen and Plunkett (2020) on
Conceptual Engineering for an overview and examples of philosophical projects that involve explicitly
changing people’s concepts in society by trying to persuade people.
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considerations for deliberating about a particular moral or political topic ought to be.
Reasonable people in these cases disagree about the deliberative considerations by
way of disagreeing about what the content of a particular deliberative consideration
ought to be.
So far I have only explicitly argued for how Diverse Packages Theory’s model can
explain reasonable disagreements that are cases of Direct Deep Disagreement. But, I
submit, the model can also explain cases of Indirect Deep Disagreement. To see how
consider the following case that is like Abortion but slightly different:
Indirect Abortion: Barry and Nora are discussing the abortion laws their
society ought to enact. Nora judges their society ought to outlaw abor-
tion because she believes, although it does restrict women’s autonomy,
fetuses are innocent persons which means killing them is murder and
laws against murder are what justice requires. Barry, on the other hand,
judges their society ought to enact laws that permit abortion in the first
trimester because, whilst he agrees justice requires laws against murder,
he believes fetuses in the first trimester are not people, so killing them is
not murder and so permitting abortion to protect women’s autonomy
is what justice requires.
Indirect Abortion is an Indirect Deep Disagreement because Barry and Nora disagree
indirectly over what the deliberative considerations ought to be for deliberating about
what justice requires. They disagree over what the content of a particular delibera-
tive consideration – moral personhood – ought to be for determining what justice
requires. This is despite them agreeing that moral personhood is a relevant consider-
ation for deliberating about what justice requires.
To explain Indirect Abortion, we begin by reformulating it into a basic linguistic
exchange:
Nora: We ought to outlaw abortion in the first trimester because, al-
though it does restrict women’s autonomy, fetuses are moral per-
sons which means killing them is murder and laws against murder
are what justice requires.
Barry: We ought to protect the right to an abortion in the first trimester
because, whilst he agrees justice requires laws against murder, a fe-
tus is not a moral person, so respecting women’s bodily autonomy
is what justice requires.
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As with Nationalisation the model would read Indirect Abortion as a metalinguistic
negotiation. But, this time it does not suppose that the disagreeing parties mean dif-
ferent things by “justice” or that their disagreement involves a conflict over that the
meaning of “justice” ought to be. Rather it assumes that Barry and Nora mean differ-
ent things by “moral person”, and that their disagreement hinges on a conflict over
what the meaning of “moral person” ought to be. This is because in Indirect Abor-
tion, Barry and Nora disagree about what the deliberative considerations ought to be
for deliberating about what justice requires, by way of disagreeing about the content
of one of the considerations. That consideration is “moral person”.
The model would then explain Indirect Abortion, in much the same way it ex-
plained Nationalisation except instead of focusing on the concept justice, it would
focus on the concept moral person. It would explain how Barry and Nora diverge
in their concept-conception package by explaining how they diverge in their concept
of moral person and then how this divergence causes them to forming conflict-
ing conceptions of justice. For the sake of repetition I will not retrace the steps the
model takes for explaining all that. Rather it will suffice to say that it would explain
how Barry and Nora diverge in their concepts of moral person by citing the in-
nate and acquired dispositions that affect how they fix the content of the concept.
To that end, the model would also be able to explain reasonable disagreements that
are Indirect Deep Disagreements.
This concludes the argument for Diverse Packages Theory on independent
grounds. I have shown how its explanatory model can explain the cases of deep dis-
agreement that motivated it. It reads them as metalinguistic negotiations. It supposes
the reasonable people in such disagreements mean something different by at least one
of their words, and that their disagreement hinges on a pragmatically expressed con-
flict about what the meaning of that word ought to be. The model then explains why
such reasonable disagreements occur by citing the facts that cause people to possess
and use diverse concept-conception packages that diverge in the concept. The model
shows that when reasonable people use concept-conception packages that diverge in
this way to make moral and political judgements, they pragmatically express a conflict
about what the meaning of a word ought to be. As such, they end up in reasonable
disagreements rather than reasonable agreements.
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4 Comparative Advantages
In addition to the independent grounds for endorsing Diverse Packages Theory there
are two comparative grounds. The first ground is that it is more explanatorily power-
ful than many extant theories because of how it can explain cases of deep disagree-
ment. The second ground is that it relies on a more parsimonious view of con-
cepts when compared to the only other theory that matches it for explanatory power,
namely Dworkin’s theory of interpretive concepts. In what follows I detail both ad-
vantages.
4.1 Explanatory Power
As we saw in Chapter 2 many theorists, seeking to develop Rawls’s idea of the “bur-
dens of judgement” further, propose theories that explain reasonable disagreement
by citing facts purely about how people use concepts. These theories cite differences
in reasonable people’s dispositions and personal experiences as the facts that cause
reasonable people to use their concepts to form conflicting conceptions. Although
the details of each particular theory is slightly different, the underlying strategy is the
same. They explain how reasonable people systematically diverge in using their moral
terms to make conflict political judgements by describing how they diverge in using
their shared concepts to form conflicting conceptions.
The problem with these theories, as I argued in Chapter 2, is that they face a
dilemma. On one horn they can accept that deep disagreements are genuine disagree-
ments, in which case they do not have the resources to explain deep disagreements
as genuine disagreements and therefore have a serious explanatory weakness. On the
other horn, they can deny that deep disagreements are genuine and that therefore
they need not be explained. But, this is deeply counterintuitive. Reasonable dis-
agreements which are deep disagreements seem to involve a substantive normative
disagreement, and the participants seem to think they are worth having because how
the disagreement is resolved matters for how coercive political power would be used.
But Diverse Packages Theory can explain deep disagreements as genuine disagree-
ments. This is because it allows for the possibility that reasonable disagreements may
be metalinguistic negotiations. This means they can sometimes hinge on pragmati-
cally expressed conflicting beliefs about what a moral term ought to mean. To explain
such disagreements, Diverse Packages Theory cites facts about both concept use and
possession. This is what the idea of “concept-conception packages” allows for. It al-
lows for the explanation of reasonable disagreements as both canonical disputes and
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as metalinguistic negotiations in a single explanatory model.
4.2 Parsimony
The most significant advantage of Diverse Packages Theory is that its explanatory
model relies on a more parsimonious view of concepts than Dworkin’s theory of inter-
pretive concepts. This is significant because Dworkin’s theory is the only other extant
theory that can explain reasonable disagreements that are deep disagreements. By re-
lying on a more parsimonious theory of concepts it avoids the problems Dworkin’s
theory faces.
Dworkin’s theory, as I argued in Chapter 2, proposes an entirely new type of con-
cept – an interpretive concept – to explain reasonable disagreements.14 I argued that
although Dworkin’s theory can explain both ordinary reasonable disagreements and
deep disagreements, it faces two problems: the Virtue of Reasonableness Problem,
and Regression of Interpretation Problem. The first problem is that in declaring all
moral and political concepts as interpretative, Dworkin’s theory makes reasonable-
ness itself a matter of reasonable disagreement. The second problem is that when
reasonable people in deep disagreements try to communicate why they make their
judgements and the content of the concept they think ought to be used, Dworkin’s
theory entails that they will descend into a regression of interpretation.
Both issues stem from the way Dworkin thinks interpretive concepts work and
his global distinction on all moral and political concepts being interpretive. Diverse
Packages Theory avoids both problems because it offers a far more parsimonious view
of concepts and how they work. It neither posits an entirely new type of concept that
is unsupported by empirical data, or supposes that all moral and political concepts
are inextricably interconnected. Rather, it merely posits a new type of genuine dis-
agreement.15 This leaves concepts as they are without the need to declare all moral
and political concepts as interpretive, or that the content of any single one of them
depends on a host of other interpretive concepts.
5 Objections
Taking stock for a moment, so far I have argued for Diverse Packages Theory as the best
explanation of reasonable disagreement on the basis of two lines of argument. The
14See also Plunkett and Sundell (2013b: 251–252) for this broad understanding of Dworkin’s theory.
15See Plunkett and Sundell (2013b) for this specific advantage of metalinguistic negotiation over
Dworkin’s theory when it comes to legal disagreement.
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first argument is that it can make good on what motivates it and so actually explain
cases of reasonable disagreement that are both ordinary disagreements and deep dis-
agreements. The second argument is that it is better than other extant explanations of
reasonable disagreement on the metrics of explanatory power and parsimony. It can
explain cases of deep disagreement when other theories cannot, and it does so with-
out committing to an entirely new theory of concepts. The underlying strategy has
been that by reading cases of deep disagreement as metalinguistic negotiations, we
can vindicate the intuition that they are genuine disagreements and that they can be
explained alongside ordinary cases of reasonable disagreement in a single explanatory
model.
I want to now consider three objections that might be raised against this strategy,
namely that in employing the idea of metalinguistic negotiations, Diverse Packages
Theory has inadvertent consequences for reasonable disagreement. The first concerns
externalism about meaning. The second concerns the pointlessness of verbal disputes.
The third concerns topic discontinuity.
5.1 Semantic Externalism
In arguing for Diverse Packages Theory I presented Nationalisation and Indirect
Abortion as cases of disagreement where I claimed that reasonable people’s words can
express different contents. In simpler terms, that sometimes when reasonable people
use words I have claimed they mean different things by them. But, one might think
this relies on a controversial internalist metasemantic theory. This means the model
assumes that what disagreeing parties mean by their words and therefore the concep-
tual content of their concepts are determined by facts internal to the disagreeing par-
ties, namely their psychological dispositions. But, so the objection goes, this is not
how the meaning of words and the content of concepts is determined. The meaning
of our words is determined by facts external to the speaker.16 It does not matter what
our dispositions are like. That is irrelevant to the content our words express when we
use them. What is relevant are facts external to us about how the community at large
uses the word or how a word was first used to refer to some part of the world. The
upshot of this is that one of the key moving parts of Diverse Packages theory is at best
controversial, and at worst false.
I have two responses to this sort of objection. One clarificatory, the other method-
ological. The clarificatory response is that in everything I have said so far, I have left
it open whether the psychological dispositions that affect how reasonable people fix
16See Sawyer (2020) and Cappelen (2018: Ch. 6) for this sort of view.
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the variable content of their concepts are innate or acquired by personal experience. It
could well be that all the relevant psychological dispositions are acquired by personal
experiences. This would mean that ultimately facts external to speakers are what cause
speakers to fix the conceptual content of their concepts differently. Moreover, this is
not by accident. It is a consequence of taking seriously the empirical evidence on con-
cepts, which shows that both facts internal and external to an individual determine
the meaning of the words they use. As such, Diverse Packages Theory takes no stand
on how many of our psychological dispositions relating to content fixing are innate
or themselves created by facts external to the speaker. Therefore, the externalist could
well be correct on this front and still accept Diverse Packages Theory.
The methodological response is that ultimately Diverse Packages Theory is for po-
litical theorists to solve a problem in political theory, namely to explain reasonable
disagreement. As such, the efficacy of Diverse Packages Theory is independent of de-
bates in the philosophy of language about which psychological dispositions track the
correct way to fix the content of concepts. Diverse Packages Theory is entirely consis-
tent with an externalist metasemantic theory that says the conceptual content of our
terms is determined by specific facts external to the speaker irrespective of their dis-
positions or metalinguistic beliefs. In such cases, the externalist has merely become a
participant in a metalinguistic negotiation. As such, Diverse Packages Theory leaves
it open for an externalist to still say that in a metalinguistic negotiation, at least one
of the parties is mistaken about what their words mean because they have fixed the
content of their concepts incorrectly. Nothing in Diverse Packages Theory precludes
this, but it is irrelevant to evaluating whether Diverse Packages Theory does the work
it is supposed to do for the political theorist’s problem of explaining reasonable dis-
agreement. Of course whether the externalist’s metasemantic theory is relevant for
the political theorist’s problem is an open question. But, that question is part of an
orthogonal methodological debate about how different parts of philosophy are re-
lated, and so is unrelated to the question here and now of whether Diverse Packages
Theory is a good theory to solve the political theorist’s problem.
5.2 Pointless Verbal Disputes
In arguing for Diverse Packages Theory’s model I said that one motivation for it was
that in being able to read cases of reasonable disagreement as metalinguistic negotia-
tions it can vindicate the intuition that deep disagreements are genuine. By assuming
that they hinge on a pragmatically expressed conflict about what the meaning of a
moral term ought to be we can understand how they are genuine despite disagreeing
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parties not literally expressing conflicting beliefs by their judgements.
An objection one might have, following Chalmers (2011: 522–525), is that Diverse
Packages Theory makes deep disagreements into pointless verbal disputes. The core
idea being that even if there is a sense in which deep disagreements, when read as met-
alinguistic negotiations, are genuine in virtue of hinging on a conflict in what concept
ought to be used, they are pointless to the first-order practical matter that is expressed
by reasonable people’s political judgements. And, as Chalmers (2011: 525) says, this
sort of pointlessness is a heuristic guide to the presence of verbal disputes. As such,
using metalinguistic negotiation to vindicate deep disagreements as genuine disagree-
ments was in vain. They are pointless verbal disputes anyway and pointless disputes
are no help for political theorists who hope to show reasonable disagreements were
worth explaining.
To see how this objection works consider Nationalisation again. In that case, the
thought would be that when it is read as a metalinguistic negotiation it turns out to
hinge not on the first-order disagreement we thought it did. It does not hinge on the
economic system Bryan and Elizabeth believe justice requires. Rather, it hinges on a
conflict about what the concept of justice ought to be. But, insofar as this generates
the first-order disagreement, it is pointless to it because all it involves is a conflict about
what considerations are relevant for deliberating about justice. And, resolving that
dispute will resolve the first-order disagreement. But, this resolution doesn’t come
about because Bryan and Elizabeth settled something about justice. Rather it comes
about because they settle on which considerations they ought to be weighing up to
form beliefs about what justice requires.
But, I submit, this objection goes wrong for two reasons. The first is that it is
plainly wrong to conclude that metalinguistic negotiations are pointless with respect
to the first-order moral and political issues that reasonable people are disagree about.
The resolution of a metalinguistic negotiation about what concept ought to be used
has significant normative consequences when they involve the kinds of concepts that
usually feature in reasonable disagreements. Reasonable disagreements as should be
plain from examples like Abortion, Nationalisation, and Indirect Abortion, can poten-
tially involve concepts like justice, moral goodness, morally right, moral
person and many other moral concepts. These are by their very nature normative
concepts and therefore if people diverge over them and decide to resolve the diver-
gence, they will have serious and pervasive normative consequences. For instance,
that some states of affairs is picked out as required by justice is typically taken to jus-
tify realising it with the use of coercive political power. As such people will be forced
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to comply with laws that enforce a state of affairs that counts as just according to their
interlocutor’s concept. One can imagine how this will play out in a similar way for
a whole host of reasonable disagreements that feature moral and political concepts.
To that end, deep disagreements read as metalinguistic negotiations are not pointless,
and as such not necessarily or heuristically verbal disputes.
For a non-political example, consider a reasonable disagreement that is centred on
a topic in interpersonal morality, “the good life”. Let us suppose that it is a metalin-
guistic negotiation and as Chalmers supposes parties resolve to use the term “good
life” to mean ‘lives spent satisfying selfish desires’ rather than to use “good life” to
mean ‘lives spent helping others’. Clearly this will have profound normative differ-
ences for these individuals. It will affect what they see as demanded of them by moral-
ity and therefore how they should lead their lives.
The second reason the objection goes wrong is because Diverse Packages Theory al-
ready has a definition of what verbal disputes are and so Chalmers’s way of identifying
them is unnecessary. As I argued, people will have a verbal disagreement when they
do not share the invariable content of a concept. This is because it would show they
do not possess diverging concepts that would count as competing candidates. Rather,
they would be distinct concepts altogether who play completely different roles and
having completely different functions for those who wish to use them. A disagree-
ment using those concepts would be verbal unless we decomposed it further into
disagreement about some more fundamental concepts that people shared, or some
disagreement about entire conceptual schemes.17 Barring anything like that, Diverse
Packages Theory has already provided an analysis of when reasonable disagreements
are verbal disputes.
5.3 Topic Discontinuity
Another objection against Diverse Packages Theory might be that, even if we accept
that understanding deep disagreements as metalinguistic negotiations does not entail
they are pointless verbal disputes, it might still entail they involve a form of topic
discontinuity. That is to say that the model shows that deep disagreements are cases
where reasonable people are trying to change the topic of their discussion, rather than
trying to engage in sustained disagreement about the same topic.
The objection begins with the thought that concepts play a central role in picking
17See Chalmers (2011: 548–563) on bedrock concepts and bedrock disputes, and Midgley (1992) on
conceptual schemes.
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out the “topic” or general subject matter of thought.18 For instance, when someone
is deciding to buy a house and reflecting about what they ought to do, a number of
thoughts will typically run through their head. They will think about various things
relating to their finances, various things relating to the condition of the house, per-
haps what others think about the house or their finances as well. But all through this,
their thoughts centre on a particular topic picked out by a concept, or more likely a
cluster of concepts, relating to ‘purchasing a house’. This will be the same for peo-
ple engaged in a discussion or disagreement. A sameness in concepts will guarantee a
sameness in topic.
But, so the objection goes, if Diverse Packages Theory is right that reasonable
disagreements like Nationalisation and Indirect Abortion are metalinguistic negoti-
ations, then it shows that the people in those disagreements are not actually talking
about the same topic. This is because as Diverse Packages Theory explains those cases,
the disagreeing parties are each making a judgement according to their divergent con-
cepts. This is not a pointless verbal dispute, but it does indicate that the disagreeing
parties are trying to have a discussion centred on different topics, namely topics indi-
viduated by the concepts they are each individually using. This would be to say that
in Nationalisation, Bryan is trying to have a discussion about what justice requires as
it pertains to his concept of justice, but Elizabeth is trying to have discussion about
what justice requires as it pertains to her concept. But, neither of them realise that
they are each trying to change the topic and so there is no sustained disagreement on
a single topic of discussion.
But this objection is unwarranted because Diverse Packages Theory is fundamen-
tally neutral with respect to a wide variety of views on topic continuity. For instance,
it is compatible with the sort of view argued for by Schroeter and Schroeter (2014:
12–16), and Sawyer (2020: 385–390, 2018b: 10–15, 2018a: 13–21) where concept iden-
tity guarantees topic continuity. They argue topic sameness is got by people using
the same concepts, which is in turn understood with people sharing a “tradition” for
fixing the content of that particular concept. This tradition is supposed to include all
the various representational and non-representational ways that people’s thoughts
are related to the world. Diverse Packages Theory is compatible with such a view be-
cause of the distinction it draws between a concept’s invariable content and variable
content, and because it is neutral on precisely how or which facts fix the invariable
content of a concept. As such, the theory would say that if topic continuity depends
18See Sawyer (2020, 2018b,a), Schroeter and Schroeter (2014) and Cappelen (2018: Ch. 9) for an
overview of this type of view of the relation between concepts and topics.
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on concept identity, we should merely look at the invariable content of a concept,
and identity there indicates that reasonable people “diverge” in their concepts in the
sense of putting forth candidates for the same concept. Since Diverse Packages Theory
is not committed to any particular story about how or which facts fix the invariable
content of a concept it is entirely compatible with what Schroeter and Schroeter, and
Sawyer say about how concept identity is determined.
Beyond views that cash out topic sameness through concept identity, Diverse
Packages Theory is also compatible with a range of other views as well. For instance,
it is entirely compatible with a view like Cappelen’s (2018: 107–108) that addresses
topic continuity with the idea that it is a pre-theoretic notion. This is because Diverse
Packages Theory does not use topic continuity as a theoretical notion or commit to
any broader metasemantic theory about entities other than, concepts, meaning, ex-
tension, and intension. As such, it is neutral on what pre-theoretic notions can be
posited to make sense of topic continuity. This means it is compatible with the so-
lution offered by Cappelen which makes use of the notion of “samesaying” as a pre-
theoretic course-grained notion independent of a word’s meaning or concept.
Finally, Diverse Packages Theory is also compatible with a purely pragmatic view
of topic continuity of the sort argued for by Roberts (2012). For instance, the topic
for a reasonable disagreement could be supplied by “questions under discussion”.
These are questions that set the function of the discourse between the parties. The
initial question is then something like “What institutions and outcomes does justice
require?”. This would then elicit conflicting answers from reasonable people. This in
turn gives rise to further questions under discussion that are ever more general to fi-
nally answer the initial question. On this view what seems like discontinuity of topic
is really the work of pragmatic mechanisms in the disagreement to ultimately answer
the initial question. Diverse Packages Theory is entirely compatible with a view like
this because it has taken no position on the pragmatic mechanisms involved in a dis-
agreement beyond those involved in metalinguistic negotiations. To that end, it is
entirely compatible with additional pragmatic mechanisms if need be.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter I argued for and defended Diverse Packages Theory as the best explana-
tion of reasonable disagreement about justice. I did this first by motivating the need
to read cases of reasonable disagreement as either canonical disputes or as metalinguis-
tic negotiations. I argued this allows us to read cases of reasonable disagreement that
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are both ordinary and deep disagreements as genuine. I then showed how we can
explain why reasonable disagreements that are either canonical disputes or metalin-
guistic negotiations occur by describing how people possess and use diverse ‘concept-
conception packages’ to make moral and political judgements. I then showed how
these moving parts yield an explanatory model that can explain both ordinary cases
of reasonable disagreement and cases of reasonable disagreement that are deep dis-
agreements.
I then argued that, aside from its ability to actually explain the cases it purports
to explain, the theory has two comparative advantages. The first advantage is that by
being able to explain deep disagreements, it is more explanatorily powerful than ex-
tant theories that claim to explain reasonable disagreement. The second advantage is
that it relies on a more parsimonious theory of concepts than the only extant explana-
tion of deep disagreements. I then considered and responded to three objections that
might be put against Diverse Packages Theory. I argued that none of the objections
warrant rejecting Diverse Packages Theory.
With Diverse Packages Theory now on hand as the best explanation of reason-
able disagreement, in the next two chapters I put it to use in the second stage of my
Disagreement to Legitimacy argument. I will evaluate whether political liberalism or
political realism can, in light of Diverse Packages Theory’s explanation, show how a
society can achieve a stable political order. This is what I turn to in the next three
chapters.
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Chapter 4
The Instability of Political Liberalism
1 Introduction
At the end of the last chapter, I concluded that the best explanation of reasonable
disagreement was Diverse Packages Theory. This meant that the best explanation of
reasonable disagreement about justice – the sorts of disagreements that matter for
Disagreement to Legitimacy arguments – was that reasonable people possess and use
diverse concept-conception packages of justice which cause them to make conflicting
judgements about the institutions and outcomes justice requires. With this explana-
tion on hand, the rest of this thesis puts it to use in the second stage of my Disagree-
ment to Legitimacy argument. This second stage is what I take up now.
The goal of this chapter and the next, is to argue that, in light of Diverse Packages
Theory, extant conceptions of political liberalism and political realism cannot show
how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order. This will serve as a negative
argument for the Dual Convergent Conception I argue for in Chapter 6.
To get clear on how the argument will proceed, recall two points from Chapter
1. The first point is that the ability to show how reasonable people can achieve a sta-
ble political order is the metric of evaluation for a theory of political legitimacy, and
therefore for evaluating conceptions of political liberalism and political realism. This
is because the inability of reasonable people to achieve a stable political order in the
face of reasonable disagreement about justice is the problem that theories of political
legitimacy are solutions for. The second point to recall is that stability as a metric is
understood along two dimensions: the ability to show how to create a political order
and the ability to show how to maintain this political order over time.
The ability to create a political order amounts to showing how all reasonable peo-
ple’s balance of reasons can provide them sufficient moral reason to coordinate on
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a political principle or rules that are coercively enforced despite their reasonable dis-
agreements about justice. The ability to sustain a political order amounts to showing
how all reasonable people’s balance of reasons can be maintained so they continue
to have sufficient moral reason to coordinate on conceptions of justice or rules that
are coercively enforced despite the endogenous and exogenous forces disturbing their
balance of reasons. The forces we are concerned with are limited to, in the case of the
endogenous forces, the sphere of activity the political principles or rules themselves
permit or encourage and, in the case of the exogenous forces, the normal changes in
circumstances a political society is likely to face.
The argument over the next two chapters involves showing how the various ex-
tant conceptions of political liberalism and political realism fail on at least one of the
two dimensions of stability. The goal of this chapter more specifically is to argue that
the two main conceptions of political liberalism – the Consensus Conception and
Convergence Conception – fail on at least one of the two dimensions of stability and
that this motivates the general move towards political realist theories of legitimacy.
Recall from Chapter 1, the general strategy that unites conceptions of political
liberalism is proposing that a political principle or rule is legitimate if all reasonable
people conclusively justify endorsing it as one’s own. This is the normative standard of
‘public justification’ or “Public Justification Principle” formalised by political liberals
(Gaus and Vallier 2009). The normative standard has, broadly speaking, the follow-
ing structure. The first part is that the object of justification is either a principle or
rule. The second part is that the nature of conclusive justification is context insensi-
tive. This is because the facts that justify a principle or rule are purely the content
of reasonable people’s moral reasons. The third part is that the attitude towards the
political principles or rules that are justified is endorsement. This is to say that when
a principle or rule is publicly justified it is internalised as a requirement of justice or
morality broadly construed. As we shall see, political liberals then differ on whether
the objects of justification are only general principles for the design of institutions or
context and issue specific moral rules, and on the specific way conclusively justifica-
tion is achieved. Nevertheless, on all conceptions of political liberalism, a stable po-
litical order is achieved by reasonable people’s balance of reasons providing them and
continuing to provide them sufficient moral reason to endorse a political principle
or rule. But, as I’ll argue, given Diverse Packages Theory’s explanation of reasonable
disagreement about justice, conceptions of political liberalism and its normative stan-
dard of public justification cannot show reasonable people how to achieve a stable
political order.
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To that end, the rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In §2 I explain, the Con-
sensus Conception political legitimacy, why it fails to show how reasonable people
can create a political order, the responses available to political liberals and my reply to
each of the responses. In §3, I explain the Convergence Conception of political legiti-
macy, why it fails to show how reasonable people can maintain a political order, the
responses available to political liberals and my reply to each of the responses.
2 Consensus Conception
The most prominent version of political liberalism is the Consensus Conception. On
this conception political liberalism’s normative standard of public justification is un-
derstood to be targeted at political principles, rather than specific rules, and reached
by a consensus of moral reasons. This notion of public justification then forms the
heart of the Consensus Conception as the grounds of stability. The Consensus Con-
ception proposes that understanding public justification as an overlapping consensus
shows how reasonable people’s balance of reasons can provide them sufficient moral
reason to endorse and continue endorsing a political principle over time. In short,
that it shows how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order. In this sec-
tion I argue that the Consensus Conception cannot do this.
To that end, this section proceeds as follows. In §2.1 I lay out the Consensus Con-
ception of political liberalism. In §2.2 I argue that the conception, in light of Diverse
Packages Theory, faces a new sort of objection: the Conceptual Inconclusiveness Ob-
jection. In §§2.3–2.4 I consider two ways political liberals could respond to the ob-
jection. I argue that in both cases the responses fail or bring on their own problems.
As a result, I conclude that the Consensus Conception of political liberalism cannot
show how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order.
2.1 The Theory of Political Legitimacy
The Consensus Conception of political liberalism is best summarised as:
Consensus Conception: A political principle is legitimate if there is an overlapping
consensus of reasons amongst all reasonable people that conclusively justifies
endorsing it.
This is the theory of political legitimacy that Rawls (2005) and his followers argue for.1
The core idea is that no matter what moral reasons reasonable people have for endors-
1For those who follow Rawls, see Nussbaum (2011), Hartley and Watson (2018, 2009), Larmore
(1999, 1990), and Leland and van Wietmarschen (2017). See also, Lister (2013) although he calls the
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ing their comprehensive conceptions of justice, or making judgements about what
justice requires, there is a set of reasons they all share or “overlap” on, which conclu-
sively justify political principles. These shared set of reasons that all reasonable people
overlap on are such that they override all other justice related reasons and conclusively
justify endorsing a specific family of political principles. These are political principles
that are part of “political conceptions of justice”. As such, political principles that
are part of political conceptions of justice are ones that all reasonable people ought to
obey and that are morally permissible to enforce with the use of coercive power. This
is because, all reasonable people have sufficient moral reason to endorse any particular
principle that is a member of the family of political conceptions of justice. This is ulti-
mately what is captured by Rawls’s (2005: 137) famous liberal principle of legitimacy:
“exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with
a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common
human reason.” The principles and ideals that constitute a conception of justice are
legitimate according to Rawls if all reasonable people can endorse them. To that end,
the Consensus Conception shows how reasonable people can achieve a stable political
order by cashing out the core idea above with the idea of an overlapping consensus,
and the educating role of a political conception of justice’s principles and practical
ideals.
As Rawls (2005: 144–149) argues, reasonable people can create a political order
despite reasonable disagreement about justice because all reasonable people can find
an “overlapping consensus” on a set of reasons that conclusively justify political prin-
ciples that are part of a political conception of justice. The overlapping consensus
justifies political conceptions because it involves a consensus on a particular subset of
moral reasons – “political values” – that are reasons related to the domain of the polit-
ical. This is the limited domain of social life in which people are related to one another
within the structure of their society’s basic social institutions, which they cannot en-
ter and exit easily or transactionally, and in which the power of those institutions is
always coercive power. Outside this limited domain, there will be a host of moral val-
ues that will serve as reasons for how people ought to behave in their lives and over
which reasonable people will disagree. But, for issues in the domain of the political
the theory says there is a limited set of political values that all reasonable people share.
As Rawls (2005: 64, 140) explains, the consensus on these political values conclu-
Consensus Conception the “reasons-for-decisions model”, and Quong (2011); although his “alterna-
tive view” differs in structure from Rawls’s original account it is still committed to the underlying
consensus of reasons that is distinctive of the Consensus Conception.
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sively justify political conceptions of justice in two stages of justification. The first
stage is a “freestanding” pro tanto justification of the political conception. What this
means is that the political values are constructed out of fundamental ideas that are
implicit in the shared political culture of the society in which reasonable people live
rather than out of any comprehensive conception of justice. The public culture con-
sists of the existing political institutions and the historical texts and traditions of their
interpretations of a democratic constitutional society. The ideas taken from this cul-
ture are the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation (with its criterion
of reciprocity), the idea of people as free and equal (with their capacity for a concep-
tion of the good and sense of justice), and the idea of a well-ordered society (marked
by the fact of reasonable pluralism and regulated by a conception of justice all en-
dorse). This pool of shared ideas provides the grounds for constructing the political
values in a way that is “freestanding” from reasonable people’s comprehensive private
conceptions (or as Rawlsians call them “reasonable comprehensive doctrines”). The
political values justify a political conception of justice in a way that is separate from
and disconnected from the non-political values of reasonable people’s comprehensive
conceptions of justice.
These political values conclusively justify a political conception of justice because
reasonable people can embed it within their own comprehensive conceptions of jus-
tice and see that it is still justified from within that larger set of moral values. This is
the second stage of justification, which occurs for two reasons. The first is that the
political values are very weighty values that override all other values when it comes to
issues relating to the use of coercive political power. They do this because, as Rawls
(2005: 139) says, they are related to the “the basic framework of social life” and the
“very groundwork of our existence”. They are values that specify “the fundamental
terms of political and social cooperation” necessary for pursuing all our other values
and considerations. This shows how reasonable people’s balance of reasons gives them
sufficient moral reason to endorse a political conception of justice and the political
principles that constitute it. A conception of justice justified by the political values is
tailored for a specific purpose, namely to settle the constitutional essentials and mat-
ters of basic justice in a society. For that purpose the political values are overriding.
The second reason is that in virtue of the freestanding justification – the construc-
tion of the political values from ideas implicit in the shared political culture – rea-
sonable people can see the only way to use coercive power in a way that satisfies the
criterion of reciprocity is to endorse and defer to the political conception. As Rawls
(2005: xliv–xlvii, 50) explains, the criterion of reciprocity is that the “exercise of polit-
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ical power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our
political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of those
actions”. Since the criterion of reciprocity comes from ideas in the shared political
culture, reasonable people are already committed to it when they take into account
other reasonable people. Therefore, it is only the political values constructed in a free-
standing way that can justify coercively enforced political principles when there are
reasonable people with their own comprehensive conceptions. With all that a politi-
cal principle is conclusively justified when all reasonable people can come to see it as
justified from within their own comprehensive conceptions of justice. To that end it
can create a political order despite reasonable disagreement about justice.
According to the theory, this political order can be maintained by the educating
role of the political principles and the practical ideal of public reason that the political
values justify. As Rawls (2005: 81–86) argues the political principles that are part of
a political conception of justice design social institutions that help reasonable people
maintain their sense of justice and hence enable them to maintain their balance of rea-
sons to endorse the political conception of justice. This means the political principles
educate citizens to maintain their sense of justice which allows them to maintain their
effective endorsement of a political conception of justice. The political principles can
play this role because, as Rawls (2005: 83) claims, reasonable people have a “reason-
able moral psychology” which means they have a desire to fully realise their capacity
for a sense of justice and capacity for a conception of the good.2 This means they also
have a capacity to acquire conceptions of justice and act as these conceptions require.
As a result they are receptive to the effective regulation of a society by the principles
of a political conception of justice.
The second way the political order is maintained is that the political values that
reasonable people are supposed to overlap on also justify a practical ideal of public
reason. As Rawls (2005: 215–227) argues, the idea is that the political values also justify
an ideal of democratic citizenship. This ideal of citizenship is that reasonable people
ought to discuss and interact within the institutions of the political conception of
justice by using coercive power only with reference to the political values. This means
that reasonable people’s balance of reasons in favour of the political conception of
justice is maintained by reasonable people taking seriously the fact they disagree with
other reasonable people and given their sincere desire to agree (which is part of their
reasonable moral psychology as reasonable people) they see that the way to reconcile
2Note this moral psychology is a philosophical view of what reasonable people are motivated to
do and develop. It is not an empirical view.
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with each other so that all have sufficient reason to coordinate on the use of political
power is to decide political matters according to the political values that they all share.
With those two elements – the educating role of the political conception’s principles
and its practical ideal of public reason – the theory shows how reasonable people can
sustain a political order.
All in all, political legitimacy on the Consensus Conception of political liberalism
involves cashing out how public justification can be achieved with the idea of an over-
lapping consensus, the educating role of a political conception’s principles and the
practical ideal of public reason. Reasonable people can achieve a stable political or-
der because those ideas show how reasonable people’s balance of reasons can provide
and continue to provide all of them with sufficient moral reason to endorse political
principles despite their reasonable disagreements about justice.
2.2 The Conceptual Inconclusiveness Objection
The problem with the Consensus Conception is that Diverse Packages Theory shows
reasonable people can genuinely disagree about justice without having any overlap-
ping consensus of reasons. This is because reasonable disagreements about justice
can be caused by reasonable people possessing and using divergent concepts of jus-
tice. Possessing divergent concepts of justice means that people will have diverse
considerations when deliberating and forming conceptions of justice. This means the
set of “political values” are not going to necessarily be shared by reasonable people. In
fact the set of political values will vary for reasonable people with different concepts
of justice. As a result there would be no unique set of values that conclusively justify
a single conception of justice for reasonable people. Which means the theory would
legitimate multiple incompatible political principles. I call this the Conceptual In-
conclusiveness Objection. It is a version of the inconclusiveness objection, already
made by some theorists, which operates at the level of concepts.3 This means that the
Consensus Conception cannot show reasonable people how to create a political order
because it cannot show how their balance of reasons can provide them all sufficient
reason to endorse the same political principles.
The Conceptual Inconclusiveness Objection is significant because it is a much
stronger version than the sort pressed by theorists in the literature so far. For instance,
Reidy (2007: 261, 2000: 63–70) has argued that the set of political deliberative con-
3See Boettcher (2015: 194–195) for a good discussion of how the inconclusiveness objection, being
a variety of the broader incompleteness objection, is similar, but importantly different to the objection
put by others in the literature.
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siderations that are supposed to be the subject of the overlapping consensus do not
contain any conclusive reason for the use of coercive power in some cases like abor-
tion or animal rights. But, the version of the objection I present here is stronger than
Reidy’s. For Reidy the problem is that it is unlikely there is any rational way to deter-
minately weigh the shared reasons and that there are political issues the resolution of
which depends on the resolution of other background issues.4
My objection however is that Diverse Packages Theory shows reasonable disagree-
ment about justice can be produced by differences in the very conceptual ingredients
that people use to deliberate about justice. This is because what deliberative consider-
ations people share depends on the concept of justice they possess and use. Parties
that possess and use divergent concepts will have sets of conflicting considerations in-
putted into their deliberations about endorsing conceptions of justice. For instance,
reasonable people who are anti-democrats, or in favour of more limited forms of
democracy will not share the “political values” constructed out of the ideas implicit
in their society’s political culture. The point is that given Diverse Packages Theory we
cannot, as the Consensus Conception contends, assume that reasonable people will
share a set of deliberative considerations that override all other considerations.
The consequence of the Conceptual Inconclusiveness Objection is that it shows
how on the Consensus Conception a society will be disordered in one of two ways.
On the one hand, when reasonable people do not share a concept of justice they
split into groups where each group endorses and acts in accordance with the political
principles that are conclusively justified to them. As a result the society falls into an-
archic disorder because they oppress each other by imposing the political principles
that are justified to each of them. On the other hand, reasonable people might re-
frain from oppressing those with incompatible concepts, but have unresolved claim
disputes which create disorder when individuals try to pursue their conceptions of the
good life. This means the theory cannot show us how reasonable people can achieve
a stable political order.
2.3 Broadening the Scope Response
One way political liberals might respond to the Conceptual Inconclusiveness Objec-
tion is to broaden the scope of public justification. The idea is that the normative
standard of public justification should be applied to reasonable people’s concepts as
well such that legitimacy is grounded in a consensus at a deeper level of thought. This
4See Williams (2000) for discussion of Reidy’s version of the objection and to see how it differs
from the version I present here.
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sort of response is what it seems political liberals who argue for a general “accessibility”
constraint on reasons are aiming for (Boettcher 2015: 200–205; Eberle 2002: 253–359).
On this view of the overlapping consensus, the content of the consensus is comprised
of the reasons that all reasonable people can access with their cognitive faculties even if
the deliberative considerations they actually access are all mutually incompatible. The
idea is that when the object of consensus is reasonable people’s conceptual content we
can make sense of a greater range of admissible deliberative considerations and there-
fore make the Consensus Conception consistent with Diverse Packages Theory. But,
this response does not work because given Diverse Packages Theory’s explanation of
reasonable disagreement about justice, there are at least two ways to understand what
it means to apply public justification to reasonable people’s conceptual content and
both fail.
One way to apply public justification to conceptual content is to say that although
reasonable people can possess divergent concepts, they ought to only use the concepts
that sufficiently overlap in content with the concepts that other reasonable people use.
There are two problems with this. The first problem is that it seems prima facie im-
plausible that all of our reasonable disagreements will involve overlaps in conceptual
content. It might work for modest conceptual differences where reasonable people
only differ slightly in their conceptual content such that they disagree over certain
hard or borderline cases. But, there is no reason to think that the forms of deep dis-
agreement that Diverse Packages Theory explained in Chapter 3 will be like this. For
instance, it might work when people disagree about precisely at which point a fetus
counts as a moral person. To use only the conceptual content they overlap on may
mean only using the conceptual content that relates to the general window in which
fetuses become moral persons. But, there is no reason to assume that all our reason-
able disagreements will be like this. For instance, as I describe in Barry and Nora’s
disagreement in Chapter 3, deep disagreements involve cases where reasonable peo-
ple reject the other’s deliberative consideration entirely and therefore the conceptual
content that gave rise to it. In short, reasonable people can disagree in such a way that
they do not overlap in conceptual content at all.
The second problem is that although searching for deeper conceptual overlap is
plausible, it is implausible to ask of people if the conceptual content in question is use-
ful for making judgements that are unrelated to justice. For instance, two reasonable
people might disagree about justice, not by possessing divergent concepts of justice,
but by possessing divergent concepts of moral personhood. This would be a case
where they broadly overlap on the conceptual content that moral personhood is a
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relevant consideration for deliberating about justice, but do not share the particular
content of that consideration that specifies what counts as a moral person. In these
cases they might have good reason to use the concept of moral personhood be-
cause of its usefulness for other circumstances. Perhaps in circumstances where they
are advocating for their comprehensive conception of justice or the good life. In these
cases it seems implausible to expect them to not use the conceptual content they have
very good reason to use.
However, another way to apply public justification to conceptual content might
be to say that public justification applies to the formation of our concepts themselves
and hence to tacit beliefs about the facts that fix the conceptual content of our con-
cepts. On this view, public justification requires reasonable people share these tacit
beliefs. This will allow reasonable people to then possess the same concepts.
There are two problems with this. The first problem is that it is implausibly de-
manding. Our beliefs about the facts that fix the content of concepts are perhaps
even more diverse than our conceptual content and so finding consensus there is un-
likely. This is because an important part of Diverse Packages Theory’s explanation of
reasonable disagreements was that differences in conceptual content were explained
by differences in people’s intrinsic dispositions and personal experiences towards cer-
tain facts as the facts which fix the content of their concepts. This final cause is not
something that can plausibly be bracketed or be the object of consensus because it is
a plain empirical fact that people are dispositionally diverse and have very diverse per-
sonal experiences. The strategy of constantly moving back the overlapping consensus
to deeper levels of thought is not likely to present less diversity, but likely more of it.
The second problem is that it also seems self-undermining for a liberal concep-
tion of legitimacy since it would be committed to a profoundly illiberal view in the
topic of Conceptual Ethics.5 This is the area of philosophy that deals with the ethics
of possessing and using certain concepts over others. A political liberal taking up the
response above would be committed to denying reasonable people the freedom of
conscience and thought. This means it requires an illiberal standard on people’s con-
cept formation in order to legitimate political principles that are part of liberal po-
litical conceptions of justice. In sum, the strategy of broadening the scope of public
justification is an inadequate response to the Conceptual Inconclusiveness Objection.
5See Burgess and Plunkett (2013a,b) for an overview.
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2.4 Narrowing the Constituency Response
Another response to the Conceptual Inconclusiveness Objection might be the sort
advanced by Johnathan Quong and Micah Schwartzman where the idea is to narrow
the constituency of people that count as reasonable.6 On this strategy, Diverse Pack-
ages Theory’s explanation of reasonable disagreement about justice is neutralised at
the level of who counts as reasonable and not, as the Broadening the Scope Response
tries, at the level of what is publicly justified.
The response starts with the idea that reasonable disagreement about justice is,
by definition, a special form of disagreement. For Quong, reasonable disagreements
about justice are justificatory disagreements and not foundational ones. As Quong
(2011: 214) says:
Reasonable disagreements about justice are thus justificatory by defini-
tion. The truth of this claim does not rest on any empirical claim about
substantive agreement between actual citizens on principles of justice at
any level of abstraction. Rather, reasonable disagreements about justice
are justificatory by definition because they must always involve reason-
able citizens who share a commitment to the public or political values
that are the subject of the overlapping consensus…
In contrast, foundational disagreements are those where people do not share a com-
mitment to the public and political values. Quong (2011: 206) thinks disagreements
about the good life will fall into this category whilst reasonable disagreements about
justice will not.
For Schwartzman (2004: 200–201) reasonable disagreements about justice are dis-
agreements about issues nested within the broad notion of a public political concep-
tion of justice, and not about any issues outside that broad notion. This is because
Schwartzman argues given the definition of a well-ordered society as one where “ev-
eryone accepts and knows that others accept the same principles of justice” political
principles outside that broad notion cannot order such a society. As Schwartzman
(2004: 200) says:
Principles of justice that cannot be interpreted in ways consistent with
liberal freedoms are inadmissible because they cannot serve as the basis
of a well-ordered society. They do not appear in the nested set of public
political conceptions about which citizens may reasonably disagree.
6Strictly speaking, Quong’s target is the Asymmetry Objection, but he employs the same sort of
response to inconclusiveness objections.
126 THE INSTABILITY OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM
This means that reasonable disagreement about justice is by definition limited to dis-
agreements about “which principles of justice are the most reasonable, and…whether
the most reasonable principles have been satisfied” and not about what states of af-
fairs are just or which principles are the true principles of justice.
In both cases the idea is that in virtue of being a disagreement of a certain kind
reasonable disagreements about justice involve people who share a standard of justi-
fication for their judgements. In the case of reasonable disagreements about justice
people will, in virtue of being reasonable, share and use public justification as the stan-
dard for making their judgements. This means that the way Diverse Packages Theory’s
explanation gives rise to the Conceptual Inconclusiveness Objection is largely irrele-
vant. This is because the public justification of a political conception of justice is only
inconclusive for unreasonable people and not for reasonable people.
But this response does not work because applying the distinction between foun-
dational and justificatory disagreements that Quong and Schwartzman assert to vin-
dicate the Consensus Conception opens it up to the Public Dogma Objection (Cam-
pos 1994; Macedo 1991; Besch 2012).7 This is because it shifts the goal posts on what it
means to be reasonable without any independent reason. It turns public justification
from a normative standard that reasonable people adopt to achieve a stable political
order into a constitutive feature of reasonable people themselves. This means that
the argument for the Consensus Conception rests on the prior acceptance of public
justification and therefore by those it applies to. This would make the Consensus
Conception a form of “public dogma” or “secular fundamentalism” (Besch 2012: 165;
Campos 1994: 1824; Macedo 1991: 58). It excludes those that have not yet endorsed
public justification from the constituency to which public justification is supposed to
apply. Its normative standard legitimates the use of coercive political power against
putatively reasonable people who are necessarily excluded from having that power jus-
tified to them. This means that the way the Consensus Conception achieves a stable
political order is trivial. The balance of reasons it aims to create will always be achieved
since it will only be concerned with people who already endorse public justification.
And further, it will always maintain a political order because as soon as reasonable
people question or try to reevaluate the justificatory grounds of public justification
7Schoelandt (2015: 1037–1041) makes a similar point, but insists the problem is that restricting
who counts as reasonable means political liberals have to reject the interpersonal type of justification
distinctive of political liberalism in favour of an impersonal type of justification. I do not think we
have to go that far. Rather the problem is that, in Shoelandt’s terms, the response tries to restrict an
interpersonal type of justification to the extent it generates its own instability. As such it is not suited
as a theory of political legitimacy.
THE INSTABILITY OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM 127
they will drop out of its constituency and so the balance of reasons is maintained by
default.
Before moving on, let me dispel a reply that theorists like Quong (2011: 140), who
hold the “internal conception” of political liberalism, may be tempted to make.8 The
internal conception of political liberalism is that political liberalism as a theory of
political legitimacy should be understood as justifying liberal political principles to
liberals themselves. As such, it is a project that is internal to liberal political theory.
Now, those like Quong who profess this view of political liberalism may be tempted
to say that the distinction between justificatory and foundational disagreements does
not assume reasonable people accept anything as demanding as public justification,
but rather only some “basic liberal norms or values”, like “the moral ideal of persons
as free and equal, and of society as a fair system of cooperation”.9
But of course this does not avoid the objection because “the moral ideal of persons
as free and equal, and of society as a fair system of cooperation” are fundamental ideas
in a public culture that both liberals and non-liberals can share.10 In fact this is cru-
cial to the Consensus Conception. Although liberals will in addition also share some
“basic liberal norms or values”, non-liberals will not. All reasonable people in such a
society will claim to be committed to the view that people are free and equal and to
fair terms of social cooperation. They may not share the specific liberal interpretation
of these values, but that is only because they are after all non-liberals and so do not
possess comprehensive liberal conceptions of justice. To that end, the Narrowing the
Scope response also fails to rebut the Conceptual Inconclusiveness Objection.
2.5 Conclusion
I have argued in this section that given Diverse Packages Theory’s explanation of rea-
sonable disagreement about justice, the Consensus Conception of political liberalism
cannot show reasonable people can achieve a stable political order. I argued that it
faces the Conceptual Inconclusiveness Objection which means it either legitimates
multiple political principles or does not justify any of them. In both cases, it cannot
show how there can be a balance of reasons amongst reasonable people that provides
8Andrew Lister (2013) also seems to endorse the internal conception, but in a communitarian ver-
sion. See also Schwartzman and Wilson (2019) on their use of what they term “liberal reasonableness”.
9See Nussbaum (2011), Wenar (1995) and Kelly and McPherson (2001) for a similar point. See also
Leland and van Wietmarschen (2012) for whom the acceptance of basic liberal values is necessary, but
not sufficient for reasonableness.
10See Fowler and Stemplowska (2015) and for a similar point that is originally made in defence of
the Asymmetry Objection.
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them sufficient moral reason to endorse the same political principles.
I then argued that broadening the scope of public justification fails as a response
because it is unclear that public justification can be applied to people’s conceptual
content. I then argued that the narrowing the constituency of public justification
fails because there is no independent reason for the distinction required for doing so
and as a result makes achieving a stable political order trivial. Therefore, both of the
ways that political liberals can try to avoid the Conceptual Inconclusiveness Objection
do not work and so the Consensus Conception cannot provide an adequate theory
of political legitimacy.
3 Convergence Conception
Of course the Consensus Conception is not the only way to understand political lib-
eralism’s normative standard of public justification. Another way to understand it is
through the idea of a ‘convergence’ of reasons.11 The core idea is that ‘public justifica-
tion’ is achieved through all reasonable people having some reason that conclusively
justifies issue and context specific moral rules. This is the idea of public justification
that forms the heart of the Convergence Conception. It proposes that the conver-
gence of reasonable people’s conclusive justifications shows how their balance of rea-
sons can provide them sufficient moral reason to endorse issue and context specific
moral rules and continue endorsing these moral rules over time. In short, it shows
how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order.
By allowing far more reasons to count as conclusive and focusing on issue and
context specific moral rules as opposed to general political principles, the Conver-
gence Conception can provide a way for political liberalism to avoid the Conceptual
Inconclusiveness Objection and the series of problems that arise from responding to
it. But, as I’ll show, given Diverse Packages Theory, the Convergence Conception
cannot show how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order. The type of
agreement that is supposed to represent reasonable people’s balance of reasons provid-
ing them sufficient moral reason to endorse moral rules cannot be maintained. This
means, the conception cannot show how reasonable people can maintain a political
order.
To that end, the rest of this section proceeds as follows. In §3.1 I detail the Conver-
gence Conception and how it can avoid the Conceptual Inconclusiveness Objection.
11See Thomas Nagel (1987) and Fred D’Agostino (1996) for the earliest explication of the distinction
between the Consensus and Convergence Conceptions of political liberalism.
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In §3.2 I argue the Convergence Conception faces what I call the Verbal Agreement
Objection. In §3.3 I consider two ways that political liberals could respond to this
objection by saying more about the precise mechanism of convergence. In §3.3.1 I de-
tail the Multi-Perspectival View and argue that it is not an adequate version of the
response because it encourages people to back out of agreements when it no longer
favours them, requires complex calculations of the effect of a bargain, and requires a
particular conception of individual rights that will itself be the subject of reasonable
disagreement. In §3.3.2 I detail the Social Equilibrium view and argue it is also not an
adequate version of the response because it faces the Conceptual Integrity Objection
and so generates its own sources of instability in maintaining a political order. As
a result I conclude that although the Social Equilibrium view is the best version of
the Convergence Conception, political liberals who take it up are caught between the
instability of the Verbal Agreement Objection and the Conceptual Integrity Objec-
tion. This gives us good reason to reject political liberalism and consider other types
of theorises of political legitimacy, like political realism.
3.1 The Theory of Political Legitimacy
The Convergence Conception of political liberalism can be summarised as:
Convergence Conception: A set of issue and context specific moral rules are legiti-
mate if there is a convergence of mutually intelligible reasons amongst all the
reasonable people in a society that conclusively justifies endorsing them.
This is the theory of political legitimacy that theorists like Gerald Gaus (2016, 2011b)12,
Kevin Vallier (2019, 2014, 2011; 2009) and arguably Ryan Muldoon (2016) have argued
for.13 Although they all differ on the specific mechanism that underlies the political
order the conception is supposed to help us achieve (I will return to this point in §3.3),
the core idea is the same. That is, the public justification of issue and context specific
12Strictly speaking Gaus’s theory concerns social morality and the construction of a moral order,
with a political order being a tool for constructing and maintaining the moral order (Gaus 2016: 177–
187, 206–207, 2011b: 460–470, 545–546).
13As Gaus (2016: 168) notes, Muldoon sees his view as an alternative to political liberalism, but that
is because he only considers the Consensus Conception of political liberalism. Arguably, Amartya Sen
(2010) also advances a sort of Convergence Conception. But, as Gaus (2016: 155–163) convincingly
argues, Sen’s view sits somewhere between the Consensus and Convergence Conceptions of political
liberalism. Sen is still concerned with conceptions of justice and is still committed to some consensus
in how reasonable people view their shared social world. Given that, I leave aside discussing Sen’s view
directly even though we should keep the view in mind as a marker of how theories of legitimacy exist
on a continuum between consensus and convergence.
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moral rules that are coercively enforced is a matter of all reasonable people converging
in their conclusive justifications through potentially different and unique reasons.
Now, there are two important ways that the Convergence Conception is different
from the Consensus Conception. Both of which combine to help political liberals
avoid the Conceptual Inconclusiveness Objection. The first way is that public justifi-
cation is cashed out as the convergence of mutually intelligible reasons. As Gaus and
Vallier (2009: 58–59) summarise when contrasting consensus and convergence:
Contrast this to the Convergence Conception according to which mem-
bers of the public may arrive at common laws by reasoning based on di-
verse values and concerns. Here pluralistic reasoning is the very basis of
justification. As long as intelligibility obtains, all members of the public
acknowledge that everyone engages in genuine reasoning such that each
person’s conclusions provide her or him with reasons to accept the law.
So everyone can see everyone else as a self-legislator and freely subject to
the law. Appealing to a law justified in this manner respects each person
as free and equal, without any insistence that we reason in the same way.
Although Gaus and Vallier are using their own terminology for reasonable people –
“members of the public” – the basic point is the same. When reasonable people can
recognise the reasons others provide for endorsing a rule as reasons for endorsing it
even if they do not see them as good reasons or conclusive reasons for themselves, then
such reasons are intelligible. From there, the use of coercive power is publicly justified
if all reasonable people can find some conclusive reason, that is within that pool of
intelligible reasons, to endorse it. This fundamentally breaks from the Consensus
Conception of political liberalism by rejecting the need for a shared set of reasons,
and only requiring a convergence of mutually intelligible reasons.
The second way the Convergence Conception is different from the Consensus
Conception is that the object of justification is not a political principle, but rules
that concern specific issues in specific contexts which all can recognise as moral rules.
Which means recognising them as requirements of justice or morality broadly con-
strued. These moral rules can then play all sorts of roles from being constitutional
laws to specific laws of the property-rights system. But, they must be issue and con-
text specific. They are not general principles for how to construct rules or social insti-
tutions. Rather they are the moral rules that comprise social institutions themselves.
This narrowing of the focus of public justification on issue and context specific moral
rules is for two reasons. The first reason is that convergence on entire conceptions of
justice is taken to be too unlikely given that reasonable people’s powers of reason are
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limited. As Gaus and Vallier say:
If we are to have a good grasp of the public justifiability of moral de-
mands based on moral rule L, we must have comparative knowledge
of how L stacks up against the alternatives we can canvass. Even Mem-
bers of the Public, who recognize their sufficient reasons, are of limited
rationality, and as creatures of limited reasoning powers, when asked
whether they have sufficient reason to endorse a rule, they must ask,
“what are the alternatives we are deciding between, and what are the
costs of refusing to endorse any of them?”…To ask “what do I have suf-
ficient reason to endorse?” when I do not know the set of options is an
ill-formed question. In the terms of economics, one must know the op-
portunity costs of one’s choice – the value of the options that one has
passed over – before one can come to any reasonable judgment of what
is to be endorsed. (Gaus 2011b: 269)
Our aim in constructing a justified lawmaking systems is, as far as possi-
ble, for acts of legislation to reflect what citizens understand as distinct
and manageable issues. Here, as elsewhere, holistic justification is out-
side the bounds of real human reason. (Gaus 2011b: 496)
We [convergence theorists] focus on the public justification of moral
rules because they’re the kind of social practice that can be internalized
by most moral agents. Moral life is not based on generic moral princi-
ples like Rawls’s difference principle, but on local rules governing local
behavior. (Vallier 2019: 175)
The point here is that when people are limited in their powers of reasoning they can-
not, given their differences in their concepts of justice, adequately decide whether
they have sufficient reason to endorse a general political principle against all the other
alternatives. Doing this with context and issue specific moral rules is easier and so
convergence is more likely.
The second reason for narrowing the focus of public justification is that issue and
context specific moral rules are what’s needed for moral rules to do the work of effec-
tively ordering a society where people who disagree cooperate and do not cheat. As
Gaus (2011b: 113) says:
…group cooperation requires norms or rules that are specific enough in
their requirements that cheater detection is highly reliable within the
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group. Cooperative rules must be sufficiently general so that they pro-
vide guidance in unforeseen future circumstances while, at the same
time, it is reasonably clear to the great majority of group members (i)
when the rule applies and (ii) what the rule calls for. Because punish-
ment seems so fundamental to the evolution of cooperative orders, and
because these two desiderata are so important to the emergence of effec-
tive punishment, it appears less important that rules be fine-tuned to get
the “correct cooperative result” than that these desiderata be fulfilled.
The point here is that rules that do not clearly state what behaviour they require and
in the context in which they require them cannot help us detect those that do not co-
operate. This would make it difficult for people to actually maintain sufficient reason
to endorse moral rules and act according to them.
The point in all of this is that the objects of public justification are moral rules
that apply in specific contexts about specific issues like coercive laws whether they be
constitutions or ordinary statue law. They are not general principles encompassing
many issues and meant to be applied to various contexts like Rawlsian or Utilitarian
principles. Whether general normative principles of justice can be abstracted out of
the set of issue and context specific moral rules is of course another matter. But, on
the Convergence Conception whatever these general principle are they are not the
objects of public justification.
To that end, the theory shows how reasonable people can achieve a stable political
order with the idea of a convergence of potentially conflicting reasons on a set of issue
and context specific moral rules. According to the theory reasonable people can create
a political order no matter what concepts and conceptions of justice they have, since
all that’s required to publicly justify issue and context specific moral rules is reasonable
people to have some mutually intelligible conclusive reason to endorse it even if they
all disagree about what that reason is. The idea is that when the normalisation on
reasons is lowered to the level of ‘mutual intelligibility’ far more possible reasons can
conclusively justify including the one’s provided by people’s private comprehensive
conceptions of justice. This shows how reasonable people’s balance of reasons can
provide sufficient moral reason for all to endorse issue and context specific moral rules
despite their profound disagreements about justice.
All this provides a way for political liberals to avoid the Conceptual Inconclusive-
ness Objection.14 If public justification is construed as each reasonable person conclu-
14Although convergence political liberals have not countenanced Conceptual Inconclusiveness Ob-
jection per se, they have noted related problems and how the Convergence Conception can overcome
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sively justifying issue and context specific moral rules through their own potentially
unique reasons, rather than through a shared set of reasons, then people possessing
and using diverse concepts is not a problem. When reasonable people possess and use
diverse concepts of justice they will have incompatible sets of deliberative considera-
tions when deciding whether to endorse a moral rule. But, these incompatible sets
of deliberative considerations are not a problem since conclusively justifying an issue
and context specific moral rule does not require sharing reasons. Rather, as long as
each reasonable person finds some deliberative consideration to be a conclusive rea-
son to endorse a moral rule, that moral rule will be publicly justified. Therefore, the
Convergence Conception shows how despite reasonable disagreement about justice,
reasonable people can create a political order.
According to the theory, this political order can be maintained because the con-
vergence is not over any specific set of reasons. This means that when reasonable peo-
ple’s set of moral reasons changes or their weighing of them changes, this will simply
change the set of issue and context specific moral rules that are converged upon. This
means there is no point at which the publicly justified set of rules are oppressive or
justify anarchic rebellion since whenever they become so, they will no longer be pub-
licly justified since at least one reasonable person will not have conclusive reason to
endorse them. Since the Convergence Conception holds on to the core idea that only
publicly justified moral rules can be coercively coordinated upon, the political order
is always maintained.
3.2 Verbal Agreement Objection
Whilst the Convergence Conception does well at avoiding the Conceptual Inconclu-
siveness Objection that plagued the Consensus Conception, some political liberals
in favour of the Consensus Conception have pointed out that the way it avoids the
objection is problematic. As Hartley and Watson (2018: 59–61) say:
One way of understanding the convergence model of public reason is to
read it as insisting on a kind of overlapping consensus for each particu-
lar law and not for a shared political conception of justice. So it appears
an overlapping “convergence” on this law and that law, and so on, is a
them. See Gaus (2011b: Ch. 16) on the “Problem of Indeterminacy” and Vallier (2019: 114–115, 2014:
215) on the “Anarchy Objection”. Interestingly, Boettcher (2015: 201–204) demurs and argues some
form of inconclusiveness remains a problem because of the controversial notion of coercion assumed
by convergence theorists. I leave aside Boettcher’s objection and side with Gaus’s (2014) response to
similar objections as adequate.
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happy coincidence. But, the basis for social unity and continued com-
mitment to seeking fair terms of social cooperation, is absent on this ac-
count. The contingencies of convergence – due to the “possibly fluctu-
ating circumstances” connected with revisions of persons’ views and, as
a result, the laws that can be supported and the balance of power within
a society – provide no deep assurance to a sustained commitment, by
anyone, to laws that happen to find convergence at a given time.
Hartley and Watson’s point is that the nature of convergent agreements and the ob-
jects of those agreements means that the political order the Convergence Conception
shows how to create is chancy or coincidental. Even though it is not entirely unlikely
given people’s particular beliefs (ie. they could not have converged on anything else),
it is chancy or coincidental that they converged on a particular moral rule because
they could easily have converged on a different one with slightly different contexts
or beliefs. This initial chanciness of convergence means it lacks a kind of normative
stability. This is because, on the Convergence Conception, a political order is created
by reasonable people agreeing to the issue and context specific moral rules rather than
entire conceptions of justice. This means that when people’s beliefs change or when
the context changes the agreement will break down.
But, why should convergence theorists be particularly worried by this? After all,
it is not new that people change their beliefs or that circumstances change. That is the
nature of social and political life. Whilst this is true, I think there is something more to
Hartley and Watson argument that should worry convergence theorists, namely that
convergent agreements are disposed to break down, rather than being merely chancy.
This is made clear when we look at what Diverse Packages Theory – the explanation of
reasonable disagreement I developed in Chapter 3 – implies about the nature of con-
vergence agreements. The basic idea is that an upshot of Diverse Packages Theory’s
explanation of reasonable disagreements is that at least some of the agreements that
constitute ‘a convergence on issue and context specific moral rules’ are ‘mere verbal
agreements’. These are agreements grounded in the differences between the concepts
that people possess and use. This is because, according to Diverse Package Theory con-
cepts provide the deliberative considerations that people use to evaluate and endorse
moral rules.
A convergence on an issue and context specific moral rule is then an agreement
that some rule is a genuine moral rule on the basis of diverse considerations between
reasonable people in a specific context. However, this means these agreements are
highly sensitive to context change. This is because their agreement is grounded in the
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convergence of different considerations and the specific contexts in which those con-
siderations justify endorsing the moral rule. Slight context changes will mean that
at least one person’s considerations will not recognise the issue and context specific
moral rule in question as a moral rule any longer. It will not be justified as a moral rule
to endorse. The result of this is that at least some of the agreements that constitute
a political order on the Convergence Conception are disposed to break down. This
means, on the Convergence Conception, aspects of the political order that require en-
durance or quick institution building are by the very nature of their legitimacy likely
to become illegitimate. I call this the Verbal Agreement Objection.
To get a clearer idea of what the objection is we need to understand what Diverse
Packages Theory as the best explanation of reasonable disagreements implies about
agreements and what causes them. Recall, from Chapter 3, Diverse Packages Theory
is comprised of two core ideas. The first idea is that to vindicate reasonable disagree-
ments as genuine disagreements they have to sometimes be read as canonical disputes,
and sometimes be read as metalinguistic negotiations. The second idea is that causally
explains reasonable disagreements read in either way is that reasonable people possess
and use diverse concept-conception packages.
That analysis and explanation of reasonable disagreement starts with the premise
that reasonable people’s disagreements involve some practical conflict. It then ex-
plains this by citing how reasonable people’s concept-conception packages diverge
sufficiently to cause them to make moral and political judgements that are practically
incompatible in the context in which they live.
But, Diverse Packages Theory could also explain cases where we start with the
opposite premise. It could start with the premise that reasonable people make practi-
cally compatible moral and political judgements, and then explain this agreement by
citing how reasonable people’s concept-conception packages diverge in a convenient
way such that they lead them to agree in the context in which they live.
Now, these sorts of agreements are nothing but the idea of convergence at the
heart of the Convergence Conception where all reasonable people are said to endorse
a moral rule for their own potentially unique conclusive reasons. Two parties endorse
a moral rule despite disagreeing about what justice requires because, they each agree
that the moral rule in question furthers their own particular view about what justice
requires. This means that on the Convergence Conception, public justification ends
up being a series of agreements where reasonable people are lucky enough that their
concept-conception packages diverge in a convenient way such that they lead them to
make moral and political judgements that are practically compatible in the context in
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which they live.
So far so good. But, all this implies two ways that agreements between reasonable
people are caused. The first way is that reasonable people agree by possessing and
using concept-conception packages that diverge only in conceptions. They then agree
in virtue of the differences in their conceptions of justice being sufficiently convenient
that they entail endorsing the same issue and context specific moral rules.
Agreements like these is what I take Hartley and Watson to be worried about.
They will of course be unstable to some degree, but convergence theorists have good
reason not to be too worried. After all, in these cases reasonable people share con-
cepts. As such they share a categorisation of their social world and what is a morally
relevant consideration when agreeing to moral rules. This ensures that slight changes
in context do not undermine the justification of a rule.
The problem for the Convergence Conception lies in the second way that Diverse
Packages Theory explains agreements, namely that reasonable people can agree by pos-
sessing and using concept-conception packages that diverge in their concepts. This
means that sometimes when reasonable people agree in the way the Convergence Con-
ception proposes, they could agree wholly in virtue of the content of their particular
concepts. This would be a case of a ‘mere verbal agreement’.15
For example, Alice and Beth could agree to an issue and context specific moral
rule that says resources ought to be distributed according to talents in their society.
Alice believes the rule is what justice requires because it helps individuals and soci-
ety flourish and, individuals and society flourishing is the only relevant consideration
for a rule about distributing resources. On the other hand, Beth believes the rule is
what justice requires because she believes it gives people what they morally deserve
and moral desert is the only relevant moral consideration for a rule about a distribut-
ing resources. In such a case Alice and Beth’s agreement would be a merely verbal
agreement because they agree on the rule wholly in virtue of the particular concepts
they possess and use. It is only in virtue of the distinct and unique considerations
their concepts determine as morally relevant for deliberating about distributive rules
that enables them to agree.
The problem with a merely verbal agreement like Alice and Beth’s is that given
they possess and use divergent concepts of justice, their agreement on an issue and
context specific moral rule is highly sensitive to changes in context. It is highly sensi-
tive to changes in the facts that constitute the moral rule, ie. changes in what a rule
15See Chalmers (2011: 525–526) for this way of construing verbal agreements. See also Ballantyne
(2016) on construing verbal agreements through the same answer satisfying two different questions.
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permits or prohibits as a matter of fact. For instance, a slight change in what counts
as a talent, suppose Beth discovers people have a natural talent to cheat others, might
cause the agreement to break down because cheating others does not promote moral
desert. As such Beth would not see the rule as conclusively justified anymore given
what she views as morally relevant in her social world, namely moral desert and noth-
ing else.
These sorts of context changes can come in roughly two varieties. The first in-
volves exogenous context changes. These are changes in the facts that constitute a
moral rule that are caused by facts external to the rule. For example, take the case
of a convergence on a rule that permits an elected government to take military ac-
tion without a public announcement. Let us further suppose that this agreement
was struck in a context where offensive military action was always a matter of order-
ing large troop movements that easily become publicly visible after a couple of hours.
Let us suppose that Norman, a pessimist about global affairs, endorses the rule be-
cause it allows a government to more easily react to foreign enemies. Prindy, a just
war advocate, also endorses the rule because sometimes a government must act in
self-defence without making public announcements. But now, military action can
include the bombing of far-away targets by unmanned drones without any public
visibility.16 This new context largely driven by technological advancement means that
Prindy has no conclusive reason to endorse the rule anymore because the rule permits
secretive offensive military action. He might think he ought to still follow the rule,
but he cannot conclusively justify endorsing it. This is worrying because it is not clear
whether there is any coercive power that can restrain Norman or at least decide that
what he advocates is illegitimate. What society needs is an enduring social institution
that can decide these issues.
The second variety of context changes involves a change in the facts that constitute
a moral rule caused by the implementation of the rule itself. For example, let us say a
society has converged on a rule that all public expenditure must be introduced with
public savings measures of equal value. Over time let us say that this rule is followed
and as a result public expenditure drops which causes the public infrastructure to
depreciate in quality. This change in context will not affect all reasonable people the
same way. Some reasonable people will take this as evidence that the rule is working
and as such costly public expenditure has been avoided. Other reasonable people
16If one doubts context changes like this can have such consequences, consider the rapid escala-
tion of the coronavirus pandemic of 2019-2020 and the way many countries without enduring social
institutions were not able to form new agreements to combat the health and economic crisis. See
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/03/coronavirus-paid-leave-health-care-trump.html
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will take this as evidence that the rule is not working and that public infrastructure
requires more expenditure irrespective of public savings. In this new context, the
agreement will break down purely because of its own enforcement and therefore the
rule will no longer be publicly justified. Once again, this seems worrying because it
would mean that there is no publicly justified rule about this issue when some rule
is sorely required. What the society needs is an enduring social institution that can
decide these issues.
The basic point in all of this is not that the idea of convergence itself is objection-
able. Rather it is that its general application in political liberalism to achieve a stable
political order by justifying issue and context specific moral rules is problematic. This
is because given Diverse Packages Theory’s explanation of reasonable disagreements
some parts of the political order on the Convergence Conception will involve mere
verbal agreements. These agreements hinge wholly on reasonable people’s concepts
being conveniently different to allow them to endorse the same rule. But, context
changes in relation to those concepts means that agreements on issue and context spe-
cific moral rules are disposed to break down. Which means the Convergence Concep-
tion cannot show how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order because
at least some of the political order it generates cannot be maintained.
3.3 Mechanism of Convergence Response
One way convergence theorists are likely to respond to the Verbal Agreement Objec-
tion is by saying that the instability identified by the Verbal Agreement Objection is a
red herring. That such instability is actually a feature of the Convergence Conception.
A convergent agreement breaking down in the sort of ways the Verbal Agreement Ob-
jection supposes is good because it signals that the moral rules that were publicly jus-
tified are no longer and ought not be obeyed or coercively enforced. To illustrate this
point, convergence theorists will likely draw on the distinction between “stability” as
ordinarily understood and “robustness”, where stability as ordinarily understood is
the tendency of a system to return to the same unique equilibrium point, and robust-
ness is the tendency to return to some equilibrium point (Vallier 2019: 193–195; Gaus
2016: 230–237). The point is that the Convergence Conception shows reasonable peo-
ple can maintain a political order in the robustness sense. They argue that when we
model the mechanism of convergence in the right way we will see how a political or-
der can adapt to the short-term changes in context so that it continually returns to a
convergent agreement. In what follows I lay out two prominent ways this response
can be made – The Multi-Perspectival Bargaining View and The Social Equilibrium
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View – and argue that both have problems.
3.3.1 The Multi-Perspectival Bargaining View
Ryan Muldoon has recently argued that the mechanism of convergence should be
seen as the outcome of what he calls “Multi-Perspectival Bargaining”. On this view,
a convergence on a set of issue and context specific moral rules is the result of rea-
sonable people bargaining about the public rules, which specify rights, that ought to
govern their shared social world. It is “multi-perspectival” in the sense that Muldoon
uses the idea, developed by Scott E. Page (2007: 30–31), of people possessing and us-
ing “diverse perspectives”. Muldoon (2016: 24, 64–64) argues we ought to think of
reasonable people as holding different and conflicting perspectives that “provide us
with filters on the world – they tell us what is important, and what we can ignore”,
and “shape our preferences over potential political outcomes, but they also determine
what we see as the outcomes.” In short, they provide the apparatus to categorise what
is morally relevant in their shared social world and how they ought to judge them.
Muldoon (2016: 77–84) argues that despite holding different and conflicting per-
spectives, reasonable people can bargain over what rules ought to govern it because
their shared social world forces them to have overlapping projections of the same
states of affairs. This means although each person categorises their social world dif-
ferently they overlap insofar as they are categorising the same physical state of affairs.
Their “projections” are taken from this shared point. This means each recognises the
stakes of having their opponent’s rules governing over them. The outcome of the
bargaining is a “joint individual justification” on rules over the shared social world.
Muldoon (2016: 83) argues this bargaining will take place much like bargaining
in a marketplace where two parties agree to a mutually advantageous price for an ex-
change. In the case of issue and context specific moral rules reasonable people weigh
up how much a set of rules conforms to their private comprehensive conceptions of
justice against how much it violates it. This weighing up of the costs and benefits of
the rules determines the “price” parties are willing to pay to agree to them.
Muldoon (2016: 72–77) proposes that the bargaining works like this because the
object of the bargaining are rules that specify rights according to a “social conception”
of rights. According to this social conception, rights come in different varieties and
as “bundles of allowances and guarantees”. The idea is that this is what allows people
to come to an agreement about rights through bargaining because it specifies rights
that have two features that allow them to be traded off against each other. One fea-
ture is that they come in different varieties like positive and negative rights, rivalrous
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and non-rivalrous, and excludable and non-excludable, which means they can be ex-
tended or limited to only certain individuals in a society. Another feature is that they
can be broken up into bundles of “many affiliated allowances for action or guaran-
tees that may be considered at least somewhat independently of each other”. These
two features of rights, as limited and reducible to bundles of independent allowances
and guarantees means that two people who do not share a perspective on how to cate-
gorise what is morally relevant can bargain their way to a set of rights over their shared
social world. They are able to agree on the states of affairs they are discussing (even if
these states of affairs are a small overlap of what each person sees) and on the nature
of the rules that will apply to them, but not why the other person thinks the rules are
right or correct.
Muldoon (2016: 90–91) acknowledges that this model of convergence does con-
tain a measure of instability. Since the agreement is grounded in the set of diverse per-
spectives that reasonable people have when bargaining, the agreement breaks down
either when the set of perspectives or the context changes. But, he argues, this insta-
bility can be limited to a sort that individuals can see the benefits of diversity and of
striking iterative agreements which push reasonable people back into a political or-
der without making people live by rules they do not have sufficient reason to endorse.
Muldoon (2016: 102–103) argues that to achieve this, bargains about the distribution
of wealth and incomes should satisfy three principles. The first principle is that the
outcome of a bargain should be on the “Pareto Frontier”. In short, that bargains
should not only be pareto moves from some given distribution (ie. moves that can
benefit a person without making someone else worse off), they should also result in
pareto optimal distributions (ie. distributions where it is impossible to benefit a per-
son more without making someone else worse off). The second principle is that the
allocation of the output of a society’s material production should be proportional
to the contribution to that production. This means that as Muldoon (2016: 104)
says, “no group should be required to subsidize another group to the extent that they
would have been better off on their own.” The third principle is that, with respect to
the production of public goods, the state ought to permit individuals and groups to
produce what those groups see as public goods as long as the burdens of production
fall only on those who want them. As Muldoon (2016: 107) says, the state ought to
“serve as an escrow service for groups looking to establish public goods for themselves,
but with the constraint that they would have to be compatible with a bargaining pro-
cess…over public goods rather than rights.” The principle would then simply take the
form of a requirement for another bargain made over the public goods in addition to
THE INSTABILITY OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM 141
the one made over rights.
Muldoon (2016: 110–111) concludes that when these three principles are satisfied,
this will ensure that reasonable people see the value of diversity and social experimen-
tation. Muldoon believes that when reasonable people see that their bargains are
constrained by those principles, they will see the value of living in a diverse society
and of experimenting with new bargains over rights and public goods. These Millian
inspired “experiments in living” as Muldoon (2016: 35) puts it, will allow people to
adapt to changing contexts and learn from them. And, given they can be assured their
bargains satisfy the three principles above, they will see that they are made better off
in the new bargains that structure their society than backing out completely. They
will see the value of experimentation and striking new bargains as a way to improve
their social world.
Muldoon’s account of the mechanism of convergence is compelling and does pro-
vide a plausible picture of why the Verbal Agreement Objection might not be a seri-
ous problem. If a society has, as Muldoon argues, reason to value the adaptation
to changes in context and perspectives to strike new bargains, then the instability of
mere verbal agreements does not seem all that worrying. But, there are I think three
serious problems with the Multi-Perspectival Bargaining view of the mechanism of
convergence that undermine its ability to show a political order can be created let
alone maintained. The first two of which have been already made by Gerald Gaus.
The first is the Problem of Mutual Advantage. The Multi-Perspectival Bargain-
ing way of understanding convergence makes achieving a stable political order hinge
on what is mutually advantageous to the bargainers when they make an agreement.
This means there is nothing in the Multi-Perspectival Bargaining view that prevents
someone from backing out of an agreement on rules as soon as a rule or the “price”
they paid for it is no longer advantageous to them. In fact the view encourages it as a
way for people to strike new bargains. But, as Gaus (2016: 170–171) rightly points out
one of the core ideas of reasonable people trying to agree to rules is that they seek rules
that bind people despite how it might advantage them in the future. This is part of the
idea of endorsing a rule as a rule that justice requires. In short, the Multi-Perspectival
view seems to have an odd idea of the type of rules reasonable people are trying to
propose and agree to.
The second problem is the Problem of Calculation. The Multi-Perspectival view
underestimates the complexity of predicting changes in context. This complexity un-
dermines the way reasonable people are supposed to conclusively justify the set of
coercive rules by negotiating their way to an agreement. It seems almost impossible
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for someone to calculate the costs and benefits of striking a bargain when they can-
not predict how striking a particular bargain may change the context which will itself
require a new bargain. As an example Gaus (2016: 172) refers to rules concerning im-
migration which affect the entry of new reasonable people into a society and therefore
the make up of the set of perspectives that the constituency of reasonable people hold.
But, even in a ‘closed society’, rules concerning education, or healthcare directly affect
the context which will change the set of perspectives and therefore require a new bar-
gain. Bargainers would need to predict all of this to have some idea of judging what
rules they can agree to live under.
But aside from those two problems which have already been canvassed in the lit-
erature, there is, I submit, a much more worrying problem that has been overlooked.
This is what I call the Problem of Uni-Perspectival Rights. Recall, that one of the
things that is supposed to make the Multi-Perspectival Bargaining view work is that
the coercive rules that people bargain over specify rights according to a “social con-
ception” of rights.
The problem with this is precisely that it is a particular conception of rights and
not a multi-perspectival one. There is no reason to think reasonable people will share
such a conception because, as Diverse Packages Theory has shown that the best ex-
planation of reasonable disagreement is that people possess and use diverse concept-
conception packages. This means that when they are endorsing a rule as a rule that
justice requires, there is no reason to think they will see it as specifying the kind of
right that Muldoon assumes.17 Their conception of justice could employ a completely
distinct conception of rights and their concept of justice could employ a completely
distinct concept of rights.
For instance, reasonable people may not share the concept of a right as merely
an “allowance” and “guarantee”. They may employ a more or less sophisticated idea
of what a right even is. Even if there is little scope for divergence here, there will
certainly be a lot of disagreement about the precise features of rights. For instance,
reasonable people who believe all rights are political and institutionally defined or
believe some (albeit a large portion) of rights are grounded in people’s interests, will,
or given by God will not agree with Muldoon’s social conception of rights let alone
17This problem also plagues others in the public reason liberalism tradition who argue that when
rights are conceived in just the right way they can in fact resolve disputes between people with diverse
perspectives. See Chung (2019) on liberal rights and Chung and Kogelmann (2020: 849) on jurisdic-
tional rights for examples where the scope of rights and one’s private sphere is taken to be “reasonably”
restricted, for instance by the legal system one happens to live under. It is not clear what motivates this
once we account for the fact that reasonable people may not share the concept of a right.
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all its features. For example, it is not clear what Muldoon’s view has to say when one
bargainer suggests breaking up the ‘freedom of conscience’ such that it does not apply
to confessions to priests, but another bargainer rejects that particular freedom can be
broken up in such a way. The point here is that the sort of bargaining that allows
Muldoon’s view to work relies on a conception of rights that will be the subject of the
cases of deep disagreement that make up reasonable disagreement about justice itself.
All in all, the Multi-Perspectival Bargaining view is an inadequate response to the
Verbal Agreement Objection. It is replete with problems running from pure practical
problems of what the view requires and encourages, to a deeper problem to relying
on a unique perspective on rights. This undermines the mechanism’s ability to show
a political order can be created let alone maintained.
3.3.2 The Social Equilibrium View
The most well developed alternative to the Multi-Perspectival Bargaining view of the
mechanism of convergence is Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier’s model of convergence
as a Social Equilibrium. That is to say that convergence should be seen as an “equilib-
rium of social norms” (Vallier 2019: 192–195; Gaus 2016, 2011b: 434–443). The basic
idea is that social norms – albeit a special set of social norms – constitute a “social-
morality” that already exists in societies with reasonable disagreement about justice,
and that convergence should be modelled as an equilibrium of these social norms.
Before I explain how this view works and how it might be a response to the Ver-
bal Agreement Objection, it is worth considering what motivates it. The main mo-
tivation is that it avoids any notion of bargaining. As a result, it avoids all three of
the problems faced by the Multi-Perspectival Bargaining view. An equilibrium of so-
cial norms does not ground people’s reasons to endorse a coercive rule in what they
find mutually advantageous given the circumstances at the time of agreeing, nor does
it require complex calculations of the effects of an agreement. It also does not pre-
suppose a particular conception of individual rights since the content of the publicly
justified rules will depend on the social norms in a society. Given all that, the Social
Equilibrium view holds out hope of modelling convergence in a way that shows it can
adapt to small changes in context to achieve stability. In what follows I explain how
the view works and how it faces the Conceptual Integrity Objection.
The Social Equilibrium view’s model of convergence relies on two key ideas. The
first is that, drawing on Cristina Bicchieri’s work on social norms, we ought to see
the coercive rules that reasonable people converge on as social norms.18 The idea is
18See Bicchieri (2016, 2006) on the general empirical account, and Gaus (2016: 211–215, 2011b: 163–
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that social norms are social rules in that they set a general standard of behaviour that
is supposed to be followed by society and there is a practice of criticism and pun-
ishment for those who violate them. In a simple sense, social norms track people’s
reactive attitudes to certain actions in a society. Social norms with distinct moral con-
tent are social rules of a certain kind: moral rules. The distinct moral content is an
ongoing mutual recognition of a structure of reciprocal deontic obligations and ex-
pectations. They are as Gaus (2011b: 181–182) says “justified deontic requirements that
a large part of the population intends (at least conditionally) to follow and are actually
conformed to by a large part of a group’s members”. That is, they are “internalized”
as rules that ought to be followed by a large majority of people.
This structure has, roughly, six features which make the moral rules the sort of
rules that can be publicly justified. They are sufficiently general, intelligible to all, val-
idate claims and resolve conflicts, place requirements on behaviour not mere guide-
lines, are endorsable by others in different social positions, and proposed as being for
the good of all such that all can reasonably internalise them (Gaus 2011b: 294–303).
It is this structure that makes the social norms that are moral rules capable of being
the object of public justification.
When a scheme of social norms that are moral rules are publicly justified, which
means all reasonable people have sufficient moral reason to endorse them, they con-
stitute a social-morality which establishes the “moral order” or “public moral consti-
tution” of a society. Given this moral order is publicly justified, a political order of
coercive laws and institutions is legitimate if it enforces the moral order (Vallier 2019:
Ch. 6, 7; Gaus 2016: 206–207, 2011b: 449–470). This is because the political order is
merely an enforcement of the moral rights that the moral rules establish.
The second key idea in the Social Equilibrium view concerns how reasonable peo-
ple can identify the moral rules that all have sufficient moral reason to endorse. The
idea is to see the mechanism of convergence on a set of moral rules as an equilibrium
that emerges out of the actual path-dependent social interactions of reasonable peo-
ple (Vallier 2019: 33–36, 110–113; Gaus 2016: 223–226, 2011b: 321–322, 389–408). Con-
vergence – and hence public justification – is then an emergent phenomenon that
arises out of reasonable people’s everyday social interactions where social norms are
agreed to and reassessed continuously.
This process is modelled in two stages. In the first stage, individuals rank social
rules which they judge as strictly better than no authoritative rule at all. The set of
social rules that all reasonable people rank in this way constitutes the socially eligible
182) and Vallier (2019: 30–36) on its implementation in political liberalism.
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set because no rule in that set is judged as worse than no authoritative rule at all on a
particular issue.19 As Gaus (2011b: 322) says:
The socially eligible set, then, consists in all those proposals that are
unanimously ranked by all Members of the Public as strictly preferred
to blameless liberty – that is, rules that all have reasons to endorse as
authoritative.
To specify what it means for reasonable people to endorse a rule as authoritative, Gaus
(2016: 43–44, 2011b: 38, 43, 276–279) and Vallier (2019: 4–5), like Muldoon, borrow
the idea of a “perspective” from Page (2007: 30–31), but flesh it out further as “evalua-
tive perspectives”. In particular, as involving “evaluative standards” which are criteria
by which rules are judged, “world features” which categorise the morally relevant as-
pects of one’s social world, and a “mapping function” which applies the evaluative
standards and world features to a proposed rule.20 Given all that, what it means for a
reasonable person to endorse a rule as authoritative involves two points.
The first point is that endorsing a rule as authoritative involves recognising, ac-
cording to their evaluative perspective, that those proposing a rule have some intelli-
gible reason for endorsing as a moral rule given the definition above. This means the
socially eligible set will not include mere social conventions. These are conventions
that people might have some reason to follow, but do not count as moral rules. Rules
of etiquette would fall into this category.
The second point is that endorsing a rule as authoritative involves recognising
that, according to their evaluative perspective, those proposing a rule have some rea-
son to internalise it as a moral rule with its normative requirements and expectations.
As Gaus (2011b: 322, 325) says, if a person rejects a rule they “refuse to accord it au-
thority over him or internalize it as a rule of morality” and rules that are not rejected
in this way, are “rules that all have reasons to endorse as authoritative”. If reasonable
people cannot even recognise the rule as such it is socially ineligible for them. As Gaus
(2011b: 333) says:
If our concern is to justify moral authority, we must suppose at some
point that there is insufficient reason for according some rule (and de-
19I leave aside the additional step of arriving at the optimal socially eligible set which includes only
the rules that are not pareto dominated by any other rules because convergence theorists admit for
most cases the socially eligible set is enough and the additional step is irrelevant for the objection I
press (Gaus 2016: 215).
20Gaus (2016: 51–56) adds two further features that detail an ordering of social worlds. I leave these
aside for now because they are largely irrelevant for our purposes. See also Gaus (2018: 648–650) for a
further development of the idea to include more features. For now the idea I summarise will suffice.
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mands based on it) authority. Such a rule manifestly fails the test of
public justification. The set of rules that all Members of the Public have
some reason to accept as authoritative yields what I have called a socially
eligible set.
The important point here of course is not that reasonable people have sufficient moral
reason to endorse any particular rule compared to the other rules in the eligible set.
Rather it is that, as Gaus (2011b: 323, 325) says, the socially eligible set is a modest con-
clusion where if a rule is not in the socially eligible set it “fails to be publicly justified in
a strong sense” such that reasonable judge those rules to “palpably fail to adequately
perform their tasks.” This will leave a set of moral rules about some specific issue that
all reasonable people have some reason to endorse as authoritative. This means that
they are willing to hold others accountable for complying with even though each rea-
sonable person ranks the rules within that set in different ways. This is the socially
eligible set.
After forming a socially eligible set, Gaus (2016: 198–202, 2011b: Ch. 4) and Vallier
(2016: 202–214) argue that reasonable people must look to narrow the socially eligible
set by focusing on an order of justification. This allows them to hone in on the moral
rules that need to be justified first and then proceed from there. They propose that
reasonable people can make use of two ideas. The first is the idea of focusing on what
rights people require as moral agents. This will establish basic rights that need to be
settled related to the preservation of people’s status and capabilities as moral agents.
The second is the idea of “jurisdictional rights” following Constant’s ‘liberties of the
moderns’. These are rights that establish private spheres of conduct where each rea-
sonable person’s perspective is morally authoritative. These two devices provide a set
of key issues that reasonable people will then be able to focus on rather than every
moral rule that could be proposed.
After a socially eligible set is narrowed with those two devices, reasonable people
are still left in an unsatisfactory position for creating a political order because the so-
cially eligible set legitimates multiple incompatible moral rules. Reasonable people
require some decisive way to publicly justify a unique moral rule.
To that end, the second step of public justification involves reasonable people
converging on a unique moral rule – which means they find a rule they all have con-
clusive reason to endorse – in the socially eligible set by interacting with each other
based on those rules. As such, convergence is achieved by reasonable people acting
on moral rules according to 1) what moral rules best satisfy their evaluative perspec-
tives, and 2) the extent to which acting on the moral rules other reasonable people are
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coordinating on allows them to reap the benefits of having social interactions where
they can “respect their equality and moral freedom”. The benefits are that they will
be able to make morally authoritative demands on others that are publicly justified.
Reasonable people will then converge because there are two forces that are pushing
people into agreement, the satisfaction of their evaluative perspectives and the ben-
efit of endorsing rules that others also endorse so they can enjoy social interactions
that respect other’s equality and moral freedom. The point is reasonable people will
be able to weigh these two considerations in such a way that they do not merely hold
out for rules that most satisfy their evaluative perspective, but reconcile in favour of
rules that satisfy their perspective as far as is possible whilst also allowing them to have
social interactions with publicly justified rules. The crucial normative upshot of this
whole process is, as Gaus (2011b: 414) says:
If reasonably goodwilled people interact over a longish period of time,
seeking to find mutually acceptable norms of interactions, they can
come to converge on a common rule x, and this fact – that they have
converged on this morality rather than that – itself can provide a public
justification for x.
The idea here is that reasonable people’s social interactions can be modelled in such
a way to show how all reasonable people can come to have sufficient moral reason to
endorse moral rules even though they started by disagreeing on what they took to be
the ideal moral rules. In short, the model shows how a set of coercive rules can be in
equilibrium between all reasonable people who reconcile according to their evaluative
perspectives and the benefit of having social interactions with publicly justified rules.
The point in all of this is that convergence on a set of issue and context specific
moral rules need not be the outcome of a procedure like Muldoon’s bargaining, but
an emergent outcome of people’s path-dependent social interactions and revisions of
social norms. As Gaus (2011b: 402–403) says:
For once the rule is in social equilibrium (and is a recognized social
norm), then all have conclusive moral reason to act on this rule rather
than any other in the optimal eligible set. Thus, having created a justi-
fied rule though our interdependent choices, we can then insist that all
conform to this rule, for all free and equal persons now have conclusive
reason to conform to this rule, rather than any other: it is the one that
best fulfills the evaluative standards of each.
It is an emergent equilibrium of social norms that can be legitimately explicated, en-
forced and maintained by coercive political power because they are the moral rules,
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in virtue of being in equilibrium, that are publicly justified. This is how reasonable
people can achieve a stable political order given reasonable disagreement.
On this view, reasonable people create a political order by freely endorsing moral
rules and then constructing coercive institutions to coercively enforce them. This oc-
curs because of the way moral rules are taken to be informal social norms that people
coordinate on through social interactions they learn or adopt. An equilibrium of
such social norms, when it satisfies the model Gaus and Vallier propose, will consti-
tute an equilibrium point that describe the publicly justified moral constitution of a
society. The political order is then constructed to enforce this moral constitution to
either keep the unreasonable from straying or to ensure that all understand the costs
of violating it.
This political order is maintained by a feedback loop between the underlying
moral order of social norms that fall in and out of convergence and the coercive laws
in place. This solves the Verbal Agreement Objection because it shows how changes
in context will be met with changes in people’s reciprocal normative obligations and
expectations which will shift the equilibrium of social norms. This is because the un-
derlying moral order is made up of social norms which form a polycentric network
(Gaus 2016: 184–187). This means that rather than being a single set of principles that
govern all human interactions or all social institutions, they are a network of rules that
concern different behaviours at different levels of generality and in different parts of
a society. This means there is no single subject, set of actions, or level of generalisation
at which the social norms apply.
The polycentric nature of social norm networks allow for changes in context to
be met with localised violations where people attempt to coordinate on a new rule in
the socially eligible set. It allows for a practice of moral reform and criticism so that
reasonable people can move to a new equilibrium of moral rules in the same process
that Gaus and Vallier think the political order is created. This means reasonable peo-
ple’s interpersonal exchanges and moral deliberations pushe them back into an equi-
librium. Given only moral rules that are in equilibrium can be coercively enforced,
the political order will follow the changes in the moral order. With new coercive laws
and institutions being constructed to adapt to changes in social norms.
On this view, the Verbal Agreement Objection is a red herring because the possi-
bility of mere verbal agreements is not worrying. They are merely shifts in the equi-
librium of social norms that constitutes a publicly justified moral constitution which
is then enforced by a political order of coercive laws and institutions. The socially el-
igible set provides a set of rules that reasonable people can constantly reflect on and
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deliberate about endorsing. As a result, any changes in context are part and parcel of
how reasonable people converge on coercive rules.
I concede that the Social Equilibrium view does avoid the Verbal Agreement Ob-
jection. It does offer a convincing account of how the mechanism of convergence can
be understood to avoid the sort of instability I argued was present in the Convergence
Conception. But, I submit, all this comes at a cost, namely that the view relies on the
coercive power of social norms and so faces a version of the Integrity Objection. The
Integrity Objection is a well canvassed objection against the Consensus Conception
of political liberalism.21 The idea being that requiring non-liberals to only justify polit-
ical principles and decisions according to the reasons they share with other reasonable
people requires them to split their persona between acting as political liberals in the
political domain and acting as they truly think is right according to their comprehen-
sive conceptions of justice in the private domain. That political liberalism entails this
infidelity to their true character, plans and beliefs means it attacks their integrity as
reasonable people.
The Convergence Conception is, rightly, seen to avoid the Integrity objection.22
But, I propose, there is a version of this objection that operates at the level of con-
cepts – the Conceptual Integrity Objection – that the Social Equilibrium view of the
Convergence Conception cannot avoid.23 The idea being that modelling the mecha-
nism of convergence as an equilibrium within the socially eligible set of social norms
threatens the conceptual integrity of reasonable people. This is because achieving a
stable political order depends on reasonable people endorsing a moral rule purely be-
cause of the costs of diverging from the majority who endorse it. This means that
reasonable people must succumb to the social pressure of social norms to maintain a
political order.
To understand how this happens, consider what Diverse Packages theory says
about how reasonable people make moral and political judgements when they have
deep disagreements. It says that reasonable people possess and use diverse concept-
conception packages. Possessing divergent concepts of justice that input conflict
considerations into their respective deliberations, and second weigh these consider-
ations up in different ways to endorse divergent conceptions of justice. They then
21See Vallier (2012) for a good overview. The Objection has so far been confined to the way the Con-
sensus Conception requires the religious to restrain using some of their core reasons to either endorse
or reject coercive laws. As such it is largely about the unjustified costs restraining the sorts of concep-
tions of justice we ought to endorse or use (Vallier 2012: 156–160; Eberle 2002: 143–151; Wolterstorff
1997: 105).
22See Eberle (2011: 291–293) and Vallier (2012: 161–164) on this point.
23See Waldron (2015) for the closest version of the objection I press.
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make judgements on, according to these conceptions, which actions are required by
justice.
Now, this picture implies that the “evaluative perspectives” on the Social Equi-
librium view amount to concept-conception packages. After all, they have the same
function, to generate judgements about what is or is not required by justice in the
world. Given that, when reasonable people have diverse evaluative perspectives what
it means for a moral rule to be in the socially eligible set is that it is a rule that is sup-
ported to some extent by all reasonable people’s concepts of justice.24 This means
that at least some of the considerations a person’s concept of justice categorises as
morally relevant support the rule. This is because the rule is seen as able to fulfil the
functions of ordering a society on a particular issue in the way a rule that justice re-
quires does. This corresponds to what convergence theorists like Gaus (2011b: 397)
say about the different stages of public justification:
The upshot of the first stage of Kantian public justification…was that
y is eligible as a binding, moral, requirement; and according to the sec-
ond, iterated interaction, stage, each Member of the Public has suffi-
cient reason (simply given her own evaluative standards) to follow y over
every other member of the optimal eligible set as the common binding
requirement.
The Conceptual Integrity Objection concerns the way the Social Equilibrium
view models how people can then endorse a single rule within that socially eligible
set. Given Diverse Packages Theory, this will involve reasonable people evaluating
moral rules according to what best satisfies their concept of justice and the benefits
of coordinating on rules that others are coordinating on. This means that as more peo-
ple endorse a rule the benefits of also endorsing that rule increase and therefore the
balance of reasons to endorse the rule becomes weightier and eventually conclusive.
The problem with this is it entails that for some reasonable people the overriding
reason that will conclusively justify a moral rule is the coercive social pressure of other
reasonable people endorsing and acting on a social norm. They face others holding
them accountable in their day to day social interactions. This is because at least for
24This point is supported by the fact that Gaus seems to accept Bicchieri’s view of what it means to
people to endorse social norms that are moral rules, namely that they internalise the rule by embedding
it in a schema for interacting with others in varying contexts. A schema being a mental model of the
appropriate normative requirements and normative expectations in a particular circumstance. But, a
schema is, at least by Bicchieri and McNally’s (2018: 26) description of them, a type of information
structure that is like a concept, or part of a concept.
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some reasonable people, the moral rule that is endorsed by others is the one that they
rank as the one that least satisfies their concept of justice. Although they can see
the rule as better than no rule at all, it is barely better. This, I submit, threatens their
conceptual integrity. This is because achieving a stable political order, depends on the
overriding weight of others endorsing a rule in one’s balance of reasons. It does not
depend on reasons related to a rule conforming accurately to what is morally relevant
in their social world let alone what justice requires. Achieving a stable political order
depends on at least some reasonable people foregoing acting on rules that are more
integral to their concepts.
This is all very abstract. To get a sense of what the Conceptual Integrity Objec-
tion is, take a concrete example like healthcare. Consider an issue and context specific
moral rule M : Individuals and groups in the provision of healthcare have a right to
discriminate against individuals on the basis of congenital illnesses and for no other
reason. Suppose M is in the socially eligible set, meaning that all reasonable people
have some reason to endorse it as authoritative according to their deliberative consid-
erations provided by their concept of justice. Now, suppose Gordon, as part of the
minority in this society, evaluates M as better than no rule at all because he thinks no
authoritative rule at all on this issue would simply lead to even worse discrimination
for individuals looking to be cared for. This would affect people finding healthcare
for even common non-congenital illnesses. But, Gordon evaluates M as the worst
possible morally authoritative rule in the socially eligible set (ie. it is closer to being
ruled out by his concept of justice than any other rule). On the deliberative consid-
erations that Gordon’s concept of justice provides, he has much weightier reason
to endorse all the other moral rules in the socially eligible set because they all satisfy
his concept of justice better. Perhaps these are rules that each permit discrimina-
tion to a small degree, but not on a whole category of illnesses. Suppose now that a
large majority in Gordon’s society, contrary to Gordon, endorses M. What is Gordon
to do? What moral rule within the socially eligible set does Gordon have sufficient
moral reason to endorse and coordinate on?
On the Social Equilibrium view, Gordon ought to endorse and act on M purely
on the fact that the majority in his society endorse M. If it weren’t for that fact, he
would have sufficient moral reason to endorse some other rule within the eligible set.
This is not to restate the Social Equilibrium view’s mechanism of convergence. Rather
it is to point out that the reasonable people who are left in the minority as their society
slowly converges on a single moral rule in the socially eligible set, face a stark choice.
Their balance of reasons provides sufficient moral reason to endorse a rule purely on
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the basis that others are endorsing it and that the rule is in their eligible set.
Given the way all this is supposed to be occurring through informal social inter-
actions, it shows how creating a moral order depends on people feeling the coercive
social pressure of the majority in their society acting on a moral rule they judge as
barely better than no rule at all. The sole reason why Gordon will converge is that
a sufficiently large number of people endorse a social norm and that joining them is
more beneficial than not. Gordon ought to endorse a moral rule not because his con-
cept represents reality accurately, but because he faces “resentment, indignation” and
the “guilt” of acting on a moral rule that the majority are not converging on (Gaus
2016: 181). This threatens his conceptual integrity. He cannot, according to the Social
Equilibrium view, achieve a stable political order by finding moral rules that his con-
cepts provide sufficient moral reasons to endorse. Rather he has to also consider the
fact that the majority of reasonable people in his society endorse some other moral
rule according to their concepts.
One thought might be, so what? What is so bad about the threat to conceptual in-
tegrity? The main problem is that it manifestly generates its own source of instability.
This is because reasonable people are likely to mistrust and hate their fellow reasonable
citizens if their conceptual integrity is constantly under threat by the social pressure to
endorse a social norm. This is no philosopher’s flight of fancy. There is considerable
evidence from political psychology that the more disagreement people face in their
communicative network of political discussants, the more likely they are to become
ambivalent or disengage from participating in communicative social practices within
that network. For instance, Diana Mutz (2006) has argued that facing lots of dis-
agreement generally causes people to disengage from their communicative networks
where they would have the sorts of social interactions needed for convergence.25 This
can happen in two ways. Disagreement can cause a form of ambivalence where peo-
ple experience a conflict within themselves about what they think and so withdraw
from participating. Alternatively, disagreement when there is social accountability
in the form of people having unpleasant social interactions can lead to people valu-
ing social harmony over social interactions which lead them to change their minds
or those of others. Perhaps more worryingly for the view, Nir (2011) and McClurg
(2006) have backed up this evidence with studies that show when people who hold
minority positions in their communicative network experience high levels of disagree-
ment this causes them to disengage from participating in political procedures and not
25See Huckfeldt (2008; 2004) and Wojcieszak (2012; 2011) for more evidence of this, and Barnidge
(2017) for further evidence of this in social media networks.
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just withdrawing from “talking politics”.
The worry in all of this is that there is good reason to think that reasonable people
will turn their back on trying to find the moral rule that all can endorse within the
socially eligible set. Any equilibrium change is disposed to fail because reasonable
people are justified in either holding out for some compromise moral rule that is more
supported by their concept-conception package or saying something like, “Look I
cannot accept the coercive power of social pressure because necessarily it is beyond
my control, but I can accept a potentially oppressive arrangement since I can at least
hope to control it if I can persuade enough people”. This is because they will judge the
process by which social norms become publicly justified moral rules less controllable
or lacking in compromise from all parties than some other method. This is a severe
cost for the Social Equilibrium view. It would undermine the core mechanism by
which a political order is maintained. Constant shifts in the equilibrium will appear
oppressive because the path to justifying them involves succumbing to the informal
costs of transgressing them as social norms.
This puts convergences theorists in a bind. On the one hand they face the Verbal
Agreement Objection if they choose to be neutral on the mechanism of convergence.
On the other they can accept that although the Social Equilibrium view is the best
version of the Convergence Conception it comes at the cost of threatening conceptual
integrity. On either side they face the problem of not being able to maintain a political
order.
One response convergence theorists might make is to say that the Conceptual
Integrity Objection fundamentally misunderstands what it means for a moral rule to
be in the socially eligible set. That it does not mean the moral rule is supported by at
least some of the considerations in all reasonable people’s concept of justice. Rather
it means that the moral rule is conclusively justified with respect to every reasonable
person’s concept of justice. This is how we should interpret what it means for a
rule to be in the socially eligible set. This means it does not make sense to say that
people have more or less weighty reason to endorse the rules relative to each other in
the socially eligible set. This sort of view might be one way of reading convergence
theorists like Gaus (2011b: 425) when they say:
The Deliberative Model explicates the moral point of view, and what is
acceptable is any option in the optimal eligible set. That is the test. If x is
in the optimal eligible set, then x as a current social rule is now the basis
of a moral equilibrium: a rule that has been converged upon and can be
freely followed, and whose authoritative nature can be acknowledged
154 THE INSTABILITY OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM
by each while consulting only her own evaluative standards.
On this view, a rule being in the socially eligible set does not mean that reasonable
people merely have some reason to endorse it as I suggested earlier. Rather it means
they have a conclusive reason which establishes its moral authority.
This may well be a plausible way to read the Social Equilibrium view, but it only
opens it up to the worry that a stronger threshold will yield an empty socially eligible
set. That, given how people can possess and use divergent concepts of justice their
difference in how they interpret certain rules and rights to how they evaluate them
will be deep and irreconcilable. In fact this sort of result was one of the motivations
for a Convergence Conception of political liberalism. That public justification would
more easily be achieved by focusing on convergence rather than consensus and by
focusing on context and issue specific moral rules rather that conceptions of justice.
Another response convergence theorist might make is that, given Diverse Pack-
ages Theory’s explanation of reasonable disagreement, any theory of political legit-
imacy that employs convergence is going to involve some threat to conceptual in-
tegrity. The depth of reasonable disagreement means that any way that a theory of
political legitimacy shows how a reasonable people can conclusively justify political
principles or rules is going to justify principles or rules that are some reasonable per-
son’s least justifiable option. There is no way around this. So, this is not a cost unique
to the Social Equilibrium view.
I think this is far too premature. The real lesson is that the Social Equilibrium
view is the best version of the Convergence Conception. But, it comes at a cost. It
threatens the conceptual integrity of reasonable people and so risks undermining the
core mechanism of creating and maintaining a political order in their eyes. This mo-
tivates, I submit, retaining the core idea of convergence, but exploring other types of
theories. It motivates acknowledging that political liberalism is not the only way to
theorise how reasonable people can have sufficient moral reason to coordinate on po-
litical principles or rules that are coercively enforced. This is what I turn to in the next
chapter by exploring how conceptions of political realism fare given Diverse Packages
Theory.
3.4 Conclusion
In this section I have argued that the Convergence Conception of political legitimacy
cannot achieve a stable political order because it cannot show how reasonable people
can maintain the order it creates. I argued it faces the Verbal Agreement Objection
because an upshot of Diverse Packages Theory was that some convergent agreements
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would be “mere verbal agreements”. In short, I argued that convergent agreements on
issue and context specific moral rules between reasonable people who diverge in their
concepts of justice will be highly sensitive to changes in context. As such, at least
some of the political order the Convergence Conception purports to create cannot be
maintained in the face of even slight changes in social contexts.
I then argued that although there are two ways convergence theorists can model
the mechanism of convergence to respond to the Verbal Agreement Objection, both
of them face their own objections. I argued the Multi-Perspectival View is not an ade-
quate version of the response because it encourages people to back out of agreements
when it no longer favours them, requires complex calculations of the effect of a bar-
gain, and requires a particular conception of individual rights that will itself be the
subject of reasonable disagreement. As such, it cannot create a political order.
I then argued that the Social Equilibrium View is also not an adequate version of
the response because it faces the Conceptual Integrity Objection. It relies on a mech-
anism that threatens the conceptual integrity of reasonable people and so generates
its own sources of instability for maintaining a political order.
I concluded that although the Social Equilibrium view is the best version of the
Convergence Conception it comes at the cost of threatening reasonable people’s con-
ceptual integrity. This undermines the core mechanism by which it maintains a po-
litical order. As such, the Convergence Conception is caught between the instability
of the Verbal Agreement Objection, and the instability of the Conceptual Integrity
Objection. Therefore, the charge that the Convergence Conception cannot achieve
stability stands.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that given Diverse Packages Theory’s explanation of rea-
sonable disagreement, political liberalism cannot provide an adequate theory of po-
litical legitimacy. This is because it does not provide a theory of political legitimacy
that can show us how to achieve a stable political order. The Consensus Conception
of political liberalism, as I argued in §2, cannot create a political order because it faces
the Conceptual Inconclusiveness Objection and both of the ways theorists could re-
spond to it fail. The Convergence Conception, as I argued in §3, cannot maintain a
political order because it faces the Verbal Agreement Objection and both of the ways
theorists could respond to it have their own problems.
The upshot of all this is that it motivates a general turn to political realism for
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a theory of political legitimacy. This is the task I take up in the next chapter where
I argue that extant conceptions of political realism also fail in various ways to show
how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order.
Chapter 5
The Instability of Political Realism
1 Introduction
In the last chapter I argued that conceptions of political liberalism are not adequate
theories of political legitimacy because they cannot show how reasonable people can
achieve a stable political order. I concluded that this motivates a general turn towards
political realism. The goal of this chapter is to show how, despite the fact that extant
conceptions of political realism – the Non-Domination and Restrained Domination
Conceptions – avoid the problems of political liberalism, they also fail to show how
reasonable people can achieve a stable political order.
Recall, from Chapter 1, I said the general strategy of political realism is that it pro-
poses that a political principle is legitimate if all reasonable people conclusively jus-
tify it as acceptable in a particular context. But, getting clear on the precise normative
standard being used is difficult. Political realism as a first-order normative theory of
political legitimacy is both heterogeneous and less developed than other approaches
to political legitimacy. Theorists have argued for a political realist theory of legitimacy
without clearly specifying what makes their theory a political realist one. With that
in mind, in the same way that political liberalism has been defined by extracting the
idea of public justification from its earliest proponents - largely Rawls – I will take a
similar strategy with political realism.
I will take what defines political realism as a theory of political legitimacy is its
use of the general normative standard Bernard Williams (2005: 3, 62–63, 135–138)
calls “meeting the Basic Legitimation Demand”. This is the idea that political legit-
imacy involves offering an “acceptable solution to the first political question”. This
involves justifying the political principles that are coercively enforced by an institu-
tional structure like the modern state to secure “order, protection, safety, trust, and
157
158 THE INSTABILITY OF POLITICAL REALISM
the conditions of cooperation”. When such political principles are justified they meet
the “Basic Legitimation Demand” or BLD.
The normative standard of ‘meeting the BLD’ is distinguished from the political
liberal’s standard of ‘public justification’ in three ways. The first way is that the objects
of justification are general political principles which prescribe the design of a society’s
basic institutional structure which comprises its “fundamental political framework”
(Sleat 2013: 154–155; Williams 2005: 4). Unlike the political liberal standard of ‘public
justification’ which can be applied to both political principles or context and issue
specific moral rules, meeting the BLD is squarely concerned with legitimating general
political principles.
The second way ‘meeting the BLD’ is distinguished from ‘public justification’ is
that the nature of the conclusive justification is context-dependent. This means the
facts that justify include both the content of people’s moral reasons and the context in
which reasonable people deliberate (Sleat 2013: 156; Williams 2005: 3). Again unlike
public justification, meeting the BLD allows facts about the context in which people
weigh reasons to justify political principles. This is understood broadly as facts about
the social world, its practices, other people and their deliberations.
The third way ‘meeting the BLD’ is distinguished from ‘public justification’ is
that the attitude towards the political principle that is justified is acceptance (Sleat
2013: 153; Williams 2005: 77–78, 135–138). This is a purely practical attitude towards
political principles which realists claim is exemplified by the actual practice of politics.
It is an attitude where reasonable people might show indignation and resentment to-
wards the principle, but nevertheless have sufficient moral reason to comply with it.
Political realists use the metaphor of games and contests that are won or lost to illus-
trate how one can accept the outcome of a contest, but nevertheless believe a different
outcome ought to have been realised.1 This attitude of acceptance in a contest sits be-
tween a full endorsement of a political principle as one’s own and a mere compliance
with it from fear of punishment. Rather, it is a matter of freely complying with a
principle.
For political realists, these three features provide theories of political legitimacy
that give “greater autonomy” to political thought and action (Williams 2005; Sleat
2013; Rossi 2019). It allows reasonable people to deal with their disagreements as they
truly are and therefore more realistically than political liberalism. Different concep-
tions of political realism then propose different ways a political principle can meet
the BLD. As we will see, political realists differ on the specific contexts that matter
1See Williams (2005: 13) and Sleat (2013: 139–145).
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for generating conclusive justifications. But, on all conceptions of political realism a
stable political order is achieved by all reasonable people’s balance of reasons provid-
ing them and continuing to provide them sufficient moral reason to accept a political
principle.
However, as I’ll argue in this chapter, Diverse Packages Theory’s explanation of
reasonable disagreement about justice shows that extant conceptions of political real-
ism cannot show how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order. To that
end, the rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In §2 I explain the Non-Domination
Conception of political legitimacy, why it fails to show how reasonable people can cre-
ate a political order, the responses available to political realists and my reply to each
of the responses. In §3, I explain how the Restrained Domination Conception works,
why it fails to show how reasonable people can create and maintain a political order,
the responses available to political realists, and my reply to each of the responses. The
upshot of all this is that it motivates the novel conception of political realism I pro-
pose in the next chapter.
2 Non-Domination Conception
The most prominent version of political realism is, what I call, the Non-Domination
Conception. On this conception, political realism’s normative standard of ‘meeting
the BLD’ is cashed out in terms of a convergence of reasonable people’s conclusive
reasons produced by the normalisation of their deliberations by their shared social
and cultural context. This convergence forms the grounds of stability on the Non-
Domination Conception. It claims to show how all reasonable people can have suf-
ficient moral reason to accept and continue to accept over time. In short, it shows
how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order. In this section I argue that
Non-Domination Conception cannot actually show this.
To that end, the rest of this section proceeds as follows. In §2.1 I lay out the Non-
Domination Conception of political legitimacy. In §2.2 I explain how the conception,
in light of Diverse Packages Theory, faces the Inconclusive Historical Interpretation
Objection. I consider a response political realists might make and argue the response
entails a descriptive theory of political legitimacy and so misses the point of this thesis
which is to find a normative theory of political legitimacy. In §2.3 I explain how the
conception faces the Structural Coercion Objection. I consider a response political
realists might make and argue the response fails because it would rule out processes
of convergence that are produced by luck or that are overdetermined by the use of co-
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ercive power. I conclude the Non-Domination Conception is inadequate because it
fails to show how reasonable people can create a political order given their reasonable
disagreements about justice.
2.1 The Theory of Political Legitimacy
The Non-Domination Conception of political realism is best summarised as:
Non-Domination Conception: A political principle is legitimate if 1) there is a con-
vergence of reasons amongst all reasonable people, in virtue of their interpre-
tations of the history of their society’s social and cultural circumstances, that
justifies accepting it, and 2) this convergence is not produced merely by the
coercive enforcement of the principle (Critical Theory Principle).
This is the theory that Bernard Williams (2005, 2002) first explicated as political re-
alism and what other theorists have defended as a distinct conception of political re-
alism (Horton 2010; Rossi 2013; Hall 2015; Freyenhagen 2011).2 It relies on two core
ideas. The first is that reasonable people interpreting the history of their society’s so-
cial and cultural circumstances is what allows them to all find some conclusive reason
to accept a political principle (Williams 2005: 11–13, 2002: 256–258). This is because
their deliberations are normalised by these interpretations of the history of a shared
social context. This ensures that the diversity in reasonable people’s reasons and their
weighing of them is reduced to the extent that their deliberations are sensitive to what
political principles they have sufficient reason to accept in this shared context rather
than endorsed as the ideal view of justice. The second idea is the Critical Theory Prin-
ciple which states that a convergence counts only if it is not a product of the coer-
cive enforcement of the political principle being justified (Williams 2005: 6, 89, 2002:
225–232). This avoids the cases where reasonable people live in social and cultural con-
texts of oppressive domination. It ensures reasonable people’s deliberations are made
freely rather than being merely dominated or oppressed by it. Those two ideas are
what, according to Williams and those that follow him, allows all reasonable people,
despite their reasonable disagreements about justice, to have sufficient moral reason
to accept a political principle that is coercively enforced and therefore achieve a stable
political order.
As I have already said, Williams argues reasonable people can create a political or-
der if reasonable people form normatively rich interpretations of the history of their
2Arguably Judith Shklar (1989) also defends such a conception with her sensitivity to historical con-
text and non-domination to legitimate a ‘liberalism of fear’. See Forrester (2012) for a good overview
of this issue.
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society’s social and cultural context that normalise their deliberations in a way that
allows them to reach a convergence of conclusive reasons. For Williams (2005: 11)
this process involves reasonable people deliberating about whether the political prin-
ciple in question “makes sense” as a valid prescription for an authoritative institu-
tional structure given their interpretation of the determinate historical facts that have
shaped and constituted their society’s social and cultural circumstances. This means,
according to Williams (2005: 11), in light of their historical interpretations of their
context, the political principle makes sense “as a legitimation of power as authority”.
When a political principle makes sense in this way it means the institutional structure
it prescribes is “an example of the human capacity to live under an intelligible order of
authority” given their interpretations. In short, it makes sense that the institutional
structure it prescribes is intelligible as an authoritative political order in their interpre-
tations. For Williams (2005: 13) the interpreting will be targeted at all sorts of facts
including, but not limited to, the “obscure mixture of beliefs (many in-compatible
with one another), passions, interests” that constitute the diverse conceptions of jus-
tice reasonable people hold. This sort of interpreting knits together an explanation of
a society’s history and allows people to evaluate whether a political principle “makes
sense” in their present social and cultural circumstances.
When a political principle “makes sense” in this way to reasonable people and
it is not the product of the coercive enforcement of the principle itself, it means rea-
sonable people have sufficient moral reason to accept the principle in their social and
cultural circumstances. When the historical interpretations are free from the influ-
ence of the coercive power enforcing the political principle it means reasonable people
can be assured the process of convergence is an authentic one which grounds a polit-
ical relationship rather than merely a form of successful domination where coercive
power justifies itself. The outcome of all of this is that the historical interpretation is
the grounds on which reasonable people’s balance of reasons provides them sufficient
moral reason to accept the political principle they are evaluating, regardless of what
political principle they endorse as their own.
Reasonable people can then maintain this political order because of the way the
historical interpretations are constantly updating, and also because the sort of politi-
cal principles being justified. To the first point, since the creation of a political order is
grounded in the interpretation of the history of reasonable people’s shared social and
cultural context, it means the political order will track any changes in that context. As
reasonable people judge a new social and cultural circumstance as significant enough
to feature in their normatively rich historical explanations, what they converge on
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will also change. A society can adapt to large cultural shifts. This means that reason-
able people will not be subject to political principles that were justified in social and
cultural circumstances far removed from the one they currently live in. The use of
coercive power under those circumstances would rightly be judged as oppressive and
illegitimate.
To the second point, even though the political order tracks reasonable people’s
shared social and cultural context it is not vulnerable to slight changes in context. This
is because the object of this justification is a general political principle for the design
of an entire institutional structure like the modern state rather than issue and context
specific rules as with the Convergence Conception of political liberalism. This means
that what people converge upon is comprehensive enough to apply beyond a specific
set of circumstances or issues. This avoids the Verbal Agreement Objection I pressed
against the Convergence Conception of political liberalism in Chapter 4. Reasonable
people’s balance of reasons can be maintained in the face of slight changes in social
and environmental circumstances since their balance of reasons supports accepting
the broad terms of a political principle that is coercively enforced.
To see an example of how the theory can achieve a stable political order consider
Williams’s example of liberalism. For Williams (2005: 9–10) the Non-Domination
Conception legitimates some form of liberalism in most western liberal democracies,
if not all societies on earth. This is because we currently live in the social and cultural
circumstances of “modernity”. The idea is that when reasonable people interpret the
determinate historical facts that constitute “modernity” – the religious wars, the pros-
perity of liberal institutions – they will conclude that liberal political principles make
sense as a valid prescription of an authoritative institutional structure whilst a reli-
gious theocratic political principle does not. This is because a coercive institutional
structure prescribed by liberal political principles is intelligible as an authoritative po-
litical order in their interpretations. As a result they have sufficient reason to accept
(but crucially not endorse or adopt) a liberal political principle if they are not liberals.
But, if we consider a different society in different historical circumstances, a lib-
eral political principle may not be legitimate. For instance, consider a deeply religious
society whose political culture has been shaped by foreign invasion, the imposition of
a foreign religion and a recently established liberal government. Now in this society,
according to the Non-Domination Conception, moderate natively-religious political
principles rather than liberalism would make sense as a valid prescription of a coer-
cive political authority because of the historical facts that have shaped that society’s
social and cultural circumstances. The reasonable people of that society will have had
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their ideas of self-determination, religious and political liberty shaped by the years of
foreign occupation, the imposition of what they see as a false religious and recently
life under liberal institutions. For them, a moderate natively-religious state would
be an example of an authoritative institutional structure and therefore they would
have sufficient reason to accept the natively-religious political principles even if they
themselves were of a different religion.
What political principles make sense as a valid prescription of an authoritative in-
stitutional structure will vary most when comparing society’s separated in time rather
than distance. Societies compared at a single instance in time will vary less because
historical events will most likely be shared. They will have been party to the same
wars, economic crises and intellectual movements. This is why Williams (2005: 9–10)
thinks some form liberalism and its political principles are the only things that make
sense for most real world contemporary societies. But of course, social and cultural
circumstances keep changing and people’s interpretation of them will keep changing
such that, whilst liberalism may be legitimate now it may not be in the future.
2.2 Inconclusive Historical Interpretations Objection
One problem with the Non-Domination Conception is that the way it proposes rea-
sonable people can converge on a political principle through their interpretations of
their society’s history will be inconclusive with respect to any particular political prin-
ciple. This is because as some realists have already pointed out the interpretations of a
society’s history will be the subject of reasonable disagreement in as much as anything
else. For instance as Sleat (2013: 121–123, 2010: 489–501) has argued, William’s exam-
ple of “modernity” is highly contested with marxists, anarchists, and existentialists
all providing their own interpretations of it. Sleat argues that “modernity” for the
marxists is characterised by economic oppression and alienation, for the anarchists
the growing power of the state to control and monitor individuals, and for the ex-
istentialists the rejection of religious metaphysics and a religiously defined “telos of
humanity”. This means the Non-Domination Conception faces a version of the In-
conclusiveness Objection that beset the Consensus Conception of political liberalism:
the Inconclusive Historical Interpretations Objection.
But what should really be worrying to realists is that this inconclusiveness is un-
likely to be particular to “modernity” or resolved by refining our historical interpre-
tive practices. Rather, it is what we should expect given Diverse Packages Theory as
the best explanation of reasonable disagreement about justice. Diverse Packages The-
ory predicts that differences in historical interpretation can happen in two ways. One
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way is that whilst focusing on a determinate set of historical facts they may pick on
different determinate facts as more or less relevant to their interpretation. This is
because they might judge different historical events as morally relevant to what jus-
tice requires given their divergent concepts of justice. Recall, from Chapter 3, this
is one of the crucial functions of a person’s concept. Possessing divergent concepts
causes people to use different sets of morally relevant considerations in their delibera-
tions. For instance, two people might conflict over whether the condition of working
women during World War 2 was a relevant historical event for deliberating about a po-
litical principle in their current social context. This would manifestly result in people
forming different and conflicting historical interpretations of their society’s current
social and cultural context.
Another way reasonable people differ in their historical interpretations is that
they may connect the same determinate facts into a narrative in different ways. This
is because they might diverge in a concept that affects the content of one of the rele-
vant deliberative considerations provided by the concept justice. This would cause
them to differ about the content of some historical event because they possess diver-
gent concepts related to individuals, groups and ideas in those historical events. For
instance, two people might conflict over the concept working poor. This would
again result in reasonable people forming different and conflicting historical interpre-
tations of their society’s current social and cultural context.
When historical interpretations differ in these two ways reasonable people will
have reasons filtered out in such a way that they do not have reason to accept political
principles other reasonable people have reason to accept. This is because if they pos-
sess and use diverse concepts of justice, as Diverse Packages Theory predicts, then
they will have different and conflict reasons filtered out in their deliberations. This
will lead them to find different political principles make sense as valid prescriptions of
an authoritative institutional structure. This means the core mechanism for normal-
ising the generation of a sufficient moral reason for all reasonable people to accept a
political principle fails because it is based on a consensus in justice-related judgements
about history.3 All this means that reasonable people will not all have conclusive rea-
son to accept the same political principle. As such the Non-Domination Conception
cannot show how reasonable people can create a political order.
Political realists may respond by arguing that the fact the we have seemingly sta-
ble western liberal democracies is evidence that people will form the same historical
3See Rossi (2013: 566–567) for a similar point about the role of consensus in the Non-Domination
Conception. Although Rossi seems to see it as a feature, rather than as a bug, of the view.
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interpretations of their social and cultural context. For instance, Hall (2015: 474)
argues that the ability of liberal regimes to order societies in a way that they have
prosperous economies without military turmoil all whilst holding political actors to
account shows that liberalism is the more realistically successful way of ordering polit-
ical institutions. He thinks that “even though some people will deny that liberalism
in Williamsian terms makes sense, if these complaints are to be politically convincing
they must offer some reasons for thinking that viable alternatives exist that will be
as good at ensuring order and the conditions of cooperation here and now”. Jubb
(2015: 923) best sums up this view when he says, “Unless enough people find liberal
political orders at least acceptable, they could not have survived”. The basic idea in all
of this is that the very formation and survival of liberal democracies over the last two
centuries shows that we have good reason to believe people will have the same if not
very similar historical interpretations despite their reasonable disagreements.
However, this response to the Inconclusive Historical Interpretations Objection
does not work because it misses the point of a normative theory of political legitimacy.
The Non-Domination Conception is proposing a theory about what makes political
principles legitimate, so that reasonable people can act according to them and achieve
a stable political order. But, pointing to seemingly stable states does not establish
that. Rather, it gets the order of explanation backwards. We need an explanation of
what makes those states stable. What Hall and Jubb would have to provide for that is
empirical evidence that shows reasonable people do not differ in their interpretations
of their society’s history. This would provide evidence that Diverse Packages Theory
does not show that people’s possession and use of divergent concepts would affect
how reasonable people form their historical interpretations. Moreover, western lib-
eral democracies do not provide this kind of evidence. In many of these seemingly
stable states, Diverse Packages Theory correctly predicts that there is a great deal of
reasonable disagreement about the justice of a society’s past. One need only look to
the debates in those countries about the historical status of their indigenous peoples,
the participation in past wars, and about how those countries were founded. All those
debates are replete with disagreements about the justice of historical events.
2.3 Structural Coercion Objection
Another problem with the Non-Domination Conception is that even when reason-
able people happen to converge in their conclusive reasons on a political principle, the
conception’s second condition will nearly always be violated. Most, if not all, reason-
able people live within some coercive institutional structure. That is the normal social
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circumstances for reasonable people. This means it is within the context of an existing
institutional structure that reasonable people will form historical interpretations of
their society’s social and cultural context and evaluate political principles. But, engag-
ing in historical interpretation within an existing institutional structure violates the
second condition of the conception itself. This is because people will be influenced by
the state’s structural coercion. This means the Non-Domination Conception cannot
actually create a political order.
The clearest example of this structural coercion is public education or even pri-
vate education regulated by the state. These are coercive measures that will influence
how people go about evaluating whether a political principle makes sense as a valid
prescription of a coercive institutional structure. This is because reasonable people
develop the very tools to make historical interpretations – their concepts – in com-
pulsory schooling. The nature of that schooling is largely out of their control and
coercively imposed on them. But, without that schooling they would not be able to
do the sorts of things the Non-Domination Conception supposes they can do to le-
gitimate political principles. According to the second condition all this would rule
out reasonable people’s process of reaching convergence.
In fact the only form of convergence that would count would be one generated
completely autonomously of the state’s coercive apparatus. At best this might be pos-
sible although highly unlikely given people rarely have independent access to the his-
torical facts of their own society. At worst, it is impossible because even if there is no
education related political institutions, people will still have education coercively im-
posed by their parents and guardians.4 This coercion would be regulated by the state
given it is the state the prescribes how much authority a parent or guardians has over
their children or wards. On this view it would be impossible for reasonable people to
satisfy the second condition.
In response, political realists might argue that the Non-Domination Concep-
tion’s second condition should not be understood as ruling out convergence that is
caused by any form of coercion. For instance, Williams (2002: 222–232), seemingly
anticipating the objection, offers a more precise reading of the second condition in
Truth and Truthfulness:
On almost any view of the matter, however, if one comes to know that
the sole reason one accepts some moral claim is that somebody’s power
has brought it about that one accepts it, when, further, it is in their inter-
est that one should accept it, one will have no reason to go on accepting
4Thank you to Derek Ball for pointing this out.
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it.
On this reading the second condition only rules out convergence caused by coercion
if it is also in the interest of the coercive power that people converge on the politi-
cal principle. This narrows the range of convergence processes the second condition
rules out to only those where some coercive power influences a reasonable people’s
deliberations as a way to further its interest to be legitimated. This would vindicate
historical interpretation as the basis of convergence because even if it is affected by the
state’s structural coercion it is only ruled out in case the state imposes an education
regime with the express intention to ensure reasonable people converge and hence
justify it. But, an education regime need not be administered this way and people
can be educated from childhood under a system that coercively educates them with
the intention of improving their lives generally or making them capable of evaluating
political principles no matter what principles they are.
Although this response goes some way to limiting the scope of the conception’s
second condition, as Sleat (2013: 118–120) has argued, it is implausibly optimistic
about how to assess the required counterfactuals. To see this consider two types of
cases, one where a state gets lucky and one where a state overdetermines people’s con-
vergence. In the first, let us say the state has two concurrent interests: an interest that
people converge on the political principle that it is attempting to enforce and an inter-
est in enabling people to develop and use their concepts effectively when reasoning
about which institutional structures to converge on. Let us say this state funds a com-
pulsory rigorous education system funded by coercive taxes which happen to always
result in reasonable people converging on the political principle that has been used to
set up the institutions that comprise the state and without the education system the
convergence would never happen. In short, even though it aims only at helping peo-
ple to improve their reasoning and their concepts it just so happens that its coercion
is crucial to being accepted. At best, the Non-Domination Conception is unclear on
what to do about a case like this which would make it indeterminate. At worst, it
would rule the state illegitimate which would be counterintuitive given the state was
only lucky that its interest to be legitimated was further.
A second case is when the state’s structural coercion overdetermines a convergence
process. Let us say that the state does have an interest in it being legitimated and that
it coerces to further that interest. The Non-Domination Conception would rule this
out. But, let us also say that without that coercion reasonable people would converge
on the political principle anyway. For instance, a society may have a long history of
homeschooling that would result in children growing up to converge on a particular
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political principle if there was no compulsory education regime. In this case it isn’t
clear why the convergence is ruled out when it is overdetermined since the coercion of
compulsory education makes no difference to what reasonable people converge on.
The point in all of this is that the initial motivation of the second condition – to
rule out the legitimation of oppressive coercive power – is not best served by appeal-
ing to the notion of coercion. Which political principles reasonable people accept
will inevitable depend on childhood education which will be coercively imposed in
one form or another. As it stands, the Non-Domination Conception, given the sorts
of convergences it would rule out, cannot plausibly show how reasonable people can
create a political order.
2.4 Conclusion
I have argued in this section that the Non-Domination Conception of political real-
ism cannot show how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order because
it faces two serious objections: the Inconclusive Historical Interpretations Objection
and the Structural Coercion Objection. With the Inconclusive Historical Interpre-
tations Objection I argued that the Non-Domination Conception will be inconclu-
sive in its justification of a political principle because Diverse Packages Theory shows
reasonable people possessing and using diverse concepts of justice will infect their
historical interpretations. With the Structural Coercion Objection I argued the Non-
Domination Conception would implausibly rule almost all political principles as il-
legitimate. In sum, the two objections give us good reason to think that the Non-
Domination Conception cannot plausibly show reasonable people how to create a
political order.
3 Restrained Domination Conception
As an alternative to the Non-Domination Conception, Matt Sleat (2013) has recently
proposed a novel conception of political realism which I call the ‘Restrained Dom-
ination Conception’. On this conception, political realism’s normative standard of
‘meeting the BLD’ is cashed out in terms of a convergence of reasonable people’s con-
clusive reasons produced by the normalisation of their deliberations by their individ-
ual contexts within a democratic procedure. This sort of convergence is what forms
the grounds of stability on the Restrained Domination Conception. It claims to show
how all reasonable people can have sufficient moral reason to accept a political prin-
ciple. In short, it claims to show how reasonable people can achieve a stable political
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order. In this section I argue that the Restrained Domination Conception cannot
actually show this.
To that end, the rest of this section proceeds as follows. In §3.1 I detail the Re-
strained conception of political legitimacy. In §3.2 I explain how, in light of Diverse
Packages Theory, the conception faces the No Simple Majority Objection. I consider
a response political realists might make and argue the response runs counter to the
conception’s motivations. In §3.3 I explain how the conception faces the Weak Re-
straints Objection. I consider two response political realists might make and argue
the responses undermine the motivation for the conception or, worse, undermine the
motivation for theorising about political legitimacy itself. I conclude the Restrained
Domination Conception is inadequate because it fails to show how reasonable people
can create or maintain a political order.
3.1 The Theory of Political Legitimacy
The Restrained Domination Conception of political realism can be best summarised
as:
Restrained Domination Conception: A political principle is legitimate if there is a
convergence of reasons amongst reasonable people, in virtue of their delibera-
tions as members of either the majority or minority in a democratic procedure,
that conclusively justifies it as a principle to accept.
This is the sort of theory, taking inspiration from Carl Schmitt and Chantal Mouffe,
Matt Sleat (2013) proposes as “liberal realism”. It relies on two core ideas. The first
idea is that the general political framework that underpins reasonable people’s delib-
eration should involve a democratic political constitution. This means that the soci-
ety’s constitution simply is a democratic procedure. The second idea is the distinction
between “friends”, “adversaries”, and “enemies” which defines the precise context
that different reasonable people occupy in a democratic political constitution. Specif-
ically, when reasonable people are friends and adversaries of a political principle they
share the set of “ends, values and moral commitments” the political principle realises,
whereas when they are enemies they do not. These two ideas then show when reason-
able people deliberate as friends, adversaries and enemies within a democratic polit-
ical constitution they can all find some conclusive reason to accept a political princi-
ple. This is because when friends and adversaries are the majority they have their ends,
values and moral commitments reflected in democratic outcomes, and the enemies,
despite being coerced by the majority, are coerced in a restrained way. As such the
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conception shows how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order. More-
over, this improves on the Non-Domination Conception by not assuming that the
convergence must rely on a consensus in historical interpretations, or that it cannot
be the result of any coercion at all.
According to the theory reasonable people can create a political order despite rea-
sonable disagreement about justice because reasonable people’s deliberations are nor-
malised by taking place under a democratic political constitution. As Sleat (2013: 169)
argues, the basic political framework under which reasonable people ought to delib-
erate is a “political and democratic constitution”. This follows the “political constitu-
tionalism” argued for by theorists like Richard Bellamy (2007) and Jeremy Waldron
(1999). The basic idea is that the constitution of the basic political framework is merely
the democratic procedure of elections and representative legislative assemblies. This
means all aspects of the institutional structure a political principle prescribes are im-
plemented on the basis of democratic majoritarianism. This is opposed to “legal con-
stitutionalism” where the constitutive elements of the institutional structure are set-
tled in a special type of law outside the purview of ordinary legislative procedures. Ex-
amples of this would include constitutional republics or monarchies where a special
form of law describes the constitutive arrangements of an institutional structure and
takes precedence over the democratic decision making of a legislative body. Under
political constitutionalism these constitutive elements are ordinary pieces of statue
law passed by majorities in a legislature.
Within this sort of constitution, Sleat argues that reasonable people will be either
“friends”, “adversaries” or “enemies” of a political principle. For Sleat (2013: 153–154),
“friends” are those reasonable people whose specific interpretation of their ends, val-
ues and moral commitments are realised by a political principle. In the case of “adver-
saries”, Sleat (2013: 155) argues, that political principle only realises a plausible inter-
pretation of their ends, values and moral commitments. In the case of “enemies” Sleat
(2013: 160–164) argues, that political principle does not realise any interpretation of
their ends, values and moral commitments at all.
Sleat (2013: 155–157) then argues that when the friends and adversaries of a politi-
cal principle are the majority, their deliberations will necessarily provide them conclu-
sive reason to accept it. This is because they will share a set of “ends, values and moral
commitments” which given the political and democratic constitution they will pur-
sue and realise. Friends will straightforwardly have conclusive reason because they in
fact endorse the political principle. Adversaries on the other hand will have conclu-
sive reason to accept because the principle realises at least a plausible interpretation of
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their ends, values and moral commitments, and they still occupy a place within the
democratic procedure of their society. This means they can participate in democratic
politics and shift the institutional structure to pursue their specific ends, values and
moral commitments, in which case they would become “friends” and others “adver-
saries”.
This will leave the “enemies” of the political principle in the minority with the
ends, values and moral commitments of the majority imposed on them by coercive
political power. Sleat argues (2013: 160–161, 172–174) they will have conclusive reason
to accept the political principle because their deliberations are normalised by recog-
nising their context within a democratic political constitution. This means recognis-
ing that the political principle imposed on them is a result of authoritative collective
decision making. The decision is authoritative because as members of the collective
body that makes democratic decisions, the majority support for a political principle
grounds its authority. This normalisation provides them with conclusive reason to
accept the political principle even though they do not share any of the ends, values
and moral commitments it realises.
But, this raises the question of why this convergence will not result in political
principles that simply dominate the minority? And, as a result justify the minority
of “enemies” to resist their domination. After all even though they are part of the
collective decision that authorises principles it seems they do not have any influence
on what those principles are. As such even though they can create a political order
with their fellow reasonable people what will maintain that order?
To that end, the theory shows how this political order can be maintained with the
idea that a political and democratic constitution entails the majority being committed
to both a “transformative constitutionalism” and a “restrained” domination of the
minority. The first idea is that in a democratic political constitution, when a political
principle is enforced by the majority, it is permissible for that majority to coercively
transform enemies and adversaries into friends. Sleat (2013: 158–160) explains this by
adopting Stephen Macedo’s notion of a “transformative constitutionalism” whereby
reasonable people may permissibly maintain a political order by using public schools
to shape the “intellectual development and moral character of future citizens” and re-
stricting people’s opportunities in the political sphere. For example, reasonable peo-
ple may permissibly mandate that the religious publicly proclaim “the practical mean-
inglessness of their religious convictions as a condition of being allowed to serve.” It
is not hard to imagine other ways a state might try to transform the beliefs of its ene-
mies like the use of publicly funded museums and historical exhibits or state funded
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media organisations. All this is to strengthen the support for the political principle
being implemented and reduce the number of enemies.
The second idea that shows how reasonable people can maintain a political order
is that despite aiming to transform enemies, the friends and adversaries ought to re-
spect them as reasonable people. This involves placing substantive limits on how the
majority enforces a political principle. The majority show they are “restrained mas-
ters” by placing limits to the coercive costs involved in transforming enemies. This
involves enforcing a political principle with coercive costs that are consistent with
that political principle and consistent with the aim of maintaining order. According
to Sleat (2013: 161–164) this will mean enforcing a political principle only by plac-
ing additional coercive costs (over and above simply being made to live according to
values one doesn’t agree with) on enemies when they try to actively destabilise the
political order. For instance, although Sleat (2013: 163) argues that what precisely
those costs can permissibly be is a “heavily contextual matter which will equally rely
upon a huge degree of political judgement”, he does say that some measures might
include “denying them equal rights, representation, toleration, liberty”. If they do
not actively destabilise the political order, even through the democratic procedure,
they must be treated as if they were friends and adversaries of the political principle
being imposed on them. This is what maintains their balance of reasons for accept-
ing the political principle. They are not subject to coercive costs beyond what friends
and adversaries are subjected to if they do not accept society’s institutions. They are
respected by the majority as if they were a part of it.
All in all, the Restrained Domination Conception shows how reasonable people
can achieve a stable political order by cashing out meeting the BLD with the idea of
reasonable people’s deliberations being normalised by their political context. Specif-
ically a political context defined by deliberating with a political and democratic con-
stitution and by whether they are friends, adversaries or enemies of a given political
principle. The idea is that when friends and adversaries are in the majority and en-
emies are in the minority their balance of reasons provides them all have sufficient
moral reason to accept and continue to accept a political principle.
3.2 No Simple Majority Objection
One problem with the Restrained Domination Conception is with its use of the idea
of a democratic political constitution. In proposing how reasonable people can create
a political order, the conception assumes a society will always contain a simple major-
ity of friends and adversaries such that they all share a set of ends, values, and moral
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commitments. But, there is no reason to assume this. Democratic procedures can
plausibly involve only pluralities of people who share ends, values, and moral com-
mitments. For instance, it is entirely plausible that a society is split into groups of
40%, 30% and 30% with each group sharing a distinct set of ends, values, and moral
commitments that is incompatible with the others. In such a case the Restrained
Domination Conception cannot justify any political principle and therefore cannot
create a political order. The society would be in a state of political paralysis unable
to actually legitimate any political principle. Under the democratic and political con-
stitution there would always be a majority that are enemies of a political principle
and therefore do not have sufficient moral reason to accept it. Any attempt to imple-
ment a political principle would be voted down by a majority. The point here is not
that this will always be the case, but that the Restrained Domination has to assume it
will never be the case when it is entirely plausible that the constituency of reasonable
people is split into three distinct groups who are “enemies” to each other. In such a
case the Restrained Domination Conception cannot achieve a stable political order
because there will always be a majority who do not have sufficient moral reason to
accept a political principle. This is what I call the No Simple Majority Objection.
Political realists might be tempted to say that all the Restrained Domination Con-
ception needs is an additional condition that reasonable people have to find a set of
ends, values, and moral commitments that can garner majority support and only the
principles that realise that set are candidates for being pursued coercively. But, even
this is too optimistic given Diverse Packages Theory. For that shows there is no rea-
son to think such a majority will exist amongst reasonable people. This is because a
person’s ends, values, and moral commitments are determined by one’s concept of
justice. One’s concept provides the set of values that a person then weighs up as
deliberative considerations for forming beliefs about what ends and moral commit-
ments justice requires. But, Diverse Packages Theory shows reasonable people can
disagree by possessing and using divergent concepts of justice. Put simply it is en-
tirely plausible there will be a number of concepts of justice with none shared by a
simple democratic majority. There may only be concepts of justice shared by plu-
ralities of people. As such there may not be a way to search for some very minimal set
of ends, values, and moral commitments that at least a simple majority share.
A more worrying point is that this sort of response undermines the entire moti-
vation of the Restrained Domination Conception. The additional condition on find-
ing a simple majority is a substantive constraint on candidate political principles that
tries to engineer a minimal consensus. But, one of the main motivations for the Re-
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strained Domination Conceptions was to move away from relying on a consensus to
achieve stability. The whole point of the general motivation to move away from the
Non-Domination Conception was that, given reasonable disagreement about justice,
consensus will not necessarily be found at the level of conceptions, historical interpre-
tations or, most importantly, at the level of concepts. Simply adding a condition that
reasonable people ought to look for a minimal consensus could also be used by these
other conceptions in which case there would be no reason to consider the Restrained
Domination Conception in the first place since we have explained away the problem
that led to it. To that end, I submit the way the Restrained Domination Conception
proposes reasonable people can create a political order is subject to a very plausible
counterexample.
3.3 Weak Restraints Objection
Even in cases where a simple majority does exist, another problem with the Restrained
Domination Conception is that the restraints on how friends and adversaries of a po-
litical principle can coercively enforce it when they are a majority, are too implausibly
weak. Specifically they are weak in two crucial ways. The first way is that they permit
treating a minority of reasonable people as if they were unreasonable for the sake of
stability. The second way is that they permit friends and adversaries to undermine
the conception’s own basis for stability by moving away from majoritarianism itself.
Both of these ways show the restraints on friends and adversaries are weak enough
that reasonable people cannot maintain their balance of reasons to accept a political
principle.
To see how the restraints are too weak in the first way, consider a case where the
reasonable people who are “enemies” of the majority’s political principles believe in
reforming the democratic majoritarian constitution. This is perfectly plausible ac-
cording to Diverse Packages Theory’s explanation of reasonable disagreement about
justice. The “enemies” could plausibly possess a concept of justice that includes
a traditional legal constitution as an end or moral commitment in opposition to a
democratic political constitution. According to the Restrained Domination Concep-
tion these enemies have to be treated as if they were friends and adversaries by being
part of the democratic procedure and only being dominated (over and above having
to live according to political principles they disagree with) when they actively under-
mine the political order.
But this is a problem because when minorities actually try to be full members
of their society this will count as a threat to the stability of the institutional struc-
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ture. This is because one aspect of taking part in democratic procedures is to make
arguments and persuade people to try and change their minds as what ends, values
and moral commitments ought to be realised. If minorities try to reform the demo-
cratic procedure itself and introduce some statutory barriers like judicial review, or
some form of constitutional counter balance to the majoritarianism at the heart of
the democratic and political constitution it will count as destabilising the political
order. In these cases the Restrained Domination Conception permits political princi-
ples that aim to stop them for the sake of stability. For instance Sleat (2013: 162–163)
says on the topic of how a state might protect its stability:
Protecting the stability of its political framework is therefore a legitimate
aim of any (legitimate) political association and can be pursued via a
number of different means, part of which can often include imposing
additional costs, psychological and physical, on its enemies.
But more specifically on the topic of those who threaten the basis of stability on
the Restrained Domination Conception through democratic means, Sleat (2013: 163)
says, “How the liberal state should respond to those who are pursuing the democratic
route is going to be a heavily contextual matter which will equally rely upon a huge de-
gree of political judgement,” and that “it is an open political question whether those
who seek to undermine or destabilise the liberal state via democratic means should be
subject to additional costs or not.” So despite enemies being treated as if they were
friends and adversaries of the structure, if they behave as if they were by actually us-
ing their concepts to persuade their fellow citizen it will be legitimate for the structure
to use coercive power to stop them. In the Restrained Domination Conception this
could potentially take the form of restrictions on people’s right to take part in demo-
cratic procedures or worse highly coercive measures to transform enemies into adver-
saries. The point here is not that the Restrained Domination Conception guarantees
this will happen, but that its measures to prevent it are too weak. There is nothing in
the Restrained Domination Conception that prevents the coercion of the state spi-
ralling out of control once it detects minorities as threats to stability. In the end the
restraints on majoritarianism are too weak such that they permit coercive measures
that give enemies a reason to resist the state’s coercion. It permits coercive measures
that puts them in the bind of either being passive participants or being branded as
threats to the stability of the political order.
To see how the restraints are too weak in the second way, consider a case where
the majority of the reasonable people – the friends and adversaries – decide that ma-
joritarian decision-making is unjust and they vote, as a majority, to move to a differ-
176 THE INSTABILITY OF POLITICAL REALISM
ent system entirely. Perhaps they decide to move to a constitutional monarchy or a
super-majoritarian constitution. On the Restrained Domination Conception’s own
reading this is both perfectly legitimate, and yet destabilising because the basis of how
reasonable people create a political order is that a majority of them support a political
principle within a democratic procedure. The point here is that the Restrained Domi-
nation Conception cannot show the majority how they can sustain their own political
order. They can, legitimately, at any time decide to move away from the Restrained
Domination Conception’s own ideas about what is sufficient for political legitimacy.
This is implausibly self-undermining. This is because Restrained Domination Con-
ception’s own basis for stability – the majoritarianism and its restraints – are not jus-
tified to the majority. The point in all of this is that, even when reasonable people are
treated as friends, adversaries and enemies with the restraints the Restrained Domi-
nation Conception proposes, it permits actions that do not maintain their balance of
reasons.
Political realists might respond to the Weak Restraints Objection in two ways. To
the problem that majoritarianism is not restrained in any way from abolishing itself,
realists could respond that all we need is a substantive constraint that the majority
cannot change the majoritarian basis of stability.
To the problem that the restraints on majoritarianism permit treating enemies
who use democratic procedures as unreasonable, political realists could respond that
in fact these are just cases where the majority do actually show restraint, but these ef-
forts are not recognised or appreciated. Sleat (2013: 172–174) argues that the majority
will have to resign themselves to the fact that some adversaries and enemies will not
appreciate or experience the restraint of the state. But, showing restraint in pursing a
political principle is important because the restraints explain to the majority why their
rule is legitimate. The fact that the minority are not addressed by this justification or
accept that these are successful justifications does not detract from the fact that these
are justifications nonetheless.
But I do not think either of these responses avoids the objection. With the first
response, adding a constraint that the majority cannot change the majoritarian basis
of stability commits the conception to a form of legal constitutionalism which the
conception was trying to avoid in the first place. The whole motivation for the demo-
cratic and political constitution was that a procedural framework could allow people
to have disagreements and make authoritative decisions without any consensus on
ends, values or moral commitments.
With the second response, defending the restraints on majoritarianism as actually
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merely restraints on the ruling majority commits the Restrained Domination Con-
ception to the idea that some reasonable people do not have coercive political power
actually justified to them. This fundamentally concedes the motivation for offering a
theory of political legitimacy in the first place. This is because it would mean treating
reasonable people the same as unreasonable people which would defeat the whole
motivation of trying to theorise about political legitimacy given the existence of rea-
sonable disagreement about justice. If the restraints on domination do not justify
a political principle to reasonable people then there is no sense in which they have
conclusive reason to accept it. They are merely oppressed.
This speaks to the general problem of the Restrained Domination Concep-
tion’s strategy of trying to weave a line between oppressive domination and non-
domination using the idea of restrained domination. The idea is supposed to sit
between compliance purely out of fear of coercion and compliance for purely non-
coercion related reasons. But, one of the accepted sources of instability is the oppres-
sion of the individual by the coercion of the state and the way this coercion justifies re-
sistance. Simply accepting that sometimes oppression is permissible undermines the
whole project of theorising about political legitimacy and showing how reasonable
people can achieve a stable political order. To make sense of the idea of restrained
domination, political realists have to provide some account of how the restraints on
domination are acceptable to those dominated. Otherwise, there is no distinction be-
tween it and oppressive domination.
3.4 Conclusion
I have argued in this section that the Restrained Domination Conception of polit-
ical realism cannot show how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order
because it faces two serious objections: the No Simple Majority Objection and the
Weak Restraints Objection. With the No Simple Majority Objection I argued that
there is no reason to assume, as the conception requires, that there will be a simple
majority of people who share a set of ends, values, and moral commitments. As such
the conception cannot show how to create a political order and would not avoid po-
litical paralysis. With the Weak Restraints Objection I argued that the restraints on
how the majority of reasonable people can implement political principles are weak in
two problematic ways. They permit treating the minority of reasonable people as if
they were unreasonable for the sake of stability, and the majority to implement polit-
ical principles that move their society away from majoritarianism itself. This means
that the restraints on coercive power are too weak for reasonable people to maintain
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a political order.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that although my argument against political realism mo-
tivated a general shift to political realism, we have good reason to reject extant concep-
tions of it. In §2 I argued the Non-Domination Conception cannot show reasonable
people how to create a political order because it depends on a consensus on historical
interpretation and a constraint that forbids almost any convergent agreement reason-
able people might reach. In §3 I argued that the Restrained Domination Conception
cannot show reasonable people how to create a political order because it assumes that
there will always be a simple majority of people who share a set of ends, values and
moral commitments. I also argued it cannot show how to maintain a political order
because it permits, treating reasonable people as if they were unreasonable, and the
majority in a society to move away from the conception’s own basis for stability.
The upshot of all this is that it motivates a new conception of political realism.
One that sheds any use of consensus, and provides more plausible restraints on how
political principles can be enforced. This is the task I take up in the next chapter where
I sketch the Dual Convergent Conception and show how it can provide the sort of
theory of political legitimacy we require, namely one that can actually achieve a stable
political order.
Chapter 6
Sketch of a New Political Realism
1 Introduction
Let us step back for a moment. In the last two chapters I argued against political
liberal and political realist conceptions of political legitimacy on the metric of stability.
I argued that these extant conceptions either cannot show how reasonable people
can create a political order or they cannot show how reasonable people can sustain a
political order. There are two important lessons from this negative argument.
The first is that convergence rather than consensus provides the most promising
way for a theory of political legitimacy to show reasonable people can create a political
order. It is the best way for a theory of political legitimacy, whether of the political
liberal or political realist variety, to show how reasonable people can have sufficient
moral reason to coordinate on a coercively enforced political principle or rule. On bal-
ance, theories of political legitimacy have struggled the most to show how reasonable
people can create a political order when they have relied on an element of consen-
sus. This is what the Conceptual Inconclusiveness Objection and Problem of Uni-
Perspectival Rights in Chapter 4, and Inconclusive Historical Interpretations Objec-
tion and No Simple Majority Objection in Chapter 5 showed. When a theory of po-
litical legitimacy uses consensus or incorporates some measure of consensus into its
use of convergence it cannot show how reasonable people can create a political order.
Given that, I submit, convergence understood as an agreement between reasonable
people for some conclusive reason, is the most promising way to show how reasonable
people’s balance of reasons can provide them sufficient moral reason to coordinate on
a political principle.
The second lesson is that political realism’s normative standard is the most promis-
ing way for a theory of political legitimacy that uses convergence to show how rea-
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sonable people can maintain a political order. This is because the three distinctive
features of political realism’s normative standard of ‘meeting the BLD’ (Basic Legiti-
mation Demand) have proven to be the best way of avoiding the objections I made
against the use of convergence in political liberalism.
Recall, political realism’s normative standard of ‘meeting the BLD’ is different
from political liberalism’s ‘public justification’ in three ways. The object of justifica-
tion is a political principle as opposed to issue and context specific rules. The facts that
conclusive justification depends on are the content of people’s moral reasons and the
context in which they deliberate. The attitude that is justified is to practically accept
a political principle as opposed to endorsing it as a true principle of justice or moral
rule.
Those three features avoid the Verbal Agreement Objection and the Conceptual
Integrity Objection I made in Chapter 4. Allowing reasonable people’s context to
normalise their deliberation meant that reasonable people with highly diverse sets of
moral reasons could still find a way to agree given their shared context. Focusing on
merely justifying acceptance as opposed to endorsement meant that the threshold
for any individual to reach conclusive justification was lowered. Both features made
it possible for conceptions of political realism to show a reasonable could then con-
verge on something as general as political principles. All this avoided the Verbal Agree-
ment Objection because it showed how political principles that realise conceptions of
justice comprehensive enough to deal with changing social and environmental con-
texts could be justified. It also avoided the Conceptual Integrity Objection because it
shows how reasonable could converge and accept a coercively enforced political prin-
ciple without having to give up using the concepts they believe accurately represent
their social world. Given that, I submit, political realism’s normative standard is the
most promising way for a theory of political legitimacy that uses convergence to show
reasonable people can maintain a political order.
These lessons show that what’s needed is a political realist theory of political le-
gitimacy that commits more thoroughly to convergence. A theory which, unlike the
Non-Domination and Restrained Domination Conceptions, sheds any use of con-
sensus, but makes use of the political realist normative standard. With that in mind,
in this chapter, I propose a novel conception of political realism – the Dual Conver-
gent Conception. The theory combines elements of the political liberal’s social equi-
librium version of convergence with political realism’s normative standard. The next
section details this theory and the following two sections consider and respond to two
objections that could be made against it.
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2 Dual Convergent Conception
The general strategy of the Dual Convergent Conception is to combine the political
realist normative standard of ‘meeting the BLD’ with the insights from political liber-
als like Gerald Gaus on the mechanism of convergent agreements. The way I propose
to do this is with the central organising idea of ‘ordered moral warfare’. This is a state
of affairs constituted by two convergent agreements, or a ‘dual convergence’. First,
a convergence on a political norm that prescribes a procedure for selecting a politi-
cal principle to be coercively enforced, and second on a set of political principles that
concern the design of a society’s basic structure of social institutions. In the following
subsections, I detail what the idea of ordered moral warfare is, how it achieves a sta-
ble political order, and its comparative advantages over other conceptions of political
realism.
2.1 The Idea of Ordered Moral Warfare
By a “political norm that prescribes a procedure for selecting a political principle” I
have in mind a particular type of social norm, which prescribes a particular type of
activity. The particular type of social norm I have in mind are the norms that Jon
Elster (2014: 53) calls “strategic norms” which constitute a coordination equilibrium
where all conform to the norm as the best rational response to how others act or di-
versity in general. However, unlike Elster the political norm I have in mind is not left
to “the closed circles of government and parliament” or without any moral content.
Rather they share a feature of what Elster calls “non-strategic norms” in that they are
unwritten rules that “regulate the basic machinery of politics” which are enforced by
the citizenry at large for moral reasons.1 The best way to think about the type of polit-
ical norm I have in mind is as the sort of social norm described by political liberals like
Gaus (2016: 180–183) which involves a practice of accountability where there is an on-
going recognition of a structure of reciprocal normative obligations and expectations
in relation to some behaviour.
However, the political norm that is part of the idea of ordered moral warfare is not
a norm about any social or political activity. Rather it is more limited in scope. It is
about how a society ought to transition from some coercively enforced political prin-
ciple to another. In short, they are unwritten rules that prescribe a procedure for so-
cially selecting some political principle (I will say more about what these principles are
1It should be plain here that the political norms I have in mind are the sort of mixed cases that
Elster (2014: 59) mentions in passing.
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soon). For most societies this political norm will prescribe some collective decision-
making procedure like representative democratic voting, or hierarchical council deci-
sions, or even nation-wide referendums. But, the key in all these procedures is that
their ultimate normative force and coercive enforcement does not depend on their
place in a written constitution or enforcement by the current political power. That
would merely lead to a regression in explaining how the particular procedure is justi-
fied because the question would always arise about how the written constitution was
justified. Given that, the procedure’s justification depends on a political norm’s un-
written structure of obligations and expectations demanding that people participate
in that procedure, select a political principle with it, and comply with its results. Al-
though such a norm may then be codified as law to reinforce the practice of account-
ability, this fact is not what its normative force or coercive enforcement ultimately
depends on. Rather it would depend on the political norm’s unwritten structure of
obligations and expectations conferring moral significance on that piece of law as a
law that ought to be obeyed. That is why the collective decision-making procedures
are ultimately enforced by citizens at large. They are enforced by citizens rebuking
each other for not participating, for not complying with its results or in the most ex-
treme circumstance violently enforcing the norm when they are violated. When the
political norm is codified as law, its enforcement by the political authority is contin-
gent on the fact that there is a convergence on the political norm which prescribes the
procedure that selected the political principle that the political authority acts on.
By a “set of political principles” I mean a set of general principles for the design
of a society’s basic structure of social institutions. These principles may be a part of
conceptions of justice, or they might be discreet principles related to specific insti-
tutional actions. The important point is that they are not issue and context specific
moral rules like the social norms that featured in the Social Equilibrium view of con-
vergence from Chapter 4. They are general principles that for many people may be
part of a conception of justice that designs society’s basic social institutions.
Now, the heart of the idea of ordered moral warfare is that a convergent agree-
ment on a particular political norm that prescribes a procedure for selecting a polit-
ical principle and a convergent agreement on a particular set of political principles,
together allow for a unique political principle that is a member of that set to be con-
clusively justified to all reasonable people. This is because the convergent agreements
involve for all reasonable people the conclusive justification of a political norm and
the conclusive justification of a set of principles, respectively. Individually, the justifi-
cations of the set of principles and the political norm only provide pro tanto justifica-
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tion of a particular political principle. But, together the two convergent agreements
provide two reasons that together conclusively justify accepting a particular political
principle. The agreements are then jointly sufficient for reasonable people’s balance of
reasons providing them and continuing to provide them over time, sufficient moral
reason to accept a political principle. This is because the particular political principle
is conclusively justified based on the conclusive justification of the set of principles of
which it is a member and the political norm that prescribes the procedure that selected
it out of that set.
In effect this is a general form of proceduralism where a particular political prin-
ciple is justified based on the fact that it is the output of some procedure for selecting
political principles. Except in our case, what justifies that output is not that the pro-
cedure embodies some morally relevant property of fairness, reasonableness, or ratio-
nality. But rather, that the output is the result of a procedure prescribed by a political
norm that all reasonable people have converged on, and that the output is within a set
of political principles that all have converged upon. The fact of those two convergent
agreements are what justify a particular political principle when it is selected.
But of course that simply raises the question of how conclusive justification is
achieved in those two convergent agreements. I propose that the facts that conclusive
justification depends on in the two agreements are cashed out in terms of a restriction
on what counts as a relevant moral reason and a context that normalises the delibera-
tion of those reasons. The restriction on what counts as a relevant moral reason, like
the Social Equilibrium view of convergence, is a weak restriction on the content of the
reasons that reasonable people’s concept of justice provides for deliberating about
political norms and political principles. The restriction is that people’s reasons ought
to be mutually intelligible to others as a moral reason for the person who possesses
it. This involves a mutual recognition that a person’s moral reasons makes sense as a
moral reason given that person’s concept of justice. This excludes reasons that rea-
sonable people might profess to have that are completely out of character or unrelated
to justice.
The context that normalises the deliberation of the mutually intelligible moral
reasons varies depending on the convergent agreement people are trying to reach.
When reasonable people converge on a political norm, the context that normalises
their deliberation is the historical status quo political principle they live under, and
the political principles that are actually advocated for in their particular society. In
short, the context is the political culture of their society. However, when reasonable
people converge on a set of political principles, the context that normalises their de-
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liberation is their earlier convergent agreement on a political norm. Although all this
will be fleshed out in more detail later, for now it suffices to illustrate the way contexts
will be one of the facts that conclusive justification depends on.
The result of conclusive justification depending on those facts is that it models
how reasonable people’s balance of reasons provides, what I call, ‘compliance-for-the-
right-reasons’. This is compliance not out of fear of coercion, the restraints on dom-
ination, or what makes sense given some interpretation of the history of a society’s
social and cultural circumstances. Rather it is compliance from the moral reasons
their concept of justice provides within the context of a society’s political culture,
and the context of the convergent agreement upon a particular political norm. All
this yields the following theory:
Dual Convergent Conception: A political principle is legitimate if 1) it is selected by a
procedure prescribed by a political norm that a convergence of mutually intel-
ligible reasons amongst all reasonable people and the context of their political
culture, conclusively justifies accepting, and 2) it is a member of a set of po-
litical principles that a convergence of mutually intelligible reasons amongst
reasonable people and their context of having converged on a particular polit-
ical norm, conclusively justifies accepting.
The two convergent agreements together constitute a state of affairs of ‘ordered moral
warfare’. This is a state of affairs, contra political liberals like Gaus (2016) and Val-
lier (2019), where politics is a form of warfare where reasonable people constantly
attempt to change which political principles are selected by acting according to a po-
litical norm for that very purpose. As such, reasonable people do not live under the
utopian goal of “moral peace” where, according to Vallier (2019: 2–3), people live in
a society “with a high degree of justified social trust”. Rather, they live in a form of
warfare that is ordered within the bounds of morality because reasonable people’s
balance of reasons provides compliance-for-the-right-reasons. Neither does the the-
ory aim to describe society’s “public moral constitution” which according to Gaus
(2016: 177–180) is the basic framework of moral rules that underlies reasonable peo-
ple’s shared social world. Rather, the theory explains the political legitimacy of a co-
ercively enforced political principle such that reasonable people can achieve a stable
political order by acting on it. To that end, the two conditions jointly show how rea-
sonable people’s balance of reasons can provide them, and continue to provide them
over time, sufficient moral reason to accept such a political principle. In short, the
convergent agreements are jointly sufficient for the legitimacy of a political principle.
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2.2 Achieving a Stable Political Order
As I have said, what shows reasonable people can achieve a stable political order on the
Dual Convergent Conception is the idea of ordered moral warfare. This idea is consti-
tuted by two convergent agreements and a particular sort of deliberation that models
how reasonable people can reach those agreements. The idea shows how reasonable
people can create a political order despite reasonable disagreement about justice by
cashing out reasonable people’s conclusive justification to accept a political principle
as a combination of two separate justifications. These two separate justifications are
the conclusive justification to accept a political norm that prescribes a procedure for
selecting a political principle and the conclusive justification to accept a set of political
principles.
These conclusive justifications are modelled in a similar way to how political liber-
als like Gaus (2016: 208–226) model convergent agreements on social norms that are
moral rules. We start with a deliberative model in which reasonable people’s conclu-
sive justifications are modelled by their deliberations about coordinating on political
norms and political principles. Beyond this, the Dual Convergent Conception di-
verges in three important ways. The first way is that the political norms and political
principles they deliberate about are those that are openly endorsed presently and in
the history of their society’s political culture. This does not mean that they need to
know all the norms and principles every held by any reasonable person. Rather, they
need only consider those that have been openly advocated for and therefore brought
to their attention by their fellow citizens. The second way is that reasonable people’s
deliberations are affected by both the reasons provided by their concepts of justice
and the social contexts they occupy when deliberating. The third way is that the atti-
tude that is conclusively justified is acceptance and not endorsement. Although there
is no lexical priority to the agreements, there is a causal priority and so I will begin
with explaining the convergent agreement on the political norm first.
The convergent agreement on a political norm that prescribes a procedure for se-
lecting political principles is modelled, as in Gaus’s model, in terms of comparative
preferences. This means it is modelled in terms of the political norms reasonable peo-
ple prefer over a justificatory baseline (Gaus 2011b: 304–310). However, since I aim
to model how people have conclusive reason to accept a political norm rather than
endorse it as their own, there will be two justificatory baselines. The preferences over
these two justificatory baselines are cashed out in terms of two choices that reasonable
people make about political norms. The idea is that these two choices will model the
way the reasons a reasonable person’s concept of justice provides are normalised by
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a shared social context. This normalisation is what allows reasonable people with di-
verse concepts of justice to make the deliberations necessary to converge and accept,
rather than endorse, a political norm.
The first choice people make is to ask themselves: “Given the historical status
quo political arrangement, which political norms do I prefer over a political norm
that enforces a procedure of remaining at the status quo for the forseeable future?”.
This yields a set of political norms that reasonable people prefer over the uncertain-
ties that come with living in an unjustified political order. This is a preference not
over a chaotic state of nature or state of “blameless liberty” as Gaus (Gaus 2011b: 322)
has in his model. Rather it is a preference over an unjustified status quo order that
may be overthrown or continue by oppression without justification. As such, it is a
preference over the uncertainties of living under a political order that all do not have
conclusive reason to coordinate on.
The second choice people make is to ask themselves: “Given the set of political
principles openly endorsed now and in the history of my society’s political culture,
which political norms do I prefer over a political norm that enforces a procedure
of randomly selecting political principles?” This further narrows the set of political
norms from the first choice, to a set of political norms that reasonable people prefer
over the uncertainty of having to live under political principles merely selected at ran-
dom. It models a preference over having no control of the political order one lives
under even though it would be justified.
The outcome of both choices is, I submit, a set of political norms that a reason-
able person has conclusive reason to accept. Importantly, this does not mean they
have conclusive reason to accept a particular political norm over all others in the set.
Rather, it means they have conclusive reason to accept any of the political norms in
the set over all the other political norms openly endorsed presently and in the history
of their society’s political culture. This is because they have evaluated these norms
according to their concept of justice and the social contexts mentioned in the an-
tecedent of the two choices above. As such, the set only includes those norms that
a reasonable person could coordinate on over political norms that enforce the un-
justified status quo political order, or enforce a procedure gives them no control over
whether they live in a justified or unjustified political order. In short, the choices yield
the set of political norms that a reasonable person is willing to reconcile on given they
value living in a stable political order and value achieving it by controlling their social
world rather than by pure luck.
To move beyond the individual perspective and model how all reasonable people
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can converge on a political norm we then take the overlap of every reasonable person’s
individual set. This overlap yields the set of political norms that all reasonable people
have conclusive reason to accept, or as I will call it the social acceptance set of norms.
Of course, every reasonable person will have a personal ranking of the political norms
within the social acceptance set of norms. This is because they are not indifferent be-
tween the political norms in the social acceptance set of norms. But, even if the strength
of the reason to accept varies between the norms, each individual person has at least
pro tanto reason to accept every single norm in the set over any other political norms.
This is what it means for the set to be the set of political norms that all reasonable
people have conclusive reason to accept.
But of course, a set of political norms that all have conclusive reason to accept is
not enough. To avoid disorder what reasonable people require is to coordinate on a
single norm and therefore conclusive reason to accept a particular political norm in
the social acceptance set of norms over all others. Here again political realism can take a
cue from political liberals like Gaus. The model supposes that reasonable people will
recognise that some choice needs to be made within the social acceptance set of norms
and so they will converge through their path-dependent social interactions that are
particular to their society and its history. There are many ways this can be specifically
modelled, ranging from 2-person iterative impure coordination games, to N-person
iterative impure coordination games within a single generation.2 However the conver-
gence is modelled, in reality it will be an emergent social evolutionary phenomenon.
It will involve many historically extended social interactions where convergence on a
single political norm will depend on socially contingent events in a society’s history
that relate to political norms. For example, revolutions, civil wars, constitutional con-
ventions, high court decisions, referendums and even the publishing of philosophical
works will all affect how reasonable people in a particular society will weigh the bene-
fits of coordinating with the political norm others are coordinating on. At the end of
all this every reasonable people can have some conclusively reason for accepting the
same political norm despite their reasonable disagreements about the ideal political
principles.
With that explanation of the convergent agreement on a political norm in place,
we are in a position to see how the convergent agreement on a set of political prin-
ciples is supposed to work. This convergence is modelled in much the same way as
the convergent agreement on a political norm. It is modelled in terms of the political
2See Gaus (2011b: Ch. 7), and Vanderschraaf and Skyrms (2003) on these models. See also Shotter
and Sopher (2003) on empirical evidence for these results.
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principles people prefer over two justificatory baselines. Except, now there are two
important differences. The first difference is that the object of justification is a set of
political principles out of the political principles openly endorsed presently and in the
history of their society’s political culture. The second difference is that people’s delib-
erations are modelled in terms of two choices reasonable people make in light of the
social context of the convergent equilibrium on a particular political norm they have
already reached. In short, the convergent agreement on a political norm about the
procedure for selecting a political principle becomes a shared context that normalises
the reasons reasonable people’s concept of justice provides. This normalisation is
what allows them to make the deliberations necessary to converge on a set of political
principles.
The first choice they make is to ask themselves: “If the political norm we have
converged on enforces a procedure that does not select the political principle I conclu-
sively endorse, then which political principles do I prefer over any possible random
principle?”. The answer to that question yields the set of principles an individual
prefers over the uncertainty as to which political principles will be selected, given the
certainty it will not be the one a person conclusively endorses. This is not a prefer-
ence over a state of nature, or state of no justified political principles at all. Rather,
it is a preference over simply having some principle being selected with no regard for
whether it conforms to one’s concept of justice or not. It is a preference over hav-
ing no control of how close one’s society can approach the political principles one
conclusively endorses.
The second choice reasonable people make is to ask themselves: “If the political
norm we have converged on enforces a procedure that does select the political princi-
ple I conclusively endorse, then which political principles do I prefer over any possible
random principle?”. The answer to that question further narrows the set of princi-
ples to the principles an individual prefers over the uncertainty as to which political
principles could possibly be selected, given the principle they conclusively endorse is
currently selected. This, again, is not a preference over a society returning to a state
of nature, or state of no justified political principles at all. It is a preference over hav-
ing no control of how far one’s society could stray from the political principles one
conclusively endorses.
The outcome of both choices is, for every reasonable person a set of political prin-
ciples they have conclusive reason to accept. Importantly, this does not mean they
have conclusive reason to accept any particular principle in the set over all others.
Rather, it means they have conclusive reason to accept any of the political principles
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in the set over all the other principles openly endorsed presently and in the history
of their society’s political culture. This is because they have evaluated these principles
according to their concept of justice and the social contexts mentioned in the an-
tecedent of the two choices above. As such, the set will only include principles that, a
reasonable person could coordinate on whether her favoured ideal political principle
– the one she has conclusive reason to endorse – is or is not selected. In short, the
choices yield the set of principles that a reasonable person is willing to reconcile on.
However, much like the convergence on political norms, to move beyond the in-
dividual perspective and model how all reasonable people can converge on a particular
political principle we first take the overlap of every reasonable person’s individual set.
This yields the social acceptance set of principles, which is the set of principles that all
reasonable people have conclusive reason to accept. But of course, every reasonable
person will have a personal ranking of the principles within in the social acceptance set
of principles. They are not indifferent between the political principles given they are
evaluating them based on their concepts of justice and the contexts mentioned in
the two choices above. Nevertheless, even if the strength of the reason to accept varies
between the principles, each individual person has at least pro tanto reason to accept
every single principle in the social acceptance set of principles. This is what it means for
the set to be the set of political principle that all reasonable people have conclusive
reason to accept.
But of course, a set of political principles that all have conclusive reason to accept
is not enough. To actually create a stable political order reasonable people need to
coordinate on a particular political principle. Therefore they need to have conclusive
reason to accept a particular political principle in the social acceptance set of principles
over all others. Here, on the Dual Convergent Conception, political realists need not
rely on any social evolutionary mechanism. Rather, we can rely on the earlier con-
vergence on a political norm. It is the fact that a particular political principle within
the social acceptance set of principles is selected by the procedure prescribed by the
converged upon political norm, that then conclusively justifies that particular political
principle.
The obvious question at this stage is, why should we think the social acceptance
set of principles will not be a null set? Why will reasonable people not hold out and
judge that in both of the choices they do not prefer any principles other than those
they conclusively endorse? Why should we think reasonable people will be pushed
to reconcile? I propose two reasons.
The first reason is that reasonable people’s deliberations will be normalised by
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their shared social context. Reasonable people will be pushed to converge rather than
diverge in the deliberative process because they are not relying purely on the consid-
erations their concepts of justice categorise as morally relevant. Rather they also
rely on the shared social context of having converged on a particular political norm
that prescribes a procedure for selecting political principles. This social context helps
reasonable people converge by providing information relevant for constraining their
deliberation.
One sort of information the social context provides is about which principles are
consistent with and support the ideals of citizenship that reinforce the political norm
they have converged on. This means that reasonable people will have some shared rea-
sons to accept or reject principles. But importantly they will not share them because
they have the same concept of justice. They will share the reasons because they can
recognise how certain principles will conflict with or undermine the political norm
they have converged on. Such principles would undermine an equilibrium they as
reasonable people have arrived at.
Another sort of information the social context provides is about which political
principles are more or less likely to be selected. This means that reasonable people can
construct shared predictions of what kind of social world they would end up with
when making their choices. Combined with their own concept of justice, reason-
able people can evaluate the value of accepting political principles that range across
the spectrum of easy to realise, to too difficult to realise. For instance, if the procedure
the political norm prescribes is “yearly referenda”, then a person can predict which
political principles are more or less likely to be selected. They can make predictions
according to the way the questions on the referenda ballot are decided and given the
political principle their fellow citizens advocate for. These judgements will constitute
a shared set of predictive models of which political principles are likely to be selected
and which are not. These models will help reasonable people weigh their considera-
tions to a sufficiently similar degree. It encourages them to reconcile towards political
principles that are more likely to be selected than not, but also towards those that do
not conflict with their concept of justice so much that they do not have reason to
accept it.
Aside from the shared information, the second reason reasonable people will
be pushed to reconcile is that as reasonable people they can recognise two facts
about their social and biological reality that underpin their political life. These social
facts have largely been ignored in contemporary political philosophy because of the
propensity to idealise reasonable people too much away from actual people. How-
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ever, this ignores the ‘production’ and ‘decline’ of reasonable people. These facts are
important if a theory of political legitimacy is about how actual reasonable people
ought to act.
The first social fact is that reasonable people do not emerge into existence fully
formed as reasonable people. They are initially children who live a largely non-
autonomous life. To develop into reasonable people they depend on other au-
tonomous people to develop their capacity for a conception of justice. Experimen-
tal evidence shows that children innately possess moral concepts, but these remain
crude and applied in highly localised ways. More global judgements that transcend
“the enemy of my enemy is my friend” evaluations require socialisation to develop
these innate moral concepts into the sort that can be of use in political life.3 Reason-
able people cannot develop their conception of justice without depending on others
to develop their innate conceptual tools. Children require socialisation and care to
develop their moral concepts of the right and the good to then go on to become rea-
sonable people. Reasonable people are forced to recognise the social interactions that
satisfy this sort of dependence is itself a good. This is because neither they nor anyone
could have a conception of justice without it.
The second social fact is that reasonable people as adults do not maintain their
capacity for a conception of justice forever. Even though they might hold on to their
capacity for a conception of the right, they require, much like children, socialisation
to maintain their capacity for adopting and exercising ideas of what is good for them
and others. Experimental evidence shows lower political participation, general cog-
nitive decline, declining physical and mental health, and most importantly not being
able to conceive of what is good in one’s social world, are all linked to social isolation.4
Adults require others to take an interest in how their lives turn out and their views
of the good, to maintain their capacity for a conception of the good. As such, rea-
sonable people are forced to recognise the social interactions that satisfy this sort of
dependence is itself a good. This is because they could not sufficiently maintain their
capacity for a conception of the good without it.
Recognising the two social facts I have sketched forces reasonable people to recog-
nise a unique good of political legitimacy: the good of a social union of mutual depen-
dence. This is a social union in which reasonable people are able to depend on those
they disagree with for developing and maintaining their capacity for a conception of
3See Railton (2017), Hamlin (2015: 504–506, 2017), and Nucci et al. (2017). See also Bloom and
Wynn (2016) for a good overview of the issue and further evidence.
4See Reilly (2017) and Evans et al. (2018), and most importantly Cacioppo and Patrick (2009: 14–15,
100–108, 180–181).
192 SKETCHOF A NEW POLITICAL REALISM
justice. As such, it embodies a deep form of reciprocity where each reasonable person
makes the development and maintenance of each people’s capacity for a conception
of justice part of their conception of the good. This is a good that all reasonable peo-
ple can recognise. This is because it is a social union that allows them and those they
care about to have the social interactions that help them develop and maintain their
capacity for a conception of justice.
Recognising the good of a social union of mutual dependence gives reasonable
people reason to reconcile. It is only by reconciling that reasonable people avoid a
scenario where they and those they care about fail to develop and maintain their ca-
pacity for a conception of justice. To depend on others to help those we care about
to develop and maintain a capacity for a conception of justice requires that one is
willing to coordinate on political principles that do not realise one’s own conception
of justice. This is because we cannot expect those who disagree with us to make the
development and maintenance of people’s capacities part of their conception of the
good if we do not at least value their ability to realise their conception of justice. We
must be ready to see how we could coordinate on political principles we do not en-
dorse. This is because coordinating on political principles that realise other people’s
conceptions is the only rational way to expect them to help us when we require it.
Likewise, for others to coordinate on the political principles that realise our con-
ception of justice requires us to develop and maintain the capacity for conceptions
of justice in the people that other reasonable people care about. This is the case even
though we can be assured these other people may settle on conceptions we disagree
with. This means we must be ready to reconcile by tolerating the development of
capacities in others who we disagree with. This is the only way to expect others to rec-
oncile and coordinate on the political principles that realise our conception of justice.
In sum, reasonable people will reconcile because they recognise the good of a so-
cial union of mutual dependence. This reconciliation will then, in the model I have
sketched, provide them with sufficient moral reason to accept a political principle
and therefore create a political order. This is because, despite the depth and breath of
reasonable disagreement about justice, each reasonable person will have a mixture of
two reasons that together provides them conclusive reason to accept a political princi-
ple. They will have a conclusive reason to accept the political norm that prescribes the
procedure that selects a political principle, and a conclusive reason to accept the set
of principles from which the procedure selects a principle. Taken together, when the
procedure prescribed by the political norm, which reasonable people have converged
on, selects a political principle that is a member of the set of principles, which they
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have also converged on, all reasonable people have sufficient moral reason to accept
that political principle. To that end, the theory shows how reasonable people can
create a political order.
But as we have seen throughout this thesis creating a political order is not enough.
A theory of political legitimacy also has to show reasonable people how to maintain a
political order. The Dual Convergent Conception shows this through three features
inherent to the idea of ordered moral warfare. These features show how the political
order the theory creates can resist the endogenous and exogenous forces that disturb
reasonable people’s balance of reasons. They show how reasonable people can con-
tinue to have sufficient moral reason to accept the political principle over time.
The first feature is that the object of justification is a general political principle
rather than merely a context and issue specific moral rule. This means the conver-
gence on it is resistant to slight changes in social and environmental circumstances.
Convergence on a political principle involves a convergence on a general view of how
to construct social institutions. This sort of convergence will involve considerations
on various issues and across various contexts. This avoids the Verbal Agreement Ob-
jection that plagued the use of convergence in political liberalism. This is because what
is converged on is meant to apply across various contexts. Slight changes in context
do not cause the agreement to break down.
The second feature is that the convergent agreement on the political norm is rein-
forced every time a political principle is selected by the procedure prescribed by the
political norm. This is because the institutional structure the principle realises will
seek to promote and strengthen reasonable people’s agreement on the political norm.
Those who conclusively endorse the political principle will seek to endorse certain ide-
als of citizenship that will promote compliance with the political norm. This of course
does not mean they will enforce a political norm no matter what occurs or how much
the social and environment context related to the political norm changes. Rather it
merely adds a degree of rigidity to the convergent agreement on the political norm.
The third feature, is that the convergent agreement on the set of political prin-
ciples involves an inherent toleration of other people’s concepts of justice. This
means none of the principles, once realised, produce their own instability. This is
because one of the choices that modelled people’s deliberations was which political
principles they prefer over any random principle when the principle they conclusively
endorse is selected by the procedure prescribed by the political norm. This means that
one of the considerations that feature in people’s deliberations is the principles they
could tolerate when the principle they endorse according to their concept of justice
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is deselected and their society selects another competing principle. In simple terms
they had to deliberate about which principles they could tolerate once they had ‘won
the political contest’ the political norm constitutes. When all reasonable people de-
liberate in this way, the set of political principles they all have conclusive reason to
accept is a set that all can tolerate and therefore will not aim to rule out or erase when
their political principle is selected. This allows reasonable people to exercise their au-
tonomy to use the concepts they believe represent the world accurately. They can
categorise their social world according to their concepts and advocate for the political
principles they justify endorsing. When a political principle they do not endorse is
selected by the procedure prescribed by the political norm, they can be assured they
do not have to endorse it as their own, or that their advocacy for the political princi-
ples they do endorse will not be suppressed. They merely have to practically accept
the political principle whilst still being permitted to argue against its implementation
and advocate for their preferred political principles.
In sum, the Dual Convergent Conception shows how reasonable people can
achieve a stable political order with the idea of ordered moral warfare. That central
organising idea is constituted by two convergent agreements. The way deliberation is
modelled in each and the particular way the agreements are related, show how reason-
able people can have and continue to have sufficient moral reason to accept a political
principle that is coercively enforced.
2.3 Comparative Advantages
Importantly the way the Dual Convergent Conception achieves a stable political
order has a number of comparative advantages over other conceptions of political
realism. On the first advantage, recall the Inconclusive Historical Interpretation
Objection and the No Simple Majority Objection. The former was that the Non-
Domination Conception relied on a consensus in reasonable people’s historical inter-
pretations. The latter was that the Restrained Domination Conception relied on a
consensus in reasonable people’s concepts of justice to the extent there was always
at least a majority of people who shared a set of ends, values and moral commitments.
But, there was no reason to think that either form of consensus would exist between
reasonable people. As such I concluded that both the Non-Domination Conception
and Restrained Domination Conception could not show how reasonable could cre-
ate a political order. However, the Dual Convergent Conception avoids both of those
objections. It does not employ any degree of consensus on a historical interpreta-
tion or on justice. Rather it only requires reasonable people recognise a type of social
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union that is necessary for them and those they care about to develop and maintain
a conception of justice, as a good.
On the second advantage, recall the Structural Coercion Objection against the
Non-Domination Conception. The crux of the objection was the idea that if one for-
bids any convergence that is caused by coercion, as the Non-Domination Conception
does, this would rule almost all political principles or rules illegitimate. This would
then mean that no political order, or almost no political order, could ever be created.
However, the Dual Convergent Conception does not apply any constraints on how
convergence may permissibly be produced that is linked to coercion. Rather it only
requires that reasonable people have conclusive reason to accept a political norm and
a set of political principles on the basis of their concepts and their social context. This
accepts that reasonable people’s social worlds are complex systems where avoiding any
form of coercion is impossible, but nevertheless grounds the justification of political
principles in the content of their moral reasons and the context in which they use
them to deliberate.
Thirdly, recall the Weak Restraints Objection I made against the Restrained Dom-
ination Conception. The crux of that objection was that explaining the legitimacy of
coercively enforced political principles by the fact that it is the output of democratic
majoritarian decision-making offered no real restraint on the sort of political order
the majority could create. They could dominate the minority which tries to change
the political order by democratic means, or move away from majoritarianism as the
basis of the political order itself. As such, the conception cannot show how reason-
able people can plausibly maintain a political order. However, the Dual Convergent
Conception avoids this objection by committing to stronger constraints on the use
of coercive power. It is committed to the impermissibility of coercively enforcing any
political principle that, is not selected by the procedure prescribed by the political
norm or, is not within the set of political principles that all have sufficient reason to
accept. This means that the political order is more easily maintained given it can only
be changed by a procedure prescribed by a converged upon political norm, and only
changed in accordance with political principles from a set that has been converged
upon. The dual convergences provide a certain level of rigidity to the political order.
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3 Modus Vivendi Objection
One objection political liberals might have is that the Dual Convergent Conception
is nothing but an elaborate description of a modus vivendi.5 That is to say, the idea
of “ordered moral warfare” in which reasonable people have sufficient moral reason
to accept a political principle involves a commitment to coordinate based on a contin-
gent balance of forces. This is because as soon as a group of reasonable people have the
means to take power and realise the political principles they endorse, they will. After
all they do not coordinate because they have sufficient moral reason to endorse a po-
litical principle understood as internalising a political principle as one’s own. Rather
they coordinate because they have sufficient moral reason to accept it which is under-
stood as a purely practical attitude of freely complying with a political principle. As
such, when they need not accept a political principle they have no reason to comply.
But, so the objection goes, this is not the sort of stability reasonable people should
strive for. This is a political order predicated entirely on the contingent fact that no
group of reasonable has enough resources to oppress their fellow citizens. It is not sta-
ble because people have reason to endorse it, but rather purely for the instrumental
reason that one cannot successfully dominate those they disagree with.
This objection has some merit when put against political realists. Some have
flirted with the idea of cashing out political legitimacy with a modus vivendi where
people converge for purely reasons of self-interest.6 However, in the case of the Dual
Convergent Conception, the objection misreads what the idea of “ordered moral war-
fare” is. The convergent agreements that constitute it do not involve people converg-
ing for reasons related to not being able to overpower their opponents. Rather rea-
sonable people converge based on the considerations provided by their concept of
justice, the social context they occupy, and the need to achieve the good of politi-
cal legitimacy. This means they recognise given their own concept of justice, and the
fact of reasonable disagreement about justice that achieving the good of political legit-
imacy requires reconciliation in the long term. Without it there is no real possibility
that, they and those they care about can develop and maintain their capacities for a
conception of justice, and in turn realise the political principles they endorse.
The objection also ignores the point that one of the agreements that constitute
“ordered moral warfare” involves a convergence on a political norm. This agreement
5See Rawls (2005: 146–149) for the canonical political liberal view of a modus vivendi and its prob-
lems.
6See Horton (2010: 437–442). See also Sleat (2013: Ch. 4) for an overview of this move by some
political realists.
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involves reasonable people accepting a set of procedures or social practices that re-
quires them, at some stage, to relinquish power and have society transition to enforc-
ing different political principles. In short, the convergence on the political norm re-
sists the temptation to impose the principles that one’s concept of justice supports
as soon as one has the power to do so.
4 Conceptual Integrity Objection
Another objection political liberals might have is that, one of my objections to the
Convergence Conception of political liberalism in Chapter 4, applies equally to the
Dual Convergent Conception. Recall, I objected that the Social Equilibrium version
of the Convergence Conception faces the Conceptual Integrity Objection because it
threatens people’s conceptual integrity. I argued that it curbs people’s autonomy to
use the concepts they believe represent reality accurately. But, in proposing the Dual
Convergent Conception I adopted a Social Equilibrium model for how reasonable
people can converge on a political norm. It seems political liberals could then respond
that this will involve violating people’s conceptual integrity as much as I claimed it
would in the case of modelling reasonable people converging on social norms. If I
deny that people’s conceptual integrity is not violated in converging on a political
norm I have no grounds for objecting that it will in the case of social norms and so
the Dual Convergent Conception and the political liberal Convergence Conception
are on equal footing.
This objection, however, ignores the nature of the political realist normative stan-
dard the Dual Convergent Conception uses. Specifically, it ignores how in the politi-
cal realist’s normative standard of “meeting the BLD”, the attitude elicited by conclu-
sive justification is acceptance, and not endorsement. This means that on the Dual
Convergent Conception, the convergence on the political norm is an agreement on
accepting a political norm. As such it does not threaten a person’s conceptual integrity
because they are not having to endorse a political norm for reasons of social pressure.
They do not have to internalise the political norm as their own ideal political norm.
Rather they merely have to freely commit to it as a political norm to comply with. As
such they will have sufficient moral reason to accept a political norm, but at the same
time endorse their ideal political norm and advocate for their society to converge on
it.
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5 Conclusion
I started this thesis with what Rawls (1999: 514) says in the following passage about
the sort of perspective that underwrites the normative force of his arguments:
The perspective of eternity is not a perspective from a certain place be-
yond the world, nor the point of view of a transcendent being; rather it
is a certain form of thought and feeling that rational persons can adopt
within the world. And having done so, they can, whatever their gen-
eration, bring together into one scheme all individual perspectives and
arrive together at regulative principles that can be affirmed by everyone
as he lives by them, each from his own standpoint. Purity of heart, if
one could attain it, would be to see clearly and to act with grace and
self-command from this point of view.
I believe we have now reached where Rawls hoped to. We have arrived at a theory,
or at least a sketch of a theory, that tells us how to act from the perspective of eter-
nity. That is, from the perspective of reasonable disagreement about justice itself. The
Dual Convergent Conception I have argued for prescribes how reasonable people,
when they take seriously the reasonable disagreement about justice between them-
selves, ought to go about achieving a stable political order.
I defended this theory on the basis of a Disagreement to Legitimacy argument.
This involved first finding the best explanation of reasonable disagreement about jus-
tice. After arguing against extant explanations I proposed Diverse Packages Theory as
the best explanation of reasonable disagreement. This is the theory that says what best
explains why reasonable people make conflicting judgements about the institutions
and outcomes that justice requires, is that reasonable people possess and use diverse
concepts and conceptions of justice.
I then proceeded to find the theory of political legitimacy that, given Diverse
Packages Theory, can show how reasonable people could achieve a stable political or-
der. That is, a theory that can show how reasonable people’s balance of reasons can
provide them and continue to provide them sufficient moral reason to coordinate
on coercively enforced political principles or rules. After arguing against extant con-
ceptions of political liberalism and political realism I proposed the Dual Convergent
Conception of political realism as the theory of political legitimacy that can achieve
that. This theory combines elements of the Social Equilibrium view of convergence
with the political realist normative standard for justification into the central organis-
ing idea of ordered moral warfare. By doing this the theory shows how reasonable
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people who disagree so deeply that they possess divergent concepts of justice can live
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